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Malicious Software (malware) attacks across the internet are increasing at an alarming rate.
Cyber-attacks have become increasingly more sophisticated and targeted. These targeted attacks
are aimed at compromising networks, stealing personal financial information and removing
sensitive data or disrupting operations. Current malware detection approaches work well for
previously known signatures. However, malware developers utilize techniques to mutate and
change software properties (signatures) to avoid and evade detection. Polymorphic malware is
practically undetectable with signature-based defensive technologies. Today’s effective
detection rate for polymorphic malware detection ranges from 68.75% to 81.25%. New
techniques are needed to improve malware detection rates. Improved detection of polymorphic
malware can only be accomplished by extracting features beyond the signature realm. Targeted
detection for polymorphic malware must rely upon extracting key features and characteristics for
advanced analysis. Traditionally, malware researchers have relied on limited dimensional
features such as behavior (dynamic) or source/execution code analysis (static). This study’s
focus was to extract and evaluate a limited set of multidimensional topological data in order to
improve detection for polymorphic malware. This study used multidimensional analysis (file
properties, static and dynamic analysis) with machine learning algorithms to improve malware
detection. This research demonstrated improved polymorphic malware detection can be achieved
with machine learning. This study conducted a number of experiments using a standard
experimental testing protocol. This study utilized three advanced algorithms (Metabagging
(MB), Instance Based k-Means (IBk) and Deep Learning Multi-Layer Perceptron) with a limited
set of multidimensional data. Experimental results delivered detection results above 99.43%. In
addition, the experiments delivered near zero false positives. The study’s approach was based on
single case experimental design, a well-accepted protocol for progressive testing. The study
constructed a prototype to automate feature extraction, assemble files for analysis, and analyze
results through multiple clustering algorithms. The study performed an evaluation of large
malware sample datasets to understand effectiveness across a wide range of malware. The study
developed an integrated framework which automated feature extraction for multidimensional
analysis. The feature extraction framework consisted of four modules: 1) a pre-process module
that extracts and generates topological features based on static analysis of machine code and file
characteristics, 2) a behavioral analysis module that extracts behavioral characteristics based on
file execution (dynamic analysis), 3) an input file construction and submission module, and 4) a
machine learning module that employs various advanced algorithms. As with most studies,
careful attention was paid to false positive and false negative rates which reduce their overall
detection accuracy and effectiveness. This study provided a novel approach to expand the
malware body of knowledge and improve the detection for polymorphic malware targeting
Microsoft operating systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Malware (malicious software) represents a significant problem for today’s highly
networked and distributed computer systems (Cesare & Xiang, 2010). In general,
malware is used to represent a variety of annoying or hostile software programs
specifically designed to access, interrupt or establish communication channels, and/or
perform data exfiltration from compromised computer systems without the owner’s
informed consent (Kumar, S., Rama Krishna, C., Aggarwal, N., Sehgal, R., & Chamotra,
S., 2014). The ability to detect malware is a major challenge due to the proliferation and
complexity for detecting malware across a wide range of endpoints throughout the
enterprise (Qu & Hughes, 2013). The growth of malware threats continues to far exceed
the security industry’s projections and estimates (Qu & Hughes, 2013). According to the
McAfee Labs Threat Report (2014), the security company collected over approximately
235 million malware samples in the first quarter of 2014. In 2015, McAfee estimated
that the company collected over 3 million new samples a day (McAfee, 2016). A majority
of samples collect were detected by McAfee’s worldwide sensor network protecting
computer systems and networks for both commercial and Government organizations
(McAfee, 2014). These samples were collected based on the suspicious activity or
behavior of the malware by typical network protection devices and security appliances
(McAfee, 2014). The unprecedented growth of new malware increased by 174% for the
same quarter from the previous year (2013) and exceeded an additional 100 million new

samples (McAfee, 2014). McAfee’s 2015 Threat Report stated that malware rose by
13% in first quarter (McAfee Labs, 2015). Advanced detection methods to detect new
malware continues to be a major challenge for security researchers and commercial
security companies given the growth and sophistication of malware (Qu & Hughes,
2013).
The ability to detect and classify malware provides a means to identify and stop
the proliferation of malware across the network. Today’s detection relies upon signatures
of known malware to identify malware at the network and host (Cesare & Xiang, 2011).
Signature detection of advanced malware is complicated by polymorphism (Muhaya,
Khan, & Xiang, 2011). However, signature detection alone does not provide adequate
protection for networks and end points from polymorphic malware. The McAfee Threat
Report (2016) stated that on average the security saw almost 40 million new malware
samples in each quarter for 2015.
In order to understand the malware threat landscape – it is helpful to understand
the various types of malware and the motivational factors driving malware development.
Malware is often developed for a specific purpose to attack or disrupt a specific target or
environment (Richardson, 2011). Typically malware aims to steal information,
compromise sensitive networks, and establish launch points for future attacks (Brenner,
2008; Chu, Holt, & Ahn, 2010; Wall, 2012) . The term “malware” includes viruses,
Trojan programs and other malicious tools installed on hosts or endpoints to automate
some type of compromise that may lead to more sophisticated or complex intrusions
(Brenner, 2008; Richardson, 2011; Wall, 2012). Another type of malware – botnets
extends this capability and combines multiple aspects of existing malware into a single
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program enabling hackers to form a network of infected computers world-wide (Bächer,
Holz, Kotter, & Wicherski, 2005). Botnets can provide a foothold to create a number of
attacks ranging from the distribution of spam, denial of service attacks, and advanced
network scanning (Bächer et al., 2005). There has been significant research involved
with malware and role it plays in cybercrimes and the financial impact attacks play on
organizations (Bächer et al., 2005; Wall, 2012). Additional research has been involved
with the social factors that influence the creation, distribution, and use of malware in the
hacker community (Chu et al., 2010). Sophisticated malware enables hackers to sell
access or steal information from their botnets across the world (Bächer et al., 2005).
Botnets have revolutionized attacks on infrastructures and has advanced the targeted
attack on organizations (Chu et al., 2010). Hackers have established forums and Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) to sell and distribute malicious software, stolen data, and hacking tools
that enable less skilled malware developers to gain direct access to advanced malware
services (Chu et al., 2010).
Ransomware has become major malware challenge within the last few years
(McAfee Labs Threats Report, 2016). Ransomware better known as “scareware” has
become quite popular with cyber criminals (Kharraz, Robertson, Balzarotti, Bilge, &
Kirda, 2015). Most ransomware is polymorphic in nature (McAfee Labs Threats Report,
2016). Ransomware malware and the criminals operating the malware see to take
advantage of people’s fear of releasing private information, losing critical data, or facing
irreversible hardware damage (Kharraz et al., 2015). In most cases ransomware locks or
encrypts the victims’ computers until they make a payment to unlock or re-gain access to
their data (Kharraz et al., 2015). Ransomware has been on the malware landscape for
over 10 years, however the volume of these attacks has dramatically increased over the
3

last few years - 500% in 2013, 550% in 2014 and nearly 600% in 2015 according to
Kaspersky’s Threat Report (2016). The Crypto locker ransomware has been detected on
over 750,000 computers in the United States (Gostev, Unuchek, Garnaeva, Makrushin, &
Ivanov, 2016). Ransomware attacks have migrated from individuals to organizations
such as healthcare/hospitals and local governments. Once such ransomware case
involved an entire police department who had to pay the ransom in order to unlock or to
decrypt the departments document repository (Gostev et al., 2016). This has led to new
energy for detecting polymorphic ransomware and has mobilized many of the leading
security vendors to share findings because of the levels of sophistication and the current
ineffective defensive techniques (Gostev et al., 2016).
In order to improve detection advances in malware classification and detection are
needed to provide better end-point protection. Malware detection has traditionally been
largely signature-based (Qu & Hughes, 2013). These signatures are based on the hashing
of the malware files, executables or binaries (Sulaiman, Ramamoorthy, Mukkamala, &
Sung, 2005). Detection is then based on the a-priori signature or hash of the complete
binary or partial characteristics of byte sequences of known malware samples (Wüchner,
Ochoa, & Pretschner, 2014). Security vendors collect, analyze and create extensive
repositories of malware signatures that are used for detection within anti-virus and other
security protection. Signature-based detection continues to be one of the main tools used
for detection on commercial anti-virus (Wüchner et al., 2014). However, signature based
detection suffers from several major limitations. The first major limitation is speed. New
malware released into the wild will not be detected until the signature is captured by
some security mechanism and the executable/binary analyzed. In reality, once the
file/binary has been captured it can take weeks for one of the many security vendors to
4

publish the malicious reputation for a specific file. Unfortunately, polymorphic malware
can be developed and distributed via the internet across the world in minutes and hours
(Mandiant Research, 2014). Polymorphic malware can then self-generate new signatures
in order to appear to security devices as a new file. These new signatures will need time
to be discovered, analyzed (determined malicious or benign) and released by commercial
security vendors for protection (Szor, 2005). Signature-based defense will always suffer a
time gap between the release of a new or unknown malware types, determination of
maliciousness by the security community and signatures for the corresponding malware
(Wüchner et al., 2014). Unfortunately, it is during this time gap that the malware goes
undetected, reaches the intended targets and propagates itself throughout compromised
networks.
Malware developers understand the time gap and exploit malware determination
frequency cycle referred to as “catch, analyze, deploy” (Wüchner et al., 2014). The
challenge for malware researchers is to shorten this gap or approach the problem from a
different perspective (Cesare, Xiang, & Zhou, 2007). The second limitation of signaturebased detection is polymorphism. Polymorphic malware is an umbrella term used to
refer both polymorphic and metamorphic malware (Campo-Giralte, Jimenez-Peris, &
Patino-Martinez, 2009). Polymorphic and metamorphic malware exploit the malware
frequency determination cycle by dynamically creating a new executable and changing
its signature. By changing the signature, most current defensive technologies ignore the
executable as it has a new identity. The new executable will have a new signature and
evade existing signature detection (Cesare, Xiang, & Zhou, 2013). Malware developers
use the new signature to propagate and infect a large number of hosts (Wüchner et al.,
5

2014). The detection of malware is increasingly more difficult over time due to the
sophistication of the malware programs (Guri, Kedma, & Sela, 2013). Previous
polymorphic detection rates using advanced classification range from 68.75% to 81.25%
(Amos, Turner, & White, 2013). These detection rates used Bayes and Multilayer
Perceptron techniques to establish a baseline for effective detection of various types of
polymorphic malware (Amos et al., 2013).
Malware researchers have developed techniques to break the polymorphic
malware executable into segments and attempt pattern matching on malware segments
(David & Yahav, 2013). This approach has been extremely helpful as malware
developers tend to re-use and share functions (Rekdal & Bloemerus, 2013). However,
advanced malware developers understanding this approach employ other techniques to
protect code from being analyzed by encrypting segments of execution code and
leveraging other obfuscation techniques to avoid sub-function signature development
(Campo-Giralte et al., 2009). Malware developers design malware to invade, self-mutate
and propagate malware throughout the infected network using advanced techniques that
are generally used one-time making the research very difficult (Bossert, Hiet, & Inria,
2014). Detection of advanced malware grows increasingly more difficult because of the
sophistication and concealment of the executable. Malware detection and classification
research methods must be advanced in order to detect new types of malware. Advanced
malware analysis methodologies need to be developed in order to improve detection and
classification the evolving nature of polymorphic malware.
Identification of malicious or benign programs (files, portable executables, etc.)
must involve new discovery techniques and leveraging several types of advanced analysis
6

to identify malware (Cesare & Xiang, 2013). There are typically two types of advanced
analysis – static and dynamic. Static analysis never executes the malware, but rather
decodes the compiled code into human readable segments (Sulaiman et al., 2005).
Dynamic analysis is typically conducted via a platform referred to as a “sandbox”. The
sandbox provides an environment to execute the program and captures each sequence of
the runtime behavior (Cesare & Xiang, 2014). Both analysis tools are extremely helpful
during malware analysis as researchers are able to understand how the program executes
and what functions are actually executed by the malware (Sulaiman et al., 2005). Static
and dynamic analysis allows researchers to evaluate and determine the intent of the
malware programs and the potential targeted environment. Researchers can then classify
malware into families of malware based on the results from static and dynamic analysis.
The ability for advanced analysis to produce classification and signature detection
provides a means to perform advanced detection.
Advanced detection relies on feature extraction of the malware being analyzed
(Qu & Hughes, 2013). Recent malware research has divided detection into two tasks:
malware classification and malware detection (Qu & Hughes, 2013). Classification of
malware enables researchers to understand the family of malware and generally the intent
of the attacker (Qu & Hughes, 2013). Detection involves the identification of novel
instances of malware and detecting copies or variants of known malware (Qu & Hughes,
2013). Both classification and detection requires feature extraction of the malware binary
and class features associated with the malware (Cesare & Xiang, 2013). Detection of
new malware relies heavily on statistical machine learning (Qu & Hughes, 2013).
Searching for malware variants uses the concept of similarity searching to query a
7

database of known malware types and functions (Qu & Hughes, 2013). Similarity queries
or nearest neighbor searches relies upon techniques within machine learning or referred
to as instance-based learning (Yerima, Sezer, McWilliams, & Muttik, 2013). Instancebased learning utilizes inherent distance functions within machine learning to highlight
similarity or dissimilarity between objects (Yerima et al., 2013) . These search
algorithms use distance functions and develop mathematical metrics for various searches
and are much more efficient than traditional database queries (Yerima et al., 2013).
Traditional research and commercial malware detection systems have relied upon
static string signature searching techniques to classify and detect malware (Cesare &
Xiang, 2011). This type of search relies upon capturing sections of malware executable
code that uniquely identifies the malware (Cesare & Xiang, 2011). String signature
searching performs well from a query performance and produces low false positive
results. Therefore, string searching is heavily utilized in real-time systems for malware
detection (Cesare, Xiang, & Zhou, 2013). Unfortunately, string signature searching
performs poorly when searching for polymorphic malware variants. Poor string search
performance for polymorphic malware variants is due to the closely related but nonidentical signatures (Cesare et al., 2013). Polymorphic malware variants have similar
properties but the malware changes between instances causes ineffective searches.
Additional research needs to be performed in order to find advanced search techniques
for polymorphic and metamorphic malware.
The advancement in functionality and behavior of computer malware can be
categorized into five distinct generations (Noreen, Murtaza, Shafiq, & Farooq, 2009).
The first-generation malware was quite simple, i.e., they caused infection by simply
8

attaching themselves to the code sections of benign executables (Noreen et al., 2009).
The malware in second generation had some additional functionality such as self –
replication (Noreen et al., 2009). The malware of third generation had stealth capabilities
that make this type more difficult to detect for signature-based detection (Noreen et al.,
2009). The malware belonging to the fourth generation uses armoring techniques to
protect the code from static analysis (Noreen et al., 2009). Finally, the malware of the
current generation use polymorphic techniques to encrypt functions and obfuscate their
code with every replication (Noreen et al., 2009). Most of today’s polymorphic malware
utilizes armoring and obfuscating protections to hide and propagate themselves across the
environment.
The development and analysis of today’s malware requires experienced
programmers. The development of malware requires years of experience due to the
sophistication and nature of the programming. Therefore, malware developers have
“malware creation engines”, which generate different versions of malware in order to reuse logic and functions through and a complex set of algorithms (Noreen et al., 2009).
The malware creation engines use various techniques such as compression, function
insertion and instruction substitution to develop a new variant (Noreen et al., 2009).
However, these variants can be discovered through static and dynamic analysis as they
have the same functionality and semantics (Noreen et al., 2009). Thus, polymorphic and
metamorphic malware retains similar functionality and executable code as it replicates
itself. These functions and code base can essentially provide genetic markers for
detection (Pfeffer, Call, & Chamberlain, 2012).
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The goal of polymorphic and metamorphic malware is to dynamically generate
new versions of malware in order to evade signature detection techniques (Qu & Hughes,
2013). Today’s malware is capable of mutating or creating copies of itself making it very
difficult for signature-based detection to be effective (Qu & Hughes, 2013). Therefore,
malware research must consider new techniques to identify and detect malware variants
to improve endpoint or host security (Qu & Hughes, 2013).

Problem Statement
There is currently no single method to effectively detect polymorphic malware at
the host or end-point. Advanced malware is spreading across the enterprise through
internet downloads, email attachments and malicious hyperlinks, and mobile
devices/hosts and is a major challenge for system-owners and cyber-security
professionals (Campo-Giralte et al., 2009). Signature-based defense approaches such as
anti-virus software do not provide adequate protection from polymorphic malware
(Campo-Giralte et al., 2009). According to McAfee’s report (2016), the security vendor
collects over 3 million new samples of malware per day. Due to the overwhelming
number of new and advanced malware, new detection techniques are needed to discover
advanced malware and must be researched to provide improved detection (Borojerdi &
Abadi, 2013). New detection methods must be relied upon to examine untrusted
programs and prevent malware from causing damage and disruption to computer systems
(Cesare & Xiang, 2013). Better detection malware detection methods may prevent the
proliferation of end-point infections. Identifying and preventing malware from executing
improves overall system security and represents significant cost avoidance savings for
organizations (Qu & Hughes, 2013). New malware research must provide new detection
10

techniques to identify and classify today’s sophisticated malware (Qu & Hughes, 2013).
The research must also understand the sophistication of today’s malware and the evolving
nature of targeted malware attacks in the future (Mandiant Research, 2014).
This research focused on developing improved detection rates using various
machine learning cluster algorithms with a limited set of multidimensional topological
features. As part of the study, the research developed a feature extraction methodology,
developed a prototype environment and leveraged a testing protocol to better understand
advanced clustering algorithm performance and feature weighting to improve detection
for host or endpoint protection.

Dissertation Goal
The goal for the research was to develop an experimental prototype system to
provide improved detection for polymorphic malware. The prototype system utilized
various feature extraction methodologies for all types of samples. These features were
assembled and evaluated with advanced clustering algorithms within machine learning to
deliver improved detection. This study quantitatively examined and prototyped various
techniques to test the theory that machine learning with advanced clustering can provide
improved detection for polymorphic malware. This study is grounded in previous
quantitative experiments that leverage supervised and unsupervised machine learning for
malware research (Boro, et al., 2012; Pradesh, 2014). Further, previous research
provided a basis for various feature extraction techniques and feature isolation models to
enhance malware detection for previous research using machine learning (Chaumette, et
al., 2011; Devesa, et al., 2010). This study extends previous malware detection
techniques by combining file properties, static and dynamic analysis for feature
11

extraction. The feature extraction methodology used to assemble the multidimensional
topological data and became the input (dataset) for machine learning. Based on the
research of nearly 40 related and recent malware studies, it is believed that this is the first
study to evaluate the multidimensional topological features (file properties, static analysis
and dynamic analysis) using advanced clustering algorithms. Ultimately, the detection of
polymorphic malware was the focus and emphasis for the study. Current literature offers
detection rates for polymorphic detection using advanced classifiers range from 68.75%
to 81.25% (Amos et al., 2013). The study developed deliver detection rates of 99.43%
well above 81.25% with better than acceptable accuracy rates.
As part of the study, a feature extraction methodology used an integrated analysis
environment to perform feature extraction from all samples (malware, benign and
unknown) samples as input for machine learning. The feature extraction methodology
constructed produced a rich dataset for each sample. Feature extraction was achieved
through static analysis and dynamic analysis. This multidimensional topologic approach
delivered the unique dataset for each sample used for polymorphic malware detection.
The study evaluated detection rates for three advanced clustering algorithms using
machine learning within WEKA. The clustering algorithms used for this studying
included: 1) Advanced Ensemble Classification (Bootstrap Aggregating (Meta Bagging
(MB)), 2) Instance Based k-Nearest Neighbor (IBk) and 3) Deep Learning Multi-Layer
Perceptron (DLMLP). The study demonstrated improved malware detection based on
advanced cluster analysis using multidimensional topological data that delivered true
positive detection rates above the established baseline range of 68.75% to 81.25% for
polymorphic malware (Amos et al., 2013). Additionally, the research delivered improved
12

false positive rates well beyond the range 15.86% to 33.79% established by the same
study (Amos et al., 2013). The ability to achieve these goals was based on developing an
environment to analyze, extract, assemble and classify the malware.
The Instance Based k-Nearest Neighbor (IBk) algorithm was chosen to replace
LSH as the algorithm improves upon the “locality” aspects of the clustering algorithm.
The IBk is a k-nearest-neighbor classifier that utilizes a similar distance metric used in
the LSH algorithm. The calculated Euclidean distance function is used by IBk as a
critical search parameter within the algorithm (Manikandan, Ramyachitra, Kalaivani, &
Ranjani Rani, 2016). The IBk algorithm was selected as it provided newer techniques for
clustering outcomes.
The Deep Learning Multilevel Perceptron (DLMLP) clustering algorithm was
selected to replace the BP algorithm. Recent literature discussed the benefits of DLMLP
over BP as it improves upon the dimensions of belief for training and test datasets
(Gruber, Cammerer, Hoydis, & Brink, 2017). The main idea in replacing the BP
algorithm with DLMLP was recently presented by Gruber et al. (2017). New research
has found that artificial neural networks (ANN) can leverage belief propagation for
clustering or classification but do so inefficiently (Gruber et al., 2017). ANN’s build
networks of neurons, share information between neurons and propagate results
throughout the network using weights or beliefs (Gruber et al., 2017). This approach to
propagation is done so inefficiently as it is done many times throughout the entire
network (Gruber et al., 2017). A more efficient way to achieve similar or better results is
to establish shallow neural networks and combine other algorithms to achieve similar
propagation (Gruber et al., 2017). The goal was to utilize the DLMLP algorithm for
13

improved detection. Given that the goal of this research was to establish new detection
using advanced algorithms. DLMLP was selected for model efficiencies and to leverage
nascent algorithms that improved upon other algorithms.

Research Questions and/or Hypotheses
This study quantitatively examined and prototyped various techniques to test the
theory that machine learning with advanced clustering can provide improved detection
for polymorphic malware. Therefore, the research question was - Can machine learning
utilizing clustering algorithms with multidimensional topological feature extraction
deliver improved detection for polymorphic malware? The research did in fact deliver
improved malware detection given multidimensional topological data extracted from
static analysis, dynamic analysis and file properties. This study developed an
experimental prototype that analyzed over 1M samples using MB, IBk and DLMLP.
These samples were used to evaluate polymorphic malware detection using machine
learning with advanced clustering.
Previous results suggested that various cluster algorithms could deliver
impressive detection results with limited datasets (Fraley & Figueroa, 2016). Initial
research demonstrated various clustering algorithms produced impressive detection rates
with machine learning for smaller datasets. This study analyzed much larger datasets.
Each algorithm was allocated a dataset containing 200,000 samples containing known
malware, known benign and unknown or undetermined files. Earlier demonstration
results produced well above the 81.25% for a small dataset (Fraley & Figueroa, 2016).
The research produced detection rates for MB, IBk and DLMLP that exceeded 99.99%.
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Feature extraction was accomplished using both static and dynamic analysis
become the inputs for machine learning. The multidimensional topological data
contained file features, static analysis features and dynamic analysis features for input for
the experimental research model to demonstrate improved detection (Liu, Chen, & Guan,
2012; Tamersoy, Roundy, & Chau, 2014). These features were utilized with machine
learning with advanced clustering algorithms to produce the achieved detection rates.
Based on the research of nearly 40 related and recent malware studies, it is
believed that this is the first study to evaluate the combination of topological features (file
properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis) with machine learning using advanced
clustering. Most studies use either static or dynamic analysis. Ultimately, the focus of
the study was to demonstrate improved detection rates for malware using
multidimensional topological features with machine learning utilizing larger datasets. It
is important to note that polymorphic malware has the ability to change behavior and
execute different embedded functions over time (Campo-Giralte et al., 2009). Therefore,
detection of polymorphic malware becomes more difficult and baseline detection rates
range from 68.75% to 81.25% (Amos et al., 2013). Using this approach, the study was
able to produce detection rates for MB, IBk and DLMLP that exceeded 99.999%.
This study developed a prototype to quantitatively evaluate malware detection
effectiveness and accuracy. Accuracy can be expressed as the Number of correct
assessments divided by the Number of all assessments. Effective detection rates were
evaluated using standard statistical measures such as True Positive Rate (TPR), False
Positive Rates (FPR), True Negative Rate (TNR) and False Negative Rate (FNR). Using
these statistical measures allowed deeper understanding for the various detection rates.
15

The focus of the experimental prototype was to evaluate detection rates for the
various clustering algorithms given the various features, weighting of the features and the
advanced cluster algorithms used with a series of machine learning tests. There are a
number of statistical measures to be utilized to evaluate malware detection performance.
Sensitivity and Specificity are two standard measures that evaluate effective detection
rate (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). Sensitivity and Specificity statistical measures have been
used to evaluate malware detection performance for a number of previous malware
detection experiments (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). This analysis is provided later in the
report.

Relevance and Significance
There is currently no single method to identify and detect polymorphic malware at
an endpoint. Advanced malware affects almost every organization, business and
government entity connected to a network and internet (Pramono & Suhardi, 2015).
Traditional signature-based detection systems are ineffective due to the dynamic nature
of polymorphic malware (Cesare et al., 2013). Polymorphic malware can be delivered
through a number of distribution channels: email, embedded files, program updates, and
internet web sites (Cesare et al., 2007). Major security companies spend billions of
dollars to solve general malware issues (McAfee, 2014). The detection of polymorphic
malware is more difficult because of the sophistication of the malware programs (Guri et
al., 2013). Polymorphic malware developers continue to advance malicious programs to
evade or avoid detection by security protection devices (Qu & Hughes, 2013). There is
no single answer for detecting polymorphic and metamorphic malware. However,
researching polymorphic malware may provide greater insight into classes of malware
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and effective detection techniques for various classes. Malware research continues to be
needed in order to provide details regarding the evolving nature of polymorphic malware.
Many of today’s cyber-criminal activities on the internet can be directly attributed
to malware or malicious programs (Ulrich Bayer, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2010). Malware
comes in different sizes and shapes – Trojans, viruses, bots, etc. and give miscreants a
wide range of possibilities for achieving nefarious activities (Ulrich Bayer et al., 2010).
As a result, security companies see a huge number of new malware samples each day –
McAfee estimates at least 30 per second according their most recent report (McAfee,
2014). Globally speaking, in 2014, cybercrime is estimated to cost businesses more than
$400 billion a year (McAfee Labs, 2015). Other experts believe that a $400 billion
estimate is conservative and the total cost of cybercrime in 2014 could have approached
nearly $600 billion worldwide (McAfee Labs, 2015). The rate of growth for cost impact
has soared from $56 billion in 2004 to today’s $400 billion estimate (Schneidewind,
2010; McAfee Labs, 2015). In 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported
that on average, companies that report a network breach have lost an average of $150,000
per incident (Richardson, 2011). Data breaches today are estimated to cost US
businesses at least $200 billion (McAfee Labs, 2015). Many of these breaches have been
attributed to unauthorized money transfers and account hijacking on mobile devices (A.
Sharma & Sahay, 2014). Being able to detect and identify malware infections can deny
hackers financial reward, improve security and reduce the organizational cost of
mitigating these infections.
This research was built upon the current knowledge base for polymorphic
malware research by improving detection through machine learning. This research
developed an experimental approach to improve advanced detection by leveraging
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multidimensional feature extraction for three advanced clustering algorithms using
machine learning. By utilizing this experimental approach, this research extends the
body of knowledge for detection of polymorphic malware. By achieving improved
detection rates for polymorphic malware there is the potential to reduce the financial
impact on businesses worldwide.

Barriers and Issues
There were a number barriers and issues with the experimental research. The first
and most imposing issue is obtaining the malware data set. In order to perform this
research, the malware data set needed to contain representative samples of contemporary
polymorphic malware. These data sets are usually collected by large security commercial
organizations and are shared with partners for a fee. The researcher was able to obtain a
sufficient sample datasets for known malware, known benign and a collection of
unknown samples. The researcher was able to secure over 2 million total samples in
order to develop each of the sample datasets. The collection consisted of 1,009,108
known malware samples, 756,322 known benign samples and 748,976 unknown files. In
addition, the researcher ensured that known malware samples in the dataset were
targeting Microsoft operating systems. Obtaining the collection of samples required and
consumed a significant amount of time, a number of transportable drives and long data
transfer times.
The second issue is that in addition to the malware data, the expanded data set
must contain representative non-malware and unknown samples. The non-malware data
set must be included as part of the research in order to evaluate the effectiveness of
detection. A number of vendors were able to share a large amount of the benign files. In
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particular, Virus Total provided 90% of the 756,322 known benign samples. Unknown
samples also needed to be included as part of the study. A number of vendors were able
to share “undetermined” or “unknown” samples as part of this study. Virus Total and
Malwarebytes provided unknown files samples for this study. Contemporary nonmalware has characteristics and behaviors that protect intellectual property of commercial
software. These non-malware behaviors and characteristics are often mimicked by
malware developers in order to bypass detection. This research evaluated known
malware, known benign and unknown samples in order to evaluate overall detection
effectiveness (False Positives and False Negatives). Initially, it was thought that the
benign samples and unknown samples would be more difficult to obtain than the malware
samples. This was not the case, the malware samples targeting Microsoft operating
systems were much more difficult to obtain.
A related dataset issue was storing and securing the experimental dataset. The
objective of the research is to analyze millions of samples in order to evaluate efficacy
and validate the proposed detection approach. The study required over 2 million
samples. It was expected that the storage for malware and non-malware samples would
not exceed 1 TB. However, this was underestimated. Malware samples are typically
stored in a .zip compressed file format with a password. In many cases, vendors who
share samples also used the Unix TAR command to ship compressed files (30-35 GB for
15 Tarballs). This limited the network bandwidth and storage needed for these files.
However, the uncompressed files consumed over 1.3 TB of hard drive storage.
Once the various test data sets had been pseudo-randomly generated, the feature
extraction process would simply use the unique id (file hash) associated with the sample
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for feature extraction. As a separate process, selected files needed to be unzipped and
password supplied in order to access the sample. Additional unique identifiers were
developed as many of the files had a mixture of MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 hashes. All
files obtained, known malware, known benign and unknown files were stored in a secure
and protected repository. The secure storage of malware data set was needed to ensure
non-detonation within the experimental storage environment. The malware samples were
kept in a state such that the malware did not detonate or infect the analysis
platform/environment while stored.
Lastly, the software tools required for the prototype environment did have
represent some challenges. Sufficient software and hardware computing resources had
been acquired prior to beginning study. However, the open source version of Cuckoo had
several new features as part of the new release. Installing the new release presented some
major challenges. In addition, previous versions of Cuckoo processed samples in a
different fashion and produced automatic dynamic analysis reports. The upgraded
version of Cuckoo provided some advanced features that were more suitable for this
study. Online resources were used to eventually assist with installing and configuring
Cuckoo using the Ubuntu operating system (Kolo, 2016). Details regarding installation
dependencies, networking and configuring VirtualBox is provided in Appendix A (Kolo,
2016). Managing the overall analysis environment was somewhat challenging but
achievable. Difficulties with installing Cuckoo impacted schedule by a few weeks.

Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations:
There were a number of assumptions, limitations and delimitations with the
research conducted. Each of these areas are discussed in detail below.
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Assumptions
There were a limited number of assumptions for this study. The first assumption
was that the dataset collected from across the malware repositories represent the malware
population from across the internet. The population of malware selected was malware
captured relatively recently. Secondly, there was no determination made regarding the
genetic relationships for the polymorphic malware samples used for the study. In other
words, some samples may be related but the study assumes that these relationships do not
matter for the purpose of detection. Lastly, it was assumed that the samples collected and
maintained in a secure .zip container does not disturb or alter the malware sample itself.
The .zip container is a common industry protection mechanism that protects working
environments from malware outbreaks. All malware was secured and stored in a .zip file
format in order to protect the prototype environment. It is believed that these
assumptions were minimal and did not affect the research outcomes.
Limitations
This study included malware samples from various communities of interest for
malware research including Symantec, Virus Total, contagio, Virus Sign, and VxHeaven.
There was a limitation regarding collecting samples across these available sites. The
limitation for this study was that only polymorphic samples with dates within the last
eighteen months was used for detection research from these sites. Therefore, the sample
set may not be representative for older malware or other malware sites. The purpose of
study was to evaluate detection for current malware. Older samples may have value but
more recent malware will have more value. Collecting samples from multiple sites and
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then performing random selection should provide the needed sampling technique for
generalizability.
Delimitations
Delimitations provide boundaries for the research or study (R. Yin, 2015).
Delimitations include topics or areas that the study chose to intentionally exclude from
consideration. For the purpose of this study, the three clustering algorithms have been
selected due to demonstrated detection results from previous studies (Alam, Horspool, &
Traore, 2013; Murphy, Weiss, & Jordan, 1999; Tamersoy et al., 2014). There are most
certainly other advanced clustering algorithms that could have been used for this study.
However, the intent of this research was to demonstrate that detection can be improved
by adding a combination features from file properties, static and dynamic analysis. The
proposed research expands current detection body of knowledge by using proven
clustering algorithms with the expanded features (static, dynamic and file properties)
leveraging the machine learning environment. Other delimitations include selecting only
malware samples specifically targeting the Microsoft operating systems. Malware
targeting other operating systems was not a consideration for this study. However, there
were a limited number of samples collected that were not targeting Microsoft operating
systems across the community (Symantec, Virus Total, contagio, Virus Sign, and
VxHeaven). Non-Microsoft malware samples collected were minimal. Non-Microsoft
malware samples were discarded prior to random selection. Microsoft targeting malware
is believed to represent a majority of the targeted polymorphic malware (Ahmadi,
Ulyanov, Semenov, Trofimov, & Giacinto, 2016) Therefore, this study focused on only
samples targeting Microsoft.
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Summary
Malware represents some of the most serious security concerns for today’s
Internet. Security breaches and cyber-attacks can be directly attributed to malware or
multi-stage cyber-attacks. Malware can compromise networks and computers in the form
of botnets, viruses, worms, ransomware and advanced persistent threats (APTs). These
cyber-attacks are launched using targeted and advanced malware techniques to steal
personal, proprietary of financial information. The high number of attacks and the
associated negative notoriety make malware one of the most popular areas for advanced
research. Much of today’s advanced research has been concentrated on developing
techniques to collect, study, and mitigate malware. This research focused on detecting
“real” malware and samples found “live” on the internet. As improved detection
becomes a reality – mitigation or elimination of malware for end-points can be greatly
enhanced. Unfortunately, current host-based detection approaches that leverage
signature-based detection is largely ineffective for new polymorphic malware.
Polymorphic malware avoids or evades signature detection by using advanced
obfuscation or encryption techniques. This research set out to address these
shortcomings, new research was conducted to develop dynamic detection approaches to
identify potential malware threats. This study proposed a novel malware detection
approach that provided improved detection for polymorphic malware. The research
should enhance and compliment traditional end-point detection approaches. This study’s
approach extracted key features from file properties, static and dynamic analysis and
through advanced cluster analysis determined the likelihood of files (samples) to be
benign (good) or malicious (bad). The proposed approach analyzed the malware
executable (program) in a controlled environment in order to better understand behaviors,
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function calls and the inclusion of dynamic libraries. The research conducted leveraged
this information through machine learning to improve detection. In order to better
understand the malware threat landscape, a review of past research literature and previous
malware studies is provided next.
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Definition of Terms
Advanced Persistent Threat: A deliberately slow-moving cyber-attack that is
applied quietly to compromise information systems.
Anomaly detection: The search for network connections which do not conform to
an expected normal traffic.
Bot: A term short for robot. Criminals distribute malicious software that can turn
a computer into a bot. When this occurs, a computer can perform automated tasks over
the Internet without one’s awareness.
Botnet: Criminals use bots to infect large numbers of computers. These
computers form a network, or a botnet. Criminals use botnets to send out spam email
messages, spread viruses, attack computers and servers, and commit other kinds of fraud.
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD): Mobile devices that are personally owned, not
a corporate asset.
Clustering: Method that organizes objects with similarities into one cluster, and
objects with dissimilarities into other clusters.
Crimeware: Tools that drive hackers’ attacks and fuel the black market (e.g., bots,
Viruses, Trojan, spyware, adware, etc.)
Cryptocurrency: A digital medium of exchange that uses encryption to secure the
process involved in generating units and conducting transactions.
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Cyber Attack: An attack, via cyberspace, that targets an enterprise’s use of
cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, destroying, or maliciously controlling a
computer environment/infrastructure; destroying the integrity of the data; or stealing
controlled information.
Data Breach: An organization’s unauthorized or unintentional exposure,
disclosure, or loss of sensitive PI, such as social security numbers; financial information,
such as credit card numbers; date of birth; or mother’s maiden name.
Data Breach: An organization’s unauthorized or unintentional exposure,
disclosure, or loss of sensitive PI, which can include PII, such as social security numbers;
or financial information, such as credit card numbers.
Data Security Incident: A violation or imminent threat of violation of a computer
security policy, acceptable use policy, or standard security practice
Denial of Service (DoS): The prevention of authorized access to resources or the
delaying of time-critical operations.
Detection Rate: The percentage of the number of intrusion instances detected by
the system over the total number of intrusion instances present in the test set.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS): An approach whereby the hacker attempts
to make a service unavailable to its intended users by draining system or networking
resources, using multiple attacking systems.
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False Alarm Rate: The percentage of the total number of incorrectly classified
normal instances over the total number of instances.
Hacker: Unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an information
system.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): Pieces of forensic data, such as data found in
system log entries or files, that identify potentially malicious activity on a system or
network.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse.
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): Systems that can detect and attempt to stop an
intrusive activity, ideally before it reaches its target.
Malicious Code: Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized
process that will have an adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of an information system.
Malware: Programs or executables targeted to infect a user’s device. When
successful, the hacker is able to control the user’s device, which may lead to data loss or
escalation in the hacker’s privileges on the information system.
Mobile Device: Smart phones, tablets, portable cartridge/disk-based, removable
storage media (e.g., floppy disks, compact disks, USB flash drives, external hard drives,
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flash memory cards/drives that contain nonvolatile memory; NIST, 2013d, 2013e).
Personal Information: Information from individuals that can uniquely identify a
specific person.
Personal Identifiable Information (PII): Information that can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as his or her name, social security
number, or biometric records, alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying
information that is linked to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth or
mother’s maiden name.
Privileged Account: An information system account with approved authorizations
of a privileged user.
Privileged User: A user that is authorized to perform security relevant functions
on a computer server that ordinary users are not authorized to perform (NIST, 2013e).
Ransomware: A type of malware that encrypts files and prevents the user from
accessing data until the user pays a certain amount of money (ransom) to decrypt the files
Rootkit: A set of tools used by an attacker after gaining root-level access to a host
to conceal the attacker’s activities on the host and permit the attacker to maintain the
access through covert means.
Security Event: Any observable security occurrence in a system network.
Security Incident: A violation or imminent threat of violation of a computer
security policy, acceptable use policy, or standard security practice. These include
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an accessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information that the system
processes, stores, or transmits.
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Tool: Application that
provides the ability to gather security data from information system components and
present that data as actionable information via a single interface.
Spyware: Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed on an information
system to gather information on individuals or organizations without their knowledge.
Testing Phase: A detection phase in which the distance (e.g. Euclidean distance)
between each test instance and the normal cluster’s centroid is measured to determine
whether or not that instance is normal.
Training phase: A period in which a normal profile is built and or updated.
Trojan: A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also
has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms,
sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the
program.
Unauthorized User: A user who accesses a resource that he or she is not
authorized to use.
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Virtualization: Hiding the discrepancy between the virtual and physical allocation
of information technology resources.
Virtual Machine: A separate logical instance of resources for a user or application
that in reality is shared physical hardware.
Virus: A type of malicious software program that infects computer system
programs, data or operating system files and is capable of replicating itself to other
systems.
Worm: A self-replicating, self-propagating, self-contained program that uses
networking mechanisms to spread malicious code.

30

List of Acronyms
ACC:

Accuracy

API:

Application Programming Interface

BP:

Belief Propagation

CC:

Correlation Coefficient

C&C:

Command and Control

DLMLP:

Deep Learning Multi-Layer Perceptron

FNR:

False Negative Rate

FPR:

False Positive Rate

GUI:

Graphical User Interface

LSH:

Locality Sensitive Hashing

IBk:

Instance Based k-Nearest Neighbor

MB:

Meta Bagging or Advanced Ensemble Classification (Bootstrap
Aggregating (Meta Bagging)

ML:

Machine Learning

ROC:

Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (or ROC curve.)

SDK:

Software Development Kit

SCED:

Single Case Experimental Design

SCED CCD: Single Case Experimental Design Changing Criterion Design
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SVM:

Support Vector Machine

TNR:

True Negative Rate

TPR:

True Positive Rate
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Overview of Topics
New malware development techniques render current signature protections for
polymorphic malware practically useless from a timeliness perspective (RodríguezGómez, Maciá-Fernández, & García-Teodoro, 2013). Being able to detect polymorphic,
metamorphic and zero-day malware requires advanced detection techniques that provide
rapid adaptation, scalability and produce low false positive rates (Borojerdi & Abadi,
2013). There are numerous research studies that offer attractive alternatives for detecting
polymorphic and metamorphic malware. Given the security issues concerning malware,
it is not surprising that a majority of the today’s security research is focused on
developing enhanced detection using techniques that collect, study, and mitigate
malicious code (Kolbitsch et al., 2009). Some studies are focused on botnets and botnet
networks, others are focused the infected executables from websites and others study
behavioral aspect of Windows and mobile devices (Seigneur & Kölndorfer, 2013). There
are other studies who strictly look at the Windows API or system calls (Ye, Wang, Li,
Ye, & Jiang, 2008). New research attempts to capture a comprehensive snapshot of
malicious behaviors and activities in order to classify the malware sample in question
(Cesare & Xiang, 2013). The crucial aspect for this and other malware research is to
understand the significance of the malware problem, investigate new ways to detect the
multitude of malware types and then benchmark those results against the current
approaches. An overview of malware and the various aspects of malware are presented
next.
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Malware is software or a set of programs whose sole purpose is to damage,
disrupt or steal information from computer systems or networks (Kauranen & Makinen,
1990). Malware is often a broader term that includes viruses, worms, Trojans, botnets,
backdoors, exploits, etc. The most well-known type of malware is a virus. The term
“virus” was initially used by Fred Cohen in 1983 while conducting research for his
dissertation at the University of Southern California (Cohen, 1985). The fundamental
reason for creating such software or set of program is to create chaos, disrupt business or
seek financial motives by harming computer systems (Kauranen & Makinen, 1990). The
creation of various types of malware has launched an entire commercial industry known
as “anti-virus software” with revenues skyrocketing to several billion dollars (Noreen et
al., 2009). Malware has been a major threat to computer and networks since the early
1990s (Noreen et al., 2009). However, the malware sophistication has significantly
improved since the 1980’s when Fred Cohen coined the term. Cohen’s virus-based
research would propel numerous other researchers and discovery of “classes” of malware.
Another type of malware is something referred to as a Worm. A Worm is defined
as a type of malware that exploits vulnerabilities of unpatched systems with selfpropagation means to spread pervasively throughout a network (Weaver, Paxson,
Staniford, & Cunningham, 2003). Nazario (2004) describes worms as having the ability
to take advantage of system vulnerabilities that enable propagation via a network and
allows the execution of arbitrary code on a remote system. Largescale worm outbreaks
have decreased significantly since the early 2000s. Panda Security (2014) report that
Worm malware account for approximately 6% of all malware infections in the first
quarter of 2013. Zero-day worms are still today a real concern for system and security
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professionals. Zero-day worm attacks still represent a real threat to organizations due to
the lack of detection and the availability of high speed networks (Kaur & Singh, 2014).
Organizations that have highly interconnected networks are susceptible to such worm
malware attacks and should be a major concern for Internet users (Kaur & Singh, 2014).
Worms also can deliver other types of malware such as Trojans.
Trojans invade systems and reside within the system in order to execute
commands or instruction given by external threat actors (Gordon & Chess, 1998).
Trojans enable threat actors to take control of compromised systems (K. Chen, Zhang, &
Lian, 2013). Trojans conceal themselves inside computer system with the hopes of not
being discovered. Some Trojans are active soon after being installed. Other types of
Trojans wait for an instruction or some condition to be satisfied before executing (K.
Chen et al., 2013). After receiving remote instructions, Trojans can transact and receive
commands in order to disrupt computer operations, gather and exfiltrate sensitive
information or attempt to gain access and privileges on host computer systems (Gordon
& Chess, 1998). Trojans tend to be detected readily by signature-based detection such as
anti-virus and other end-point protection software. However, systems are still susceptible
to new Trojans attacks if user awareness and system hygiene are not addressed (K. Chen
et al., 2013). Zero-day attacks taking advantage of system vulnerabilities are still real
possibilities. However, systems policies requiring analysis of first time run executables
make this type of attack less possible.
Botnets represent one of the greatest infrastructure threat to the Internet (Barakat
& Khattab, 2010). For years, the research community has investigated and described the
impending issues and proposed countermeasures for disarming this capable adversary.
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Botnets is typically a term to describe a network of infected end-hosts that become bots
under the control of a bot master (Barakat & Khattab, 2010). The bot master represents
known controls from a human or prescribed operations known as a bot-master. Cyber
criminals and adversaries use botnets to launch Denial of Service (DOS) attacks,
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and aid in the propagation polymorphic
across the enterprise (Li, Duan, Liu, & Wu, 2010). Detection for bots come in the form
in the form of monitoring for abnormal network, memory and system behavior.
Unfortunately, botnet malware can remain dormant for long periods of time and become
active for a short period of time for a special purpose (J. Zhang et al., 2011). Unless
systems are closely monitored, botnet malware has completed execution before
notification and remediation action could be taken (Rodrigues, 2011).
Backdoors represent a malware mechanism that allows attackers surreptitious
access to a computer systems (Y. Zhang & Paxson, 2000). Backdoors have existed for
many years and were initially designed into operating systems in order to facilitate access
by system administrators (Bohra, Neamtiu, Gallard, Sultan, & Iftodet, 2004). Today’s
systems are supposed to be free of backdoors that facilitate unauthorized access to the
computer systems (K. Chen et al., 2013). Typically, malware backdoors embed
themselves into systems and networks in order to provide a means of repeatable access
for external attackers. Backdoors can exist for both interactive and non-interactive
services on systems (K. Chen et al., 2013). Interactive services simply run commands or
carry out instructions on the compromised system (Y. Zhang & Paxson, 2000). Noninteractive services include services such as relaying email spam or file transfer services
for data to be exfiltrated outside the organization (Y. Zhang & Paxson, 2000). Backdoors
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are very difficult if not impossible to detect and they take advantage of authorized
services, ports and protocols.
Taking advantage of flaws within a computer system, network or mobile platform
requires that a vulnerability exist and attackers have the means to exploit a weakness
(Ritchey & Ammann, 2000). Malware exploits target these vulnerabilities and seek to
gain access to and somehow compromise the system or network (Rodrigues, 2011).
Computer systems, networks and mobile devices will always have some underlying
vulnerability. System designers and developers try to minimize the exposure of such
weaknesses (Ritchey & Ammann, 2000). System and network vulnerabilities may be
introduced by other activities such as system integration, system operations and
maintenance or poor system or network hygiene (Kim & Hong, 2014). However, today’s
connectivity to networks make malware exploits more possible as attackers take
advantage of network connectivity to probe and understand system vulnerabilities.
Malware exploits target networks, servers and applications in order to disrupt operations
or steal information for financial gain (Alam, Horspool, & Traore, 2014). The detection
for malware exploits is even more difficult as they appear to simply be using standard
network and authorized system calls.
Ransom Malware or “Ransomware” has become quite prevalent over the past few
years. Ransomware has also become known as scareware as cyber criminals use the
malware to prey on the fears of infected computer users by stealing or encrypting user
data (Kharraz et al., 2015). Ransomware preys on people’s fear of losing control of
personal or private information, losing access to highly critical or sensitive data or
damaging hardware such that access is no longer possible (Kharraz et al., 2015). Certain
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types of ransomware will essentially encrypt data or system files such that access to the
system or data can only be achieved by unlocking the system with a “key” (Gazet, 2010).
Ransomware generally provides payment information and once the transaction is
complete, users are provided decryption keys in order to regain access (Gazet, 2010).
Payments are generally made in bitcoin or some other method that makes tracing the
payment to the recipient more difficult or near impossible (Kharraz et al., 2015).
Although ransomware has been around for over 10 years, not until recently has the
volume of ransomware raised major concerns within the security community. According
to Symantec (2014), the number of ransomware attacks increased by over 500% on 2013.
In addition, ransomware has been in the press with attacks on local police, hospitals and
small municipalities. In 2013, the Cryptolocker ransomware was in the press for
infecting nearly 250,000 computers worldwide (Symantec Corporation, 2014). Given the
substantial growth and spotlight on ransomware attacks, developing protection and
detection mechanisms should be a major research area for the security community.
However, detecting ransomware and protecting organizations from this type of attack is
difficult without having insight into the tactics and sophistication of these attacks.
The discussion above highlights the various types of malware and the impact that
they play on system owners, security professionals and ordinary end-users. Protecting,
detecting and remediating malware has become one of the fastest growing markets in the
technology sector. More research is needed in order to keep pace with the advanced
malware and detection become more critical each day.
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Synthesis of Current Literature
Several researchers have described the history of malware in “waves” or levels of
sophistication. The first wave spans from the late 1970s through the early 1990s (T.
Chen & Robert, 2004). The first malware outbreak or “wave” can be described as
inquisitive, exploratory and unsophisticated (Wüchner et al., 2014). The first wave was
really considered to be exploratory or accidental with no clear malicious intent (T. Chen
& Robert, 2004). This period can be symbolized by the ﬁrst self-spreading internet
malware (Morris Worm) that infected approximately 10% of the computers connect to
the internet (T. Chen & Robert, 2004).
The second and third wave covers almost eleven years from 1990 through 2001.
The second wave covers the 1990 through 1999 and can be characterized as the first use
of polymorphic malware and encryption techniques to evade detection by anti-virus (T.
Chen & Robert, 2004). The third wave spanned only a couple of years 1999 through 2001
and was consumed with malware being distributed through email (T. Chen & Robert,
2004). Malware such as the Melissa, PrettyPark, or LoveLetter viruses were distribution
through email and executables had additional functionality that allowed to propagate and
maintain persistence (T. Chen & Robert, 2004). The third wave also was the first wave
where malware achieved remote system access in order steal sensitive information.
The fourth wave considered to take place from 2001 through 2009. The rise of
malware during this era was characterized by increasing sophistication of malware that
leveraged multiple vulnerabilities to infect and propagate infections through instant
messaging or peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing (Shafiq, Khayam, & Farooq, 2008).
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The fourth wave also took advantage of unprotected applications and application
interfaces by dynamically downloading macros and additional malicious payloads
(Rafique & Chen, 2014). The fourth wave also saw malware adapting to more effective
detections and changes to malware developer goals and motivations. Malware such
CodeRed, Slammer, or Nimda took advantage of multiple host vulnerabilities to infect
hosts and utilized email to propagate throughout networks to exploit system
vulnerabilities (Rafique & Chen, 2014). The fourth wave of malware also seized the
opportunity to compromise unprotected network shares and served up drive-by infections
via webservers (Rafique & Chen, 2014).
The fifth wave raised the level of intent, targeting and sophistication of the
malware (Wüchner et al., 2014). During this time period, roughly 2010 until present
day, malware has become more targeted and developed by highly skilled professionals
(Wüchner et al., 2014). Malware such as Stuxnet was developed and attacked
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and was linked to
sabotaging the Iranian nuclear program (Virvilis, Gritzalis, & Apostolopoulos, 2013).
This wave was the first to have malware referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs) and Zero-Day exploits. Malware from this period is designed to attack specific
systems and targets and the level of sophistication goes beyond that of previous
commodity malware developed by previous waves (Virvilis et al., 2013). APTs such as
Stuxnet, Duqu or Flame have been linked to Government sponsors (Wüchner et al.,
2014). The motivation of these professional malware developers is economic, espionage
or sabotage for targeted systems (Wüchner et al., 2014). Motivations for commodity
malware different and is more experimental and economic based (Wüchner et al., 2014).
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Commodity malware is typically developed by amateurs and organized crime. However,
commodity malware developers will take advantage of collaborating and sharing with
professional developers to gain insight into advanced exploit methods and techniques
(Wüchner et al., 2014). In addition to methods and techniques, these groups will often
share concealment and obfuscation techniques needed to avoid detection (Wüchner et al.,
2014). Zero-day and APTs will go unknown for long periods of time due to advanced
stealth and concealment techniques (Kaur & Singh, 2014) These waves represent an
ongoing threat to organizations and the internet as a whole.
In summary, the development of malware has changed over time in both
motivation and sophistication. There has been a radical shift from accidental outbreaks to
very targeted and specific attacks. Many of the malware attacks have economic and
organizational motivational factors. Malware developers have changed over time as well
from amateurs to highly skilled and trained professionals. The malware itself has
adopted sophisticated exploitation, propagation and replication techniques to avoid and
evade detection. Today’s advanced malware use various techniques such as encryption,
environmental sensing and embedded compilers to hide functions from static and
dynamic analysis. Therefore, malware research spans years of research and has multiple
topical areas. The synthesis of current literature is organized by topic area and is
organized sequentially. The goal is to provide foundational as well as a time perspective
for each malware research topic area. In some cases, there have been and continue to be
arguments from various researchers as to which characteristics constitutes certain
malware types or classes. The following is an overview of the foundational topics and
related research in conducting malware detection research.
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Virus Research
John von Neumann was the ﬁrst to develop the concept of today’s computer virus
and is considered to be the seminal work for viruses (von Nuemann & Burks, 1966). Von
Neumann developed his theory of the computer virus during the mid-1960’s while
speculating on the fact that programs could produce and generate “code”. He conceived
and developed the concept of computer programs self-replicating through what he called
“reproducing automata” (von Nuemann & Burks, 1966). Although von Neumann did not
develop the actual computer program, he envisioned the idea of self-replicating automata
that could go viral if not addressed (T. Chen & Robert, 2004). In essence, von Neumann
predicted the spawning of malware prior to the actual technical implementation of the
concept (T. Chen & Robert, 2004). In 1971, Bob Thomas created the Creeper program
and was the first implementation of von Neumann’s virus concept (T. Chen & Robert,
2004). The Creeper program is considered to be the first virus and piece of malware
released into the wild (T. Chen & Robert, 2004). The Creeper program was not
developed as a piece of malware but rather to test the concept self-replication through a
network (Arpanet) and to inform users of its existence on the computer once it achieved a
foothold (T. Chen & Robert, 2004). The Creeper is not considered to be malware in the
truest sense of the word as it was not designed to actually harm any computer system (T.
Chen & Robert, 2004). However. Thomas’s Creeper program is largely considered to be
the “father” of all future worms and viruses for its self-replication techniques (T. Chen &
Robert, 2004). Although, Thomas’ program became the first program to actually achieve
self-replication from a malware perspective – the study of such automata would not be
studied for ten years.
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Cohen’s research is considered the first formal work in the field of computer
viruses (Noreen et al., 2009). Cohen’s seminal research on “viruses” was conducted in
1983 through 1984. His research would be later published in late 1985. Cohen is
credited for bringing the attention of viruses to the larger computer community with this
research (Noreen et al., 2009). Cohen explored a number of approaches to detecting
viruses. His research also was aimed at not only detection but the removal of unwanted
software/programs. Cohen also started to classify various forms of viruses. Cohen’s
detection and removal methods did not rely upon the information sharing or transitivity
of information flow (Cohen, 1985). Instead his detection techniques were based on
identifying various code traits used by viruses to exploit Turing machines (Cohen, 1985).
Cohen’s research outlines several types of computer viruses and the ability of the attacker
to quickly gain administrative rights to systems once infected (Cohen, 1985). Cohen also
began to describe future issues with malware and variants that would be difficult to
detect. Cohen’s research also described the problems with removing a virus from a
system once the system was infected (Cohen, 1985). Cohen also began the process to
articulate advanced classes of viruses that could mutate to avoid detection and removal
(Cohen, 1985). Cohen’s research would serve to accelerate other malware research and
begin to paint a picture for new attacks on computer systems.
Research conducted in 1987 by Maria M. Pozzo and Terence E. Gray, provided
an approach to detect modification of executable code – also known as viruses and a new
type of malware known as Worms (P. K. Singh & Lakhotia, 2002). Pozzo and Gray
presented various methods for detecting changes in executable code and housing a virus.
Their approach analyzed the run-time executable(s) and detected whether the
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executable(s) had been modified since installation (P. K. Singh & Lakhotia, 2002). This
early virus detection utilized encryption to store code values for the executable modules
of a program (A. Singh, Walenstein, & Lakhotia, 2012). The encrypted value for each
module was used to create a hash value known today as “signature”. These set of
signatures would be used to enable the detection of modified executables as the hash
values would no longer match the values of the original module. Although the
implementation approach would not be sufficient for today’s rapidly changing code
environment, the signature concept would be used by an entire anti-virus industry to
register, track and share virus hashes (A. Singh et al., 2012) .
Fred Cohen, in 1989, advanced a number of malware theories regarding virus
detection and protection through a series of published papers in order to highlight
malware issues. Cohen (1989) presented a formal model for defining computer viruses.
Cohen’s virus model formally defines sets of transitive integrity-corrupting mechanisms
called "viral-sets". These viral-sets contained various characteristics that uniquely
identified the virus and the type of attack (Cohen, 1989b). Further, Cohen’s research
explored the deeper computational properties for the defined viral-sets in order to expose
the underlying code. Additional research conducted by Cohen, shifts from detection of
viruses to computer systems protection from attack of these viral sets (Cohen, 1989a).
Cohen also presented additional research regarding the automated detection of modified
executables in order to prevent the spread of viruses of networked computer systems
(Cohen, 1989b). His work illustrated various virus models and the detections needed by
host computers (Kauranen & Makinen, 1990). Further, Cohen’s models were used to
simulate the infection and protection of trusted and untrusted systems (Kauranen &
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Makinen, 1990). These models were then used to demonstrate both theoretical and
operational infections to illustrate the feasibility of viral attacks (Cohen, 1989b). Cohen’s
research provides greater insight into optimal protection mechanisms needed to stop the
propagation of secondary infections to other systems (Kauranen & Makinen, 1990).
In 1990, Kerchen et al. at the University of California – Davis proposed to
analyze malware in new ways. Their approach was to use static analysis techniques to
discover whether code was indeed malware (Kerchen et al., 1990). The tools and
techniques used provided heuristic tools to detect malicious code in a UNIX
environment. The tools used could detect computer viruses prior to loading and
executing the malware (Kerchen et al., 1990). Kerchen et al. (1990) used two tools to
accomplish malware detection. The first detection tool searched for duplicate system
calls in the compiled and linked program (Kerchen et al., 1990). The second detection
tool used static analysis of the executable to determine the files/libraries used by the
program to write to during execution (Kerchen et al., 1990). Through the use of both
tools, Kerchen et al. were able to understand whether the program could be identified as a
malicious or benign. The approach presented in this research would lead other
researchers to investigate new ways to look the growing malware problem.
In 1990, Kephart and White began to look at computer viruses from an
epidemiological model similar to those being used to perform advanced disease research
(J. Kephart & White, 1991). Kephart and White performing research at the IBM Thomas
J. Watson Research Center began to address malware from an immune system
perspective. Their research parallels viral outbreaks and infections of the human body for
computer systems (J. Kephart & White, 1991). This paper was the first published
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research to compare the infection of the human body with computer virus epidemics.
Their work began a theoretical discussion of viral propagation using deterministic and
stochastic models (J. Kephart & White, 1991). The study also describes the conditions
under which widespread computer viral epidemics would likely occur across interconnected networks. One of the key outcomes of their research was to raise the argument
that imperfect defenses can still be highly effective at preventing the widespread
propagation of malware (J. Kephart & White, 1991).
In 1992, Cohen presented some advanced findings regarding defensive models for
computer viruses. Cohen proposed a formal definition of “computer worms” and detailed
the properties that would define this class of virus. He defined “computer worms” as a
malware subclass of viruses based on certain properties (Cohen, 1992). Cohen presented
an alternative formal definition of a virus based on the foundational work presented by
Professor Len Adelman in 1989 (Spafford, 1991). Cohen adopted Adelman’s definition
of viruses based on set theory. Although these virus definitions were not specific the
definition covered a broad range of replicating programs including Worms (Cohen,
1992). Cohen performed some analysis of internal code of Worms and viruses. He later
went on to discern the differences between viruses and worms by the nature of the
functions and self-replication needed for sustainment. Cohen demonstrated that viruses
merely create replicas. On the other hand, Worms were presented to be more purposeful
viruses because of their reliability, ability to spread and their ability to maintain malicious
functionality with replication (Cohen, 1992). This deeper analysis provided a stark
contrast of Worms and viruses. These definitions launched additional research and
created classes of malware based on executable functions. The debate regarding the
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characteristics for worms and viruses continues to rage throughout today’s research
community.
Kephart & Arnold (1994) provide extended research by identifying viral
signatures from executable code using statistical methods for the various functions
contained within the virus. The researchers later used the analogy of a human body with
the immune system to model viruses and viral attacks (J. Kephart et al., 1995). The
researchers believed that new viruses acting as “intelligent agents” could begin to infect
and propagate themselves across connected networks in new ways (J. Kephart et al.,
1995). In 1995, IBM was developing techniques to prevent computer infections by using
biologically inspired anti-virus protection (J. Kephart et al., 1995). The researchers were
early adopters for implementing neural network-based virus detection (J. Kephart et al.,
1995). This early research leveraged neural network learning to discriminate between
infected and uninfected programs. Further, this research was extended to identify new
viruses and remove the infected files automatically (J. Kephart & Arnold, 1994).
Spafford (1994) began to define how computer viruses operate and distinguish
classes of malware based on these operations. Spafford discussed the nature of true
viruses and began to describe the capabilities contained in the malware. Spafford defines
true viruses as having two major components: one that handles the spread of the virus,
and the other delivering a payload task (Spafford, 1994). Spafford was one of the first
researches to recognize that the payload task may follow an infection and not be present
initially. Instead, the payload task may await for a condition of a triggering event
(Spafford, 1994). Spafford describes how viruses work and how the virus must add itself
to another piece of executable code (Spafford, 1994). Spafford’s research classified
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various forms of computer viruses including Worms, shell code, intrusive code, and
companion code (Trojans). Spafford went to great lengths to highlight that companion
viruses are not real viruses unless the more encompassing definition of virus is used.
Again, classification of viruses began to differentiate the malware properties. The
research also draws parallels how viruses meet properties associated with life as defined
by some researchers in the area of artificial life and self-organizing systems (Spafford,
1994). Spafford also begins describe an artificial "life" for viruses within computer
systems and related environments (Spafford, 1994).
In 1996, Bontchev presented a new threat vector and an approach for detecting the
presence of macro viruses in Microsoft Word for Windows. This type of attack was
relatively new and the new “virus” would rely on the availability underlying program that
supported “macros” (Bontchev, 1996). Bontchev also began to dive deeper into the MS
Word macro attack. Bontchev found that the typical anti-viral software companies
developed inadequate protections for this type of attack. Bontchev also demonstrated
that while typical virus replicate themselves in certain ways, the Word macros lived from
document to document (Bontchev, 1996). Bontchev also discussed the need for advanced
integrity checking for application programs. This paper also discussed the significant
threat that this type of attack could represent for application programs who enable macros
and the needed protections to prevent such an attack (Bontchev, 1996).
In 1997, Kephart et al. began to contemplate and research a decade of the growing
computer virus problem. The authors believed that the anti-virus community was engaged
in an escalating arms race with malware developers (J. Kephart, Sorkin, Swimmer, &
White, 1999). However, the authors believed that the “war” was still manageable and
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winnable (J. Kephart et al., 1999). Their solution was to develop a blueprint that
automated the detection and remediation viruses on computer systems. The authors
believed that detection rates would increase and human experts would solve the problem
in the long term using such a blueprint (J. Kephart et al., 1999). The researchers also
acknowledge that the internet was becoming a fertile ground for new breeds’ malware (J.
Kephart et al., 1999). Kephart et al. believed that solution would be to develop a
protection systems similar to the human immune system for computers (J. Kephart et al.,
1999). Just as the human immune system senses the presence of previously unknown
pathogens, the researchers envisioned protection for computer systems that would one
day automatically detect and remove malware. However, their estimation of the growing
malware problem would be severely underestimated.
In 1998, White began to identify and articulate the challenges of the growing
computer virus problem (White, 1998). White’s desire was to raise awareness and alarm
the growing computer community of the many open issues facing researchers for virus
detection and protection (J. Kephart et al., 1999). White’s research highlights five
problematic issues: 1) development of new heuristics for virus detection, 2) the study of
viral spread and epidemiology, 3) deploying distributed digital immune system for
detecting new viruses, 4) detection of worm programs and 5) proactive versus reactive
approaches towards detection of virus programs. Many of these issues still exist today.
In 1998, Bontchev extended his previous computer virus by expanding the
definition of “viruses”. His research expanded the “virus” definition and pushed for
greater understanding of the virus ecosystem. Bontchev explored the incomplete nature
of definitions of computer viruses (V. Bontchev, 1998). This work discussed advanced
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classification and analysis of computer viruses. Bontchev also discussed the incomplete
nature of the anti-virus software and possible attacks bypassing anti-virus software.
Further, Bontchev called for advanced testing methods for anti-virus software. The
research also discussed system issues and social aspects of the growing computer virus
problem. Bontchev also went on to discuss useful applications of using self-replicating
software that are not malware.
In 1999, Jeffrey Kephart and Steve White presented an update to their previous
work conducted in 1993. This updated research proposed two new epidemiological
models of computer virus spread (J. Kephart et al., 1999). The two models were
developed to explain epidemic and non-epidemic spread of viruses outside the laboratory
environment. This work was conducted in order to explain the non-existent outbreak of
viruses in the workplace. The researcher’s predicted a global virus outbreak in their
previous study (J. O. Kephart, 1993). However, the researcher’s interest was heightened
because only a small fraction of all well-known viruses seemed to have appeared in real
business environment (J. Kephart et al., 1999). The researchers wanted to investigate
whether the low rate of virus infections was real or if the theoretical epidemic threshold
was too high and reporting was lost. The researchers develop localized model for
software exchange in order to observe and explain the sub-exponential rate of viral
spread (J. Kephart et al., 1999).
Worms
In 1989, Joyce Reynolds, in her work at the University of Southern California
began to describe a new type of malware known as a Worm (Reynolds, 1989). Reynolds
describes the infection and cure of the newly released Internet Worm. Reynolds’ work
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begins to envision the impact of a worm on the greater Internet community. Her work
describes how Worms could propagate through a series of inter-connected computer
systems and begins to paint a picture of the damage that Worms could cause though such
an attack (Reynolds, 1989). Her work also evaluated the social and ethical issues of
attacking the Internet ecosystem. A large part of Reynolds’ work was based on
reviewing and detailing the inadvertent release of the Internet Worm on the evening of
November 2, 1988.
Other malware research followed and began to leverage Cohen’s viral models.
These models were used to describe and classify additional types of malware. Additional
research efforts began to classify malware by execution properties, executable traits,
program characteristics and behaviors (Cohen, 1989b). There began a debate over types
of malware. The classification of malware became a hot topic as researchers began to
describe all malware as viruses. Some researchers believed that a distinction between
various classes of malware needed to be drawn. The malware term Worm is largely
credited to the work of Spafford (Spafford, 1989). Spafford (1989) defined a worm as “a
program that can run independently and can propagate a fully working version of itself
onto other machines”. Spafford’s work at Purdue University wanted to make sure that
Worms were classified differently from viruses (Denning, 1989). Spafford analyzed and
described the characteristics of a Worm to self-replicate and spread itself to computer
systems over a network. Spafford also explored issues with Worm replication over the
integrated network known today as the Internet. Spafford is credited with dissecting the
November 1988 Internet Worm incident that infected thousands of machines (Denning,
1989). Spafford describes how the Worm attack known as the Morris Worm worked its
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way through a series of inter-connected computer systems. Spafford raises concerns with
possible attacks on other computer systems/networks in which commerce, transportation,
utilities, defense, space flight and other critical activities depended on system interconnectivity (Denning, 1989). Other researchers would begin additional research into
various malware classes.
Eichin and Rochlis (1989) also began to analyze the inadvertent Internet Worm
attack in 1989 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Their published paper
defines the classification of the Internet "Worm" as a "virus" (Eichin & Rochlis, 1989).
Their paper leverages some of the work from Cohen but began to deviate from
classifying malware by executable code (Eichin & Rochlis, 1989). Instead, Eichin and
Rochlis begin to describe the possible intent of development teams of releasing malware
to attack specific computer targets. Their research was the first published work that
focused on the targeting strategies employed to execute a specific malware attack (Eichin
& Rochlis, 1989). This research also discussed the effective and ineffective defenses
used by the larger “Internet” community as a whole (Eichin & Rochlis, 1989). Their
work at MIT detailed a step by step account of the Internet crisis of 1988. Their work
outlined the various defensive security flaws that were exploited to attack the “interconnected” systems. Their work also described the propagation of the Worm/Virus
across the Internet. This research emphasized the corrective actions needed to prevent
future attacks.
Seeley at the University of Utah also analyzed the same November 1988 Internet
Worm incident. Seeley analyzed the program, systems and the executables needed to
propel the attack (Seeley, 1989). Seeley examined the Worm program, a 99-line
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bootstrap program written in the C language and a needed object file used in UNIX
systems such as VAX and Sun (Seeley, 1989). The basic goals of the attack was to locate
systems across the network, penetrate those systems by exploiting security flaws with
remote connections and replicate and execute the Worm (code) on the remote system
(Seeley, 1989). Penetration of a remote systems was accomplished in one of three ways;
1) taking advantage of security flaws in the “listening” server, 2) exploiting the “trap
door” in the SMTP mail service, or 3) guessing passwords for administrative accounts or
taking advantage of non-set passwords to elevate credentials (Seeley, 1989). Seeley also
outlined the defensive measures used by the Worm to prevent detection by inhibiting
analysis of the program. The worm’s simplest means of hiding itself was to change the
program name and directory (Seeley, 1989). Seeley’s work set the stage for analyzing
malware from an attacker’s defensive perspective.
In 2002, other researchers continued to investigate the 2001 Worm attack. Moore
et al. (2002) analyzed the Code Red worm which infected thousands (359,000) of hosts
across the Internet in 2001 in less than 14 hours. Additional research for more advanced
Worm malware highlight how the Storm Worm can be used to create botnets used by bot
masters to send spam emails or perform distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS)
(Kanich et al., 2008). The estimated cost of the Code-Red malware epidemic to be in
excess of $2.6 billion (Moore et al., 2002). The researchers used various techniques to
analyze how multiple worm-infected computers worked to propagate the Code-Red
Worm and consume network bandwidth in a targeted and coordinated manner (Moore et
al., 2002).
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In 2004, Williamson et al. presented the idea of Virus Throttling. Virus
Throttling was a technique used to slow the spread of worms and viruses by disrupting
their propagation activities largely over TCP/IP (Williamson et al., 2004). This research
was conducted in conjunction with Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and
Hewlett Packard (HP). The Virus Throttling concept was used to prevent an infected
machine from infecting other machines on the same network (Williamson et al., 2004).
The end result of such a technique was that there were fewer machines infected and there
was less traffic generated by the virus over the network (Williamson et al., 2004). The
technique worked well for Worms that used TCP/IP protocols and seemed to have
promise for other protocols. The propagation of Worms at this time was largely
attributed to the use of Instant Messaging over corporate networks. Malware being spread
over Instant Messaging was a growing concern and represented a significant threat at this
time (Williamson et al., 2004). Virus Throttling was a technique used to address a
specific malware using certain protocols. This was a step forward in terms of addressing
specific malware behaviors.
Trojans
Ken Thompson, in 1984, wrote an additional seminal paper regarding Trojan
malware (Thompson, 1984). His lecture “Reflections of Trust” was widely publicized for
identifying a problem known today as a Trojan malware. His presentation was awarded
the 1984 Turing Award for clearly presenting, explaining, and demonstrating a practical
and dangerous Trojan attack using a UNIX standard compiler (Wheeler, 2005). His
presentation demonstrated how to modify the Unix C compiler to inject a Trojan piece of
code into an executable program (Wheeler, 2005). The injected code modified the
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operating system login program to escalate privileges and grant root access to the UNIX
system (Wheeler, 2005). Thompson then demonstrated the ability to modify and
recompile the compiler itself with additional code designed to detect the existence of
Trojans in compiled code (Wheeler, 2005). Once the additional code was added, the
“Trojan code” attack would be removed from the source code so that no source code
could be detected (Wheeler, 2005). Thompson presented that these Trojan attacks could
persist through numerous recompilations and cross-compilations of the compiler
(Wheeler, 2005). He then presented that no level of source-level verification or scrutiny
will protect systems from such embedded malware code. In fact, he described that the
problem could exist at lower levels beyond the compiler such as assembly level code or
even hardware microcode which would be harder to detect (Wheeler, 2005). Thompson
implemented his attack on a Bell Labs UNIX C compiler and successfully launched the
attack on another Bell Labs group computer systems (Wheeler, 2005). His attacks were
never detected within Bell Labs and the malicious compiler was never released outside of
Bell Labs (Wheeler, 2005). This research began to propel other research into Trojan
malware and investigation into detection methods for executable code.
Botnets
Botnets represent the greatest threat to the internet according to multiple
researchers (Barakat & Khattab, 2010). Bots represent an infected host that has a
connection via a network to a botmaster (Barakat & Khattab, 2010). A botnet represents
a number of infected hosts end-hosts under the command and control (C&C) of a botmaster (Barakat & Khattab, 2010). Botnets set out to infiltrate and connect more
vulnerable machines to the botmaster. Recruiting additional bots is usually done
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exploiting various software vulnerabilities or by propagating malware to eventually
exploit a host (Vogt, Aycock, & Jacobson, 2007). All botnets are controlled by at least
one command and control (C&C) channel tied to at least one botmaster but in many cases
there are several primary and secondary botmasters (Vogt et al., 2007). Communication
channels are established in order to receive commands and funnel information back to the
botmaster (Vogt et al., 2007).

These channel have become more sophisticated over time

by encrypting traffic and exfiltrating key information about the end-points,
configurations, platforms, networks and organization (Vogt et al., 2007). The main
purpose of such a secure communication channel is to provide a command and control
(C&C) medium for the botmaster’s commands (Vogt et al., 2007). Botnets are constantly
recruiting new bots by exploiting different software vulnerabilities for end-points,
replicating itself using the same malware to other hosts and using advanced propagation
techniques to spread across various networks (Barakat & Khattab, 2010). Newly recruited
hosts often download the latest version of the “bot code” and runs this code on the endpoint typically in the background. However, this new software establishes connections to
primary and secondary C&C servers. Once established and going undetected usually by
running as a known service infected machines communicate and execute the commands
of the botmaster (Vogt et al., 2007). Most C&C channels operate at the application layer
and can establish IRC chat protocol to further hide their activities (Barakat & Khattab,
2010). Establishing IRC chat protocols and using open source P2P protocols can put
organizations end-points and networks at great risk of being taken over by botnets and
super-botnets (Barakat & Khattab, 2010). Additionally, sophisticated botnets can also
implement encryption and/or digitally sign instructions to make it almost impossible for
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network security and defensive operations to detect and stop a botnet attack (Barakat &
Khattab, 2010).
Backdoors
Landwehr et al. (1994) provide some additional definitions of security flaws that
then could be used as an attack vector. The researchers defined security flaws as "any
conditions or circumstances that can result in denial of service, unauthorized disclosure,
unauthorized destruction of data, or unauthorized modification of data” (Landwehr et al.,
1994). These researchers developed a taxonomy for security flaws and detailed over 50
actual security flaws. The goal for developing such a taxonomy was to organize or
classify computer security flaws by type in order to prevent the exploitation of
unintended security flaws and purposeful misuse of flaws to compromise computer
systems (Landwehr et al., 1994). This research was similar to the Research in Secured
Operating Systems (RISOS) project and Protection Analysis project conducted by
Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California (Landwehr et al.,
1994). Moreover, the researchers wanted to bring attention to the inherent security flaws
in software and the consequence of these security flaws in operating systems (Landwehr
et al., 1994).
Exploits
In 2000, McGraw and Morrisett published a paper that presented the growing
malware problem. This paper detailed a historical perspective of malware and the
various approaches to detect and remove malicious files (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000).
McGraw and Morrisett (from Cornell University) chaired a group of over twenty
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malware researchers from across the world to elevate a world-wide malware discussion
and a call to action (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000). The groups discussed such issues as
the increasing complexity of computer systems and the networks that deliver
connectivity. The group also discussed the ease computer extensibility and the
susceptibility of these “networked” computer systems to be attacked. The group also
concluded that any networked computing system is susceptible to malware or hostile
code. However, the researchers also pointed out that an ever-present network, like the
internet, provide attack vectors with ease (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000). The group also
came to the realization that attackers no longer have to gain physical access to computer
systems to propagate attacks. Networks, not physical access, become the highway to
drive malware attacks (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000). Networks combined with rising
system complexity provide more avenues for attack and complex systems make it easier
to hide or mask malicious code (McGraw & Morrisett, 2000).
Ransomware
Ransomware has become quite popular for cyber-criminals over the past few
years. This type of malware has grown by some accounts by 500% each year since 2013
(Symantec, 2014). Ransomware has been classified as a Trojan variant or virus
depending upon the particular malware variant infecting the system (Khakhutskyy,
2016). Although ransomware is thought to be fairly recent, ransomware has been around
for nearly thirty years (Hampton & Baig, 2015). Ransomware is used by cyber criminals
infect and encrypt data/files such that access to this information is only granted once
ransom or financial arrangements have been made to provide the “key” to unlock these
files (Gazet, 2010). However, these types of attacks are not new. The PC CYBORG
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(AIDS) as an example was delivered to many computers via a floppy disk in 1989
(Hampton & Baig, 2015). The PC CYBORG trojan then encrypted files and instructed
users via a socially engineered message to pay a license fee with a $189 check to a
company in Panama (Hampton & Baig, 2015). Much of the 1990’s ransomware was
driven by amateur hackers in order to test and demonstrate technical capability (Hampton
& Baig, 2015).
Ransomware began to rise in the early 2000’s as malware developers started to
sell their “bot-nets” (Bechtel, 2014). Malware developers started to see a market for their
“bot-nets” and began to profit from direct information theft and advertising revenue
(Bechtel, 2014). The early 2000’s also saw an increase in theft of banking credentials or
sensitive passwords (Condon, 2012). By the late 2000’s, malware developers started to
work together and share compromised assets for sale to the highest bidder (Hampton &
Baig, 2015). It was these networks of “bots” that enabled cyber criminals to launch
large-scale attacks on organizations (Condon, 2012). It was about this time that nation
state organizations also started to realize the benefit of such networks (Carlson, Davis, &
Leach, 2014). Cyber criminals were now positioned to offer cyber-attacks to steal
intellectual property, run sophisticated phishing campaigns and propagate networks
further into targeted organizations (Hampton & Baig, 2015).
Until 2011, ransomware attacks had been isolated and unsophisticated (Condon,
2012). In late 2011, ransomware began to directly attack end-users in mass (Hampton &
Baig, 2015). By 2012, ransomware launched a major cyber-attack attacking the more
connected internet user base and prey on the hype of computer viruses (Hampton & Baig,
2015). In 2012, ransomware developers launched large-scale end-user attacks with “Fake
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Anti-virus” (Kharraz et al., 2015). These fake attacks tricked end-users into believing
they had been infected by a serious virus and needed to pay for non-existent AV software
to remediate the remedy and restore the compromised system (Krebs, 2012). Information
security companies and researchers alerted the public to the scam shortly after the attack,
However, due to the sheer number of these attacks, the credit card companies responded
to payments made to the “Fake AV” and this first ransomware attack was virtually shut
down overnight (Krebs, 2012).
More sophisticated ransomware attacks began to take place around 2005.
Malware known as “lockers” began to emerge and stage denial of service attacks on
infected systems (Young & Yung, 2016). These early “lockers” attacked boot operations
and would not allow the machine to initialize until the “ransom” request was paid (Young
& Yung, 2016). Early “lockers” did not attack our touch the file system and remained in
memory after boot-up. Most security companies responded to these “locker” attacks by
extending Anti-Virus software to remove malicious software (Young & Yung, 2016).
More advance “locker” attacks were seen in late 2005 with the PGPCoder/GPCode
locker. The PGPCoder/GPCode encryption locker was the first instance of ransomware
where files and content was encrypted and released for payment (Young & Yung, 2016).
Malware attackers released various versions of GPCode and many of these versions were
released were greatly flawed. The flawed GPCode had issues poorly implemented
encryption routines, breakable encryption keys and recovery of deleted content (Hampton
& Baig, 2015). Malware developers began to strengthen GPCode over time and improve
the many issues with encryption and encryption keys (Young & Yung, 2016). The
GPCode malware was not the only limiting factor for ransomware. Directly attacking
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end-users required many points of contact including the end-user, end-user payment
gateways, cyber-attacker payment gateway and ultimately the malware developer
(Hampton & Baig, 2015). This payment of ransom process was complex and risky. The
many points of contact could slow the pace of payment and encumber the extortion
process by allowing law enforcement to intervene to stop or track payments (Hampton &
Baig, 2015).
In 2013, ransomware met with the perfect storm for delivering and executing
ransomware around the world. The perfect storm was represented by three components:
1) strong and unbreakable encryption technology, 2) anonymous delivery and exchange
of encryption keys and 3) untraceable methods to execute ransom payments (Hampton &
Baig, 2015). CTB-Locker was the first ransom malware to take advantage of the perfect
storm. CTB stands for “Curve, TOR, and Bitcoin” (Hampton & Baig, 2015). The
“curve” represented the elliptic curve cryptography implemented to encrypt the targeted
files/content. The Onion Routing (TOR) protocol enabled anonymous communication for
key exchange. Bitcoin provided secure and untraceable crypto-currency transactions in
order pay ransom. The CTB-Locker model still provides the means for new generation of
ransom malware to deny access, secure key exchange and make untraceable payments
(Young & Yung, 2016). According the Symantec ransomware grew at 500% in 2013
likely due to the perfect storm (Symantec, 2014). Large, medium and small organizations
were hit with the CTB-Locker ransomware. However, large corporate organizations had
backup solutions that offer protection for a number of threats. Many medium and small
organizations did not and still do not have the financial or technical resources to develop
the necessary backup solutions to address these threats.
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Today’s malware researchers offer that the ransomware can be easily defeated
with collaboration and sharing of malware (Kharraz et al., 2015). However, many
information security experts suggest that history should be a lesson for improving
malware over time (Kharraz et al., 2015).
Ransomware continues to own the media and prey on the public’s fear of losing
access to their information (Hampton & Baig, 2015). The security industry and academic
community is always playing catchup with advanced malware threats such as
ransomware (Wüchner et al., 2014). Currently, ransomware has the technical and
financial model for much larger payoffs (Kharraz et al., 2015). It is imperative that
ransomware be monitored and analyzed for new and improved releases (Hampton &
Baig, 2015). The ransomware financial model is simply too lucrative to ignore. At some
point, ransomware will migrate and target large corporate networks such as banks,
hospitals and critical infrastructure. Sooner rather than later, large enterprise
organizations will have address the threat of ransomware within their operational
environment.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a term used to describe a new type of
malware attack (Tankard, 2011). The term Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) was
originally identified as a specific type of malware by the United States Air Force in 2006
(Rekdal & Bloemerus, 2013). APT’s have been described as well-funded, technically
advanced and well-organized with financial motivations (Rekdal & Bloemerus, 2013).
APT attacks are typically unique and utilize multiple attack vectors to gain access to
networks (Rekdal & Bloemerus, 2013). APTs employ advanced techniques to avoid
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detection and remain on infected systems for long periods of time before activation
(Rekdal & Bloemerus, 2013). In 2011, high profile APT attacks gained notoriety by
attacking some of the who’s who for Government and technology organizations (Rekdal
& Bloemerus, 2013). Commercial organizations such as Sony, RSA Security, Lockheed
Martin, Citigroup, Fox Broadcasting and Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) were faced
with new types of attacks (Nicho & Khan, 2014). United States Government
organizations such as the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Treasury were also targeted (Nicho &
Khan, 2014). Europe also faced similar struggles with this new type of malware.
European organizations such as the European Space Agency, the British and French
treasuries were also targeted by APTs (Nicho & Khan, 2014).
APT malware has quickly become a major issue for information security and
leaders around the world (Molok, Ahmad, & Chang, 2012). APTs employ stealthy
techniques to breach networks and establish long term surveillance within the network
(Molok et al., 2012). Malware developers for APTs are concerned with breaching
systems and gaining unauthorized access to systems over time (Nicho & Khan, 2014).
The first phase for an APT is typically breaching and evading detection for extended
periods of time (Molok et al., 2012). The second phase for APT’s is to gather
intelligence and perform reconnaissance within the breached network (Molok et al.,
2012). APT’s intelligence gathering and reconnaissance is sophisticated and literature
suggests very targeted to the organization (Symantec, 2014). During the intelligence
gathering phase, APTs try to gain insight into operational aspects of the organization such
as information assets, business functions, approval authorities and “normal”
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communications (Molok et al., 2012). After the intelligence has been gathered, APTs
begin to capture the necessary credentials, gain access or escalate privileges in order to
achieve the target objective (Rekdal & Bloemerus, 2013). APT attackers tend to target
large organizations such as financial services, government and defense contractors
(Symantec, 2014). In 2010, Google, Adobe and other large U.S. organizations were
reportedly breached by Chinese APT attacks that stole intellectual property, email
accounts, and other organizational information (Panda Security, 2014). The APTs then
sent the stolen information to Taiwanese IP addresses (Panda Security, 2014). APT’s
remain a powerful malware and represent a major threat to businesses and Governments.
However, APT’s remain the least studied and the least understood of all malware (Nicho
& Khan, 2014). It is understood that APT’s adapt constantly and take advantage of
polymorphic techniques to evade detection for long periods of time (Kaur, 2014).
Several studies and authors suggest that the sophistication and targeting of APT malware
may represent the next wave of military conflict (Dunlap, 2011) .
Analyzing and Detecting Malware
In 1995, Lo et al. developed detection tools for various types of malware
including computer viruses, worms, Trojans, and logic bombs (Lo, Levitt, & Olsson,
1995). This research was one of the first detection approaches that included Static
Analysis for the malware in question (Lo et al., 1995). The detection method used was
called the Malicious Code Filter (MCF). MCF was used to detect malicious code and
security related vulnerabilities in software (Lo et al., 1995). MCF could be used to
perform off-line analysis to determine indications of compromise. The researchers
proposed MCF to slice the program into small functions or “code pieces” in order to
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analyze the overall program. Each sub-function could be analyzed to determine the
maliciousness. Program slicing techniques were used to evaluate and collect the
program properties (Lo et al., 1995). This approach enabled researchers to evaluate a
number of sub-functions of a larger program to determine overall malicious behavior.
The researchers also proposed an approach to defeat “program slicing” and the potential
countermeasures needed to maintain detection rates (Lo et al., 1995).
In 1998, Lee and Stolfo, working at Columbia University developed a general and
systematic methodology for Intrusion Detection using data mining techniques. The
researchers leveraged pattern recognition and machine learning techniques in order to
model program execution properties and user behavior (W. Lee & Stolfo, 1998). The
techniques employed were able to analyze system call data with network tcpdump data in
order to detect potential anomalies from both programs and user behavior (W. Lee &
Stolfo, 1998). The researchers were able to construct concise and accurate classifiers by
using the association rules algorithm and the frequent episodes algorithm (W. Lee &
Stolfo, 1998). These two algorithms were used to compare both intra-and inter-audit
record patterns (W. Lee & Stolfo, 1998). Using this approach, researchers could analyze
both standard and abnormal program or user behaviors. The discovered patterns then
could be used to facilitate additional feature selection to improve detection rates.
In 2001, Wagner and Dean developed static and behavioral analysis methods for
host-based intrusion detection. The researchers working at University of California
Berkeley developed methods to examine program specifications and behaviors exhibited
at time of execution (Wagner & Dean, 2001). Static analysis for the first time was being
used for intrusion detection and the researchers recognized that attacks should have
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atypical behavioral characteristics (Wagner & Dean, 2001). Wagner & Dean developed a
specification for a program based upon the results from static analysis. Secondly, the
authors used execution monitoring to determine whether the program executed as
expected. The primary challenge for the researchers was to develop an intrusion
detection technique with low false positive rates (Wagner & Dean, 2001). The
researchers were able to develop a static analysis and execution monitoring approach to
look for unexpected execution of functions. This approach was able to demonstrate
positive results for host-based intrusion detection. The authors highlight three distinct
advantages for analysis using both static and dynamic analysis: 1) achieves a high degree
of automation, 2) provides protection against a broad class of malware attacks based on
corrupted code, and 3) limited false positives or “false alarms” (Wagner & Dean, 2001).
In 2003, Linn and Debray working at the University of Arizona, researched
techniques used to obfuscation executable code to avoid static disassembly. Static
analysis provides the ability to expose machine code into human readable functions that
then can be used to reverse engineer software executables (Linn & Debray, 2003). Static
analysis, while helpful in malware research, creates deep insight into the logic of
executables and the library of functions used by the software by detailing the stepfunctions as the code executes. This insight provides malware analysts the ability to look
into the executable and look for malicious functions as they execute. Static analysis also
offers the opportunity for others to reverse engineer software and steal intellectual
property from legitimate software providers (Linn & Debray, 2003). As part of the
reverse engineering, executable disassembly provides a translation from machine code to
assembly code (Linn & Debray, 2003). Code and function obfuscation techniques are
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used by software developers in order to disrupt reverse engineering and program
disassembly by making programs harder to disassemble correctly (Linn & Debray, 2003).
Linn and Debray concluded the paper with a discussion on two static disassembly
algorithms that break obfuscation and various techniques used to impede these
algorithms.
In 2005, Gheorghescu, working at Microsoft Corporation, performed research that
would automate malware classification. The research conducted provided advanced
malware classification methods to aid in the detection of malware. Classification and
naming of viruses is helpful for sharing discovered malware. However, the anti-virus
industry did not adhere to a standard naming convention causing issues with processing
new malware samples (Gheorghescu, 2005). Standard naming conventions could
significantly speed the determination of files being malware or benign. The researchers
introduced an innovative classification system for desktop computers. The classification
compared new and unknown samples with known database of malware within minutes.
This approach would also track samples based on evolution of the malware sample
(Gheorghescu, 2005). Gheorghescu’s approach used three matching algorithms to
process malware samples and based on the results made determinations of good or bad.
The research also presented methods for malware-handling tasks including sample
clustering, outbreak detection, automatic virus naming, and phylogeny tree
(Gheorghescu, 2005).
In 2006, Baecher et.al., working at the University of Mannheim, developed and
presented a platform for processing a large-scale collection of self-replicating malware
collected in the wild (Baecher, Koetter, Holz, Dornseif, & Freling, 2006), At this point in
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time, there was little empirical data (quantitative or qualitative) to describe selfreplicating malware. The inability to harness empirical data hampered many countermeasures for malware including network-based and host-based intrusion detection
(Baecher et al., 2006). The Nepenthes platform, provided an emulation platform to
expose and capture attack data. The Nepenthes platform also provided a means to
capture empirical data about self-replicating malware and a means to analyze thousands
of samples of previously unknown malware (Baecher et al., 2006). The data collected by
the Nepenthes platform provided the empirical data capture to vendors such as host-based
IDS/anti-virus systems (Baecher et al., 2006).
Kolter and Maloof (2006), describe the use of machine learning and data mining
to detect and classify malicious executables found in the wild. The researchers, from
Stanford University and Georgetown, gathered nearly 2000 benign and 1,700 malicious
executables to perform advanced classification research. The researchers extracted more
than 255 million distinct n-grams from these two sample sets. N-grams are used to
extract substrings of a file for a fixed length n. These n-grams can be efficiently
collected and analyzed for signatures. The researchers processed and extracted feature
for 3,700 files (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). The researchers evaluated a variety of inductive
methods, including naive Bayes, decision trees, support vector machines, and boosting to
process n-gram samples (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). The researchers found that boosted
decision trees outperformed other algorithms with an area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve of 0.996. The researchers proposed an analysis methodology
that should scale to larger collections of samples. The conducted studies examined three
key parameters: the size of n-grams, the size of words and the number of selected features
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(Kolter & Maloof, 2006). Due to limited computational resources the study was unable to
evaluate exhaustively all methods for all settings. However, once the researchers applied
detectors to 291 malicious executables the true-positive rate of 98% and a desired falsepositive rate of less than 5%. This was an important finding as the methodology
suggested that the approach could be used in operational systems for detecting unknown
malicious samples (Kolter & Maloof, 2006).
In 2006, Lee and Mody presented methods for systems to automatically classify
malware into families or categories. Their approach monitored runtime behavior of
applications and captured the series of functions as they were executed (T. Lee & Mody,
2006). Based upon these environmental parameters the system was able to categorize
applications. The system accurately classified malware based on execution properties
and behavioral characteristics operating in a Microsoft-based computer system (T. Lee &
Mody, 2006). The researchers constructed a knowledge base of application groups by
sampling a large population of applications. Based upon the set of known functions and
behaviors exhibited by prior classifications, the system was able to classify new
applications into known application groups and render a verdict of whether the
application was malware (T. Lee & Mody, 2006).
In 2007, Bilar, from Wellesley College (Massachusetts), presented a paper to
discuss detection mechanisms for malicious code through statistical analysis of operation
code (opcode) distributions (Bilar, 2007). The researcher analyzed, disassembled and
performed opcode frequency distribution for 67 malware executables (Bilar, 2007).
These results were compared to those of 20 non-malicious samples. Bilar (2007) found
that the malware opcode distributions did significantly differ from that of non-malicious
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samples. In addition, unique opcodes seem to be a stronger predictor as many of the
malware samples had unique frequency distribution patterns (Bilar, 2007). The
researchers found that sixty opcodes accounted for 99.8% of opcodes found in both
malicious and benign samples. However, 14 malicious opcodes accounted for 92% of the
total extracted opcodes and the top 5 malicious opcodes accounted for 65% of the
extracted opcodes. This research would be used as the basis for using machine learning
for detection of malware.
In 2007, Martignoni, Christodorescu and Jha discussed the growing threat of
malware due to the sophistication of malware evading signature-based detection
(Martignoni, Christodorescu, & Jha, 2007). The malware developers can easily evade
detection by "packing" the malicious payload in layers of compression or encryption
(Martignoni et al., 2007). The researchers describe state-of-the-art malware detection
using both static and dynamic techniques to uncover the packed malware. These
techniques are slow due to off-line nature of the analysis and prove to be highly
ineffective due to the metamorphic nature of the malware (Martignoni et al., 2007). The
researchers proposed a new technique known as OmniUnpack. The OmniUnpack
approach closely monitors the execution of a program in real-time and detects the
“unpacking” when the program has removed the various layers of packing (Martignoni et
al., 2007). OmniUnpack improved “packed” malware detection by analyzing the
unpacked malicious payload during runtime execution. Experimental results
demonstrated quite effective detection results with low overhead.
In 2008, Ye, Wang, Li, Ye, & Jiang discussed the failure of the traditional
signature-based anti-virus systems to detect polymorphic/metamorphic malware (Ye et
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al., 2008). The researchers also discussed that the traditional signature-based anti-virus
systems were also blind to new and previously unseen malicious executables (Ye et al.,
2008). The researchers discussed that data mining techniques are needed due to large and
growing collections of malware (Ye et al., 2008). The research presented involved
analyzing and developing profiles for Windows APIs called by PE files. The researchers
discuss the results of their Intelligent Malware Detection System (IMDS) using
Objective-Oriented Association (OOA) mining based classification (Ye et al., 2008).
IMDS consisted of three major modules: 1) PE parser, 2) OOA rule generator, and 3) rule
based classifier. This study outperformed commercial software products such as Norton
Anti-Virus and McAfee VirusScan (Ye et al., 2008). This approach also outperformed
previous data mining based detection systems using Naive Bayes, Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and Decision Tree techniques (Ye et al., 2008). The study demonstrated
a solid approach for polymorphic and metamorphic malware detection.
In 2009, Rieck et al. present issues with malware variants (polymorphism) and the
use of obfuscation to hinder detection at the file level (Rieck, Trinius, Willems, & Holz,
2009). The researchers acknowledge that the amount and diversity of malware variants
render classic security defenses like anti-virus ineffective (Rieck et al., 2009). The
research suggested that the sheer volume of attacks from malware including viruses,
worms and Trojans make detection more difficult by the day (Rieck et al., 2009). The
volume combined with obfuscation and polymorphism techniques require a new
approach for detection. The researchers believe that a machine learning approach was
needed to solve the polymorphic malware growing problem. The research presented
offers a framework for automatically identifying novel classes of malware with similar
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behavior (clustering) and assigning unknown malware to these discovered classes
(classification) (Rieck et al., 2009). These techniques, clustering and classification,
allowed for improved detection and an environment to process thousands of malware
binaries. Further, clustering and classification provided improved discovery of novel
malware variants.
In 2009, Bayer et.al., working on conjunction with University of California Santa
Barbara and University of Vienna, developed automated environment to analyze malware
samples in a controlled environment (U. Bayer, Milani-Comparetti, Hlauscheck, Kruegel,
& Kirda, 2009). This automated environment would also produce reports that detailed
the program’s actions during execution. These details were then used to analyze both
benign and malware samples. The researchers then explored clustering techniques to
identify samples based on execution behavior. The researchers admitted that previous
clustering techniques did not scale and failed to generalize the observed behavior (U.
Bayer et al., 2009). The new approach proposed a scalable clustering approach to identify
and classify malware samples. The researchers performed dynamic analysis to capture
execution traces for malware programs. Profiles for malware were generated using these
execution traces in a generalized manner (U. Bayer et al., 2009). These profiles were
then used as input into a scalable clustering algorithm capable of handling large datasets.
Dai, Guha and Lee (2009) provide unique insight into malware classification by
analyzing frequency distribution or unique call sequences for various types of malware.
The researchers approach malware detection through extracting dynamic instruction
sequences from malware through data mining techniques (Dai et al., 2009). The
researchers extracted runtime instruction sequences from unknown executables and
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organized instruction sequences into basic blocks in order to evaluate malware (Dai et al.,
2009). The extraction techniques used were based on certain instruction sequence
patterns based on instruction associations with derived basic blocks (Dai et al., 2009).
The researchers used a data mining processes to perform feature extraction, feature
selection and to build the classification model (Dai et al., 2009). This approach yielded
accurate, reliable and efficient predictive classification model for malware detection.
In 2010, Devesa et al. presented that a significant security threat exists due to the
exponential growth in malware (viruses, Trojans or worms) (Devesa et al., 2010). The
researchers define malware as any kind of program explicitly designed to harm or disrupt
computer system operations (Devesa et al., 2010). In order to mitigate the malware
problem, all incoming code must be analyzed to classify these files as malware or benign
software. The most common approach is to combine static and dynamic analysis
techniques in order to extract execution properties for the unknown files (Devesa et al.,
2010). However, due to the escalation in polymorphic and metamorphic malware attacks
the manually analyzing thousands of suspicious files each day would be futile (Devesa et
al., 2010). The researchers proposed an emulation environment for testing that provided
secure and safe execution of suspicious code. The environment properties to classify
samples with several machine-learning algorithms (Devesa et al., 2010). The study tested
the proposed system real malware samples. The initial results from the study reported
reliable results with high performance for the malware sample set.
In 2010, Paulevé et al. working in France, applied Locality Sensitive Hashing
(LSH) to dramatically improve performance for processing pattern recognition to be
applied to malware detection (Paulevé, Jégou, & Amsaleg, 2010). The researchers
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viewed traditional search schemes as computationally expensive and poorly fitting for
real data sets (Paulevé et al., 2010). Although several extensions had been proposed to
address the limitations, there had not been a comprehensive review of the algorithms or
recommendations for “real world data”. The study conducted a comparison of several
families of space hashing functions in a real world environment (Paulevé et al., 2010).
The comparison included random projections, lattice quantizers, k-means and
hierarchical k-means. The finding demonstrated that the unstructured quantizer
significantly improved the accuracy of LSH (Paulevé et al., 2010). The study also
discussed the previous findings concerning LSH, merits and limitations to the proposed
LSH approach.
In 2011, Bailey et al. presented a study to highlight the ineffectiveness of AntiVirus (AV) commercial products. The researchers used a large collection of malware
that spanned a variety of attack vectors (e.g., spyware, worms, spam) to demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of AV in an operational environment (Bailey, Oberheide, & Andersen,
2011). Further, the study showed that AV products mischaracterized malware and failed
in large part to semantically define malware or classes of malware. The authors proposed
a new classification technique that describes malware behavior in terms of system state
changes (e.g., files written, processes created) rather than in sequences or patterns of
system calls (Bailey et al., 2011). The researchers developed a methodology to
automatically categorize of malware into classes based on behaviors (Bailey et al., 2011).
The study also demonstrated that behavior-based clustering provided a more direct and
effective way to classify malware (Bailey et al., 2011).
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Alam, Horspool and Traore (2013) extended malware research by examining
dynamic binary obfuscation. Dynamic binary obfuscation is used by metamorphic
malware to generate a new sequence of opcodes in the memory in order to avoid
detection (Alam et al., 2013). Polymorphic and metamorphic malware is very difficult to
analyze manually because of the sophistication of such malware (Alam et al., 2013). The
researchers developed an automated tool and language named MAIL (Malware Analysis
Intermediate Language) to automate and optimize the analysis and detection process
(Alam et al., 2013). MAIL provided an element of portability for building metamorphic
malware analysis and detection due to the use of annotated control flow graphing used for
pattern matching (Alam et al., 2013). The study yielded detection rated for metamorphic
malware of 93.92% and a low false positive rate of 3.02% (Alam et al., 2013). This study
also discussed the re-use of functions from previous successful malware exploits. The
researchers also discussed the use of embedded compilers and obfuscation by
metamorphic malware to evade detection (Alam, et al., 2013).
In 2014, Tamersoy and Roundy, presented research for detecting both
polymorphic and metapmorphic malware. Their researchers stressed the need for new
detection methods due to the increasing sophistication of malicious software (Tamersoy
et al., 2014). The researchers call for new defensive techniques that are scalable and
agile to malware. The researchers propose a new algorithm that identifies malicious
executable files by applying reputational data with the file (Tamersoy et al., 2014). The
researchers constructed a large dataset from Norton Community Watch and performed
analysis for non-infected/infected machines and benign/malicious files resident on those
machines. The researchers then identified relationships that exist between machine and
75

malware (Tamersoy et al., 2014). This algorithm “Aesop” leverages locality-sensitive
hashing to measure the strength of these inter-file relationships (Tamersoy et al., 2014).
These relationships were used to construct a bi-partite graph to infer benign or malacious
(Tamersoy et al., 2014). The study produced impressive results with a 99.61% true
positive rate and a 0.01% false positive rate (Tamersoy et al., 2014).
In 2015, Mohaisen and Alrawi presented an aproach to automatically detect
metamorphic and polymorphic mawlare based on behavior exhibited during analysis.
Automated Malware (AMAL) provides both analysis and labeling (classification and
clustering) to improve malware detection (Mohaisen & Alrawi, 2015). AMAL consists
of two sub-systems, AutoMal and MaLabel. AutoMal provides tools to collect detailed
behavioral artifacts of file, memory, network and registry during execution (Mohaisen &
Alrawi, 2015). MaLabel uses the data provided by AutoMal to train and build classifiers.
AutoMal can be used with unsupervised learning by leveaging multiple clustering
algorithms for sample grouping (Mohaisen & Alrawi, 2015). The research presented
achieved a precision rate of 99.6%. The researchers also discussed several benchmarks,
costs estimates and measurements highlight and support the merits and features of
AMAL.
The foundational studies presented above were intended to provide a historical
perspective and context for malware research. Advanced detection studies are provided
below. Advanced detection studies provide deeper insight into designing, conducting and
evaluating malware experimental research. Additional details regarding advanced
detection studies referenced below are presented in Appendix A.
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Research Methods
Malware research is typically conducted using quantitative research methods
(Rossow et al., 2012). Quantitative studies have been used to observe and collect
datasets for a wide array of experiments (Creswell, 2007). In many cases, quantitative
malware experiments have been designed to improve detection models, study
longitudinal behaviors and validate prior malware research (Rossow et al., 2012). The
study was aligned with Rossow’s (2012) three basic concerns for conducting malware
research: 1) following a research methodology and being transparent with the study
details, 2) developing an experimental framework that uses the correct and representative
data and 3) the experiment must take due consideration to not harm the research,
resources or contaminate findings. Each of these concerns were addressed and discussed
in detail later in the study’s approach.
The experimental design and approach enabled for this research to advance the
study in stages. The staged approach enabled the research to conduct experiments and
validate results at various checkpoints. This approach provided flexibility for the
researcher and allowed the feature set and clustering algorithms to be utilized and
adjusted over time. The developed prototype environment was able to discover
polymorphic malware with multiple datasets – training datasets and experimental
datasets. The developed prototype environment was designed to inspect and determine
the malicious or benign attributes of files and compare results. The focus of this study
was to identify and detect Windows-based polymorphic malware. Windows has become
primary target for malware attacks and represents the largest population of end-points at
the enterprise level. An illustration of the proposed environment is provided below.
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This malware research followed the single-subject experimental approach
outlined by Neuman and McCormick (1995). Single-subject experimental design has
evolved over time to facilitate researchers quest to answer different types of questions
under varying experimental circumstances (Neuman & McCormick, 1995). The most
common single-subject experimental designs include are reversal designs, multiplebaseline designs and multi-element designs (Neuman & McCormick, 1995). The purpose
of using the single-subject design for this experiment was to develop a protocol that
worked nicely with the malware research subject area. It was believed that malware
research closely resembles that of medical research and thus can be used to evaluate
incremental treatments and measure results for drug treatment and patient care protocols.
Single-subject experimental design was used for this study as it paralleled baseline testing
with incremental treatment testing. This study achieved the desired goal to improve
malware detection given multidimensional topological data extracted from static analysis,
dynamic analysis and file property. This study further improved detection rates by
adding weighted multidimensional features from static analysis, dynamic analysis and
file properties to evaluate detection rates. This study was designed to answer two basic
research questions:
1) Can detection rates be improved by increasing the quality and quantity of
multidimensional features for the machine learning advanced clustering algorithms from
file properties, static and dynamic analysis?
2) Which of the machine learning advanced clustering algorithms performed
better given the multidimensional features from file properties, static and dynamic
analysis?
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The single-subject design provided a standard and widely accepted protocol to answer the
research questions posed for this study. The study followed the basic single-subject
protocol throughout the study:
1. Establish baseline data – established a baseline for detection given a standard
feature dataset with a standard clustering algorithm for polymorphic malware through
multiple measurements before an intervention. Currently the detection rates for
polymorphic detection rates using advanced classifiers range from 68.75% to 81.25%
(Amos et al., 2013). Three datasets were generated that allowed detection rates to exceed
the baseline detection rates of 68.75% to 81.25%.
2. Manipulate feature set – the standard feature dataset was augmented to evaluate
whether detection rates are improved after the intervention of features. A number of
studies examined dynamic analysis (Rieck, Trinius, Willems, & Holz, 2011), static
analysis (Kerchen et al., 1990) and file properties (Subramanya & Lakshminarasimhan,
2001). The study examined three multidimensional datasets. The three datasets were
generated by combining known malware, known benign and unknown samples into
single feature dataset. Once the baseline was generated, the feature weighting was
manipulated to see if detection rates would improve (Siddiqui, 2008).
3. Controlled procedures and environment – the developed prototype environment
and datasets were controlled to ensure the extracted feature dataset remained static over
time and the automated feature extraction process remained unaltered (Rossow et al.,
2012).
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4. Standard measurement approaches – a standard measurement approach was
completed after performing baseline detection measurements for known (malware and
benign) and unknown samples using multidimensional topological data with baseline
clustering. The study established baseline detection rates for each of the three clustering
algorithms: 1) Advanced Ensemble Classification (Bootstrap Aggregating (Meta
Bagging (MB)), 2) Instance Based k-Nearest Neighbor (IBk) and 3) Deep Learning
Multi-Layer Perceptron (DLMLP). Standard measurements included such measures as
Accuracy (ACC) and the Correlation Coefficient (CC), True Positive Rate (sensitivity
measure), and False Positive Rate (specificity measure). As specified by the standard
protocol, these measurements were established as a permanent observational recording
(Rossow et al., 2012).
5. Weighting of features – as part of this testing protocol the inputs were
manipulated and assessed. Within a single dataset, features were weighted in a structured
methodology, evaluated and assessed. The weighting of static features, dynamic to static
features and file properties to dynamic to static features were assessed to evaluate
improved detection rates for polymorphic malware.
6. Capturing testing results - All testing data were captured in terms of ACC, CC,
True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
7. Graphing results - All testing data were graphed and presented in terms of
ACC, CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
8. Evaluating results – results from test data was collected after each test. Each
test was analyzed with rigor to understand the ACC, CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and
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False Positive Rate (FPR). The test results from each test was evaluated and changes to
inputs were documented to understand detection rate improvement. The test results were
generated after each test and provision were made to ensure that the results were
accurately reported.
9. Test controls - the specific design for this study required that test controls
remain in place from one test to another such that the test data, interpretation of the data
test and conclusions reached from testing were reliable and believable.
The experimental design and approach enabled the researcher to advance the
study through a defined testing protocol. The testing protocol enabled the researcher to
conduct baseline testing and perform experimental testing with the various clustering
algorithms. The testing protocol also provided the researcher with a means to select,
weight feature sets, conducting testing and document results for the various clustering
algorithms. The testing protocol allowed the researcher to validate detection results in
stages and evaluate effectiveness. The experimental research methodology was
consistent with previous quantitative malware studies (Creswell, 2007). The study’s
methodology was constructed to improve detection models and validate test results prior
to conducting additional research (Rossow et al., 2012). The research design utilized a
widely accepted quantitative approach for conducting experimental studies similar to
those conducted in healthcare, drug trials and other medical studies (Rizvi & Nock,
2008).

Gaps in Current Literature
In both the foundational research and advanced detection studies there exists a
number of gaps for ongoing malware research. As the war against malware (Trojans,
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viruses, worms, APT’s, etc.) continues to escalate and spiral into unknown dimensions
some perspective is needed to understand the threat landscape. It is important to
understand and recognize that malware attacks are causing businesses and Governments
to lose billions of dollars (McAfee Labs, 2015). Malware research is unfortunately not
keeping pace with the adversary and the rapid escalation of polymorphic and
metamorphic malware has continued evade today’s detection techniques (Hansen, Mark,
Larsen, Stevanovic, & Pedersen, 2016).
In reviewing nearly six-hundred (584) articles and studies, roughly one fifth (124)
of those studies conducted advanced polymorphic malware research. However,
polymorphic malware remains a major threat for ransomware and other types of malware
(Kaur, 2014). More research is needed for polymorphic malware as the threat has
become more advanced. Polymorphic malware is thought to represent at least half of the
new malware released annually (Symantec, 2014). In addition, polymorphic malware
growth in 2012 was 392% (Qu & Hughes, 2013) and greater than 500% in 2015 (Gostev
et al., 2016). Due to the changing nature of polymorphic malware, additional malware
research is needed to identify the evolving characteristics of the malware in order to
provide better and different detection approaches. New techniques are needed to identify
and classify the evolving polymorphic families of malware (Kaur, 2014).
Another research gap identified is the dataset or “samples” used for conducting
malware research. There are many variations for collecting and testing malware datasets.
Some of the major malware researchers from industry and academic continue to make
samples available for consumption. Some of the major industry contributors include
McAfee, Symantec, Virus Total, etc. There are also a number of unaffiliated sites that
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offer malware for research as well. The unaffiliated sites include contagio, Virus Sign,
VxHeaven and others. The majority of reviewed studies collected and used malware
from these community of interest sites. In doing so, researchers leveraged known
malware samples for detection purposes and experiments. Researchers were able to
leverage these known malware datasets and validate new detection techniques with “live”
malware samples. However, few studies mentioned the use of benign samples in order to
validate detection. A majority (24 of 33) of the advanced malware detection studies
referenced “labeled” test data – meaning that the study knows all the samples submitted.
A minority of advanced malware detection studies used both known malware and known
benign samples in order to evaluate and validate detection rates. However, in reviewing
over thirty advanced malware studies not a single study evaluated a dataset with
unknown samples. Several leading researchers suggest that using unknown samples
would strengthen the study and offer additional validation for detection techniques
(Hansen et al., 2016). It is well understood that assembling a malware dataset for
research purposes is difficult. Finding additional benign and unknown samples makes
the task of assembling a rich dataset much more difficult. As Hansen (2016) points out,
there are significant benefits with constructing datasets that contains known malware,
known benign and unknown samples.
Due to the use of polymorphic and metamorphic techniques utilized by malware
developers, the number of unique malware ﬁles has exploded (Tamersoy et al., 2014). It
is the sheer number of these unique files that render signature detection essentially
useless (Fraley & Figueroa, 2016). However, there exists some number of unique
features that can identify “families” of malware (Wüchner et al., 2014). The challenge
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for improving malware detection is to find the right combinations that lead to better
results (Wüchner et al., 2014). Malware researchers have been utilizing varying
techniques to identify “clusters” of related malware families and use the proximity of the
clusters for detection (Tamersoy et al., 2014). Several researchers have offered that the
ﬁles can be clustered based on the result static or dynamic analysis (Hansen et al., 2016;
Kaur, 2014; Qu & Hughes, 2013). Other researchers have demonstrated unique file
properties and executable location may be used to detect malware (Mohaisen & Alrawi,
2015). Taking feature extraction outputs from both static and dynamic analysis would
allow the construction of a rich dataset. In addition to static and dynamic analysis
features, values such as file characteristics, environmental properties and file
relationships could be used for additional analysis (Mohaisen & Alrawi, 2015). Further,
advanced algorithms such as Meta Bagging (MB), Instance Based k-Nearest Neighbor
(IBk) and Deep Learning Multi-Layer Perceptron (DLMLP) use proximity clustering
algorithms to understand file-properties affinity and maliciousness (Yedidia, et al., 2003).
Thus, if one file is known as malicious with certain features it could be associated with
like files and features. Advanced clustering techniques such as General Belief
Propagation, Loopy Belief Propagation, Dynamic Bayesian Networks, Hidden Markov
Model (HMM), and Markov Random Field (MRF) could be examined and evaluated
using the rich dataset offered by combining the results of static and dynamic analysis
with file properties. These techniques have been examined by previous studies and
should prove to be a solid approach for future study. The benefit of advanced clustering
algorithms is that they may provide additional fidelity for analyzing feature clusters
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In summary, there are a number of gaps in current literature. The first issue is
there is not sufficient research for polymorphic malware. Polymorphic malware
continues to grow at rates that far exceed the ability to industry and academia to keep
pace. The second issue concerns the datasets used for research. The datasets should have
representation from three all types of files: 1) known malware, 2) known benign and 3)
unknown samples. Constructing dataset in this manner should yield more “real world”
detection results. Lastly, many of the malware studies have utilized advanced algorithms
based on either static or dynamic analysis. None of the studies reviewed combined the
features of both types of analysis in order to improve detection. By combining the
feature dataset and using advanced clustering algorithms should provide improved
polymorphic malware detection.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Current Studies
The research conducted for previous studies include both foundational malware
research (discussed in the previous section) as well as advanced detection studies in order
to establish a baseline for this study. It was important to establish a baseline of topics and
emerging malware research. It was also important to expand the understanding of
contemporary experimental research leading to advanced malware detection. For the
purpose of this discussion, the research referred to in this section is the Advanced
Malware Detection Studies presented later in this chapter. In researching, reviewing and
evaluating over thirty contemporary malware detection studies that span seven years
(2010-2016), researchers presented unique malware detection and classification using a
number of experimental approaches. The majority of the studies presented an
experimental framework for conducting the malware research. A number of the studies
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selected a sufficient sample size for conducting the research. Some of the better studies
conducted malware research and thoroughly evaluated detection findings. These findings
and results were analyzed to evaluate achieved detection rates in terms of True Positive
and False Positive rates.
The thirty-three (33) studies presented in the Advanced Malware Detection
Studies were reviewed and evaluated with the intent to leverage those positive aspects of
the for this study. These studies were reviewed and evaluated based on a number of
factors. The strengths of these studies include: 1) most of the studies (32 of 33)
performed the study through an experimental framework, 2) almost all the studies (31 of
33) surveyed were focused on improving malware detection with “live” or real malware
samples, 3) a majority of the studies (27 of 33) used dynamic analysis or static analysis to
perform feature extraction for their study, 4) almost all of the studies (32 of 33) utilized
advanced algorithms to aid or boost detection rates using features extracted from static or
dynamic analysis and 5) most of the studies (30 of 33) analyzed detection results with a
quantitative evaluation of study results. In most cases, the studies evaluated findings
with several statistical measures to evaluate detection effectiveness. These criteria are
typically used as statistical quality measures with machine learning. The statistical tests
used to evaluate the performance various algorithms can be evaluated with Accuracy
(ACC) and the Correlation Coefficient, True Positive Rate (sensitivity measure), and
False Positive Rate (specificity measure).
Upon deeper inspection, the studies collectively also had some weaknesses or
issues with conducting the research. The weaknesses for advanced malware studies
include: 1) malware sample storage - there is little to no discussion regarding the
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working with or securing “live” malware for the study or experiment, 2) sample size - the
range of malware samples tested was very large - nearly 23 million (from a low of 90
samples to a high of 24 million samples), 3) feature selection - not a single study (0 of
33) combined the features from both static and dynamic analysis – many of the studies
performed either static (14) or dynamic analysis (13), 4) malware classification or types
of malware used for the experiment was not disclosed or the study only worked with
known malware – there were no unknown samples to further test detection rates from a
blind study perspective and 5) the use of training datasets for machine learning – there
were varied and differing approaches to selecting, maintaining and using training
datasets. The weaknesses outlined here should not discount any work conducted.
However, addressing these issues can only help to improve future research.

Similar Research Methods
Researchers who choose to pursue quantitative research methods seek to
understand complex models and make knowledgeable claims regarding the subject matter
(Creswell, 2007). Researchers develop and apply strategies of inquiry or develop
evaluation methodologies to analyze complex models or to better understand phenomena
(Creswell, 2007). Strategies of inquiry or evaluation methodologies assist with the
overall research approach by focusing on the experiments, quasi-experiments or
correlational studies (Creswell, 2007). Quantitative research strategies design and
execute complex experiments with many variables and specialize in the treatment of
interdependent variables (Creswell, 2007). Quantitative studies seek to explain
experiments through structural equation models that explain and prototype experimental
outcomes (Creswell, 2007).
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Malware research is typically conducted using quantitative research methods
(Rossow et al., 2012). In the past, malware researchers have relied on quantitative
experimental designs to understand how malicious code behaves during execution
(Rossow et al., 2012). Quantitative studies have been used to observe and collect
datasets for a wide array of malware experiments. In many cases, malware experiments
were designed to improve detection models, study longitudinal behavior and validate
prior research (Rossow et al., 2012). The previous advanced malware detection
quantitative research methods have been reviewed and will be presented later in this
section.
Malware research, similar to other types of research, needs to construct the
appropriate framework for the experimental study. The research design must address a
number of basic concerns. The first concern is the research methodology. According to
Rossow (2012), the research methodology must be described sufficient detail in order to
enable allow other researchers to reproduce the approach. In addition, the methodology
must be transparent with the study’s details in order to fully share findings (Rossow et
al., 2012). Secondly, the experimental framework must have the correct and
representative dataset. Researchers must be careful with selecting and using datasets
such that bias is not introduced into the experiment (Rossow et al., 2012) Lastly, the
experiment must take due consideration to not harm others (Rossow et al., 2012).
Malware research must be very careful as these experiments are dealing with live
samples, similar to medical virus research. An outbreak of malware can harm not only
the experiment but also those resources around or supporting the research (Rossow et al.,
2012).
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The thirty-three (33) studies presented in the Advanced Malware Detection
Studies section were reviewed to understand: 1) the research methodology, 2) the dataset
and 3) the safeguards put in place in order to do no harm. Almost all the studies (32 of
33) performed the study through a quantitative experimental framework. The one study
that did not follow an experimental framework conducted an observational study.
Almost all studies (31 of 33) performed malware detection research with “live” or real
malware samples. A majority of the studies (27 of 33) used either dynamic or static
analysis as part of the experiment to extract further data for analysis. Almost all of the
studies (32 of 33) utilized advanced algorithms to aid or boost detection rates. However,
the majority of the studies did not provide sufficient details to replicate the study. Most
of the previous studies (30 of 33) analyzed detection results. In most cases, the findings
were evaluated with several statistical measures to evaluate detection effectiveness.
Overall, the Advanced Malware Detection Studies provided the necessary framework and
were fairly consistent with the experimental methodology and using representative
datasets.
Advanced Malware Detection Studies
Over sixty (60) contemporary malware detection studies were surveyed that
spanned seven years (2010-2016). These studies surveyed and reviewed to understand
the unique detection and classification approaches presented by the researchers. In order
to address current malware detection research for the proposed research were analyzed to
understand:
1) research approach or framework for the study;
2) sample size – both lableled and unlabled samples;
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3) feature selection - based on static or dynamic analysis;
4) use of machine learning (supervised/unsupervised training) or advanced
algorithms used to support detection;
5) evaluation of detection results.
After reviewing sixty studies, it became clear that number of studies had strengths and
weaknesses. However, studies that had severe weakness needed to be eliminated from
further review as they provided little or suspect value. Studies that did not provide a
solid research approach, a reasonable sample size or set and an evaluation of detection
results were eliminated from further review. In many cases, the evaluation 1) research
approach, 2) sample set and 3) evaluation of results were pass/fail. Based upon the
criteria above - twenty-seven (27) of the studies were eliminated from further review.
Some of the studies were eliminated due to the fact that they lacked sufficient detail
regarding the experimental research approach or how the experiment was conducted.
Other studies were eliminated due to the fact that they were unclear or vague about the
malware samples used for the experiment. Some of the eliminated studies had
contradictory discussions regarding the experimental research and the results. These
studies either did not specify or did not directly address the research approach for
conducting the malware study. Studies were also eliminated due to the fact of how the
malware detection results were either presented at a high level or not evaluated. In many
cases, the studies eliminated presented results but did not quantitatively present an
evaluation of the detection results achieved. Lastly, studies were eliminated because of
the malware sampling or how the malware was collected for the study. Only the studies
that clearly specified research framework, provided sufficient malware samples,
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evaluated detection results and remained as part of the next phase of reviewing current
research.
The remaining thirty-three (33) studies then reviewed and data extracted for
evaluation purposes. These studies were reviewed and evaluated based on a number of
factors.
1. Most of the studies (29 of 33) performed the study through an
experimental research framework;
2. All remaining studies (33 of 33) surveyed were focused on improving
malware detection with “live” malware samples;
3. A majority of the studies (27 of 33) used dynamic analysis or static
analysis to perform feature extraction for their study;
4. Almost all of the studies (32 of 33) utilized advanced algorithms to help or
boost detection rates and,
5. Most of the studies (30 of 33) analyzed detection results with a
quantitative evaluation of study results.
The highlights for the remaining malware experimental studies are presented in Table 1
below.
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Table 1 Advanced Detection Studies
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Summary
Detecting polymorphic and metamorphic malware continues to be a challenge for
the security community. A majority of the today’s security research is focused on
developing enhanced detection using techniques that collect, study, and mitigate
malicious code (Kolbitsch et al., 2009). However, new polymorphic malware and the
detection evading techniques render many of the current signature protections useless and
therefore leave end-points unprotected (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). The speed at
which polymorphic malware is advancing threatens enterprise computing and internet
operations (Symantec Corporation, 2016). Being able to detect polymorphic,
metamorphic and zero-day malware requires advanced detection techniques that provide
rapid adaptation, scalability and produce low false positive rates (Borojerdi & Abadi,
2013). This study offers an attractive alternative for detecting polymorphic malware
specifically targeting Windows operating systems. This study offers a single data set
containing known malware, known benign and unknown samples, feature extraction
methodology, a prototype environment and detection approach that far exceeded today’s
accepted baseline. The proposed methodology, experimental framework and
experimental design is presented next.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview
The purpose of this study was to develop a quantitative experimental prototype
using multidimensional topological data with machine learning using advanced clustering
to provide improved detection for polymorphic malware. The study ultimately yielded a
detection methodology for polymorphic malware with true positive detection rates well
above the established baseline range of 68.75% to 81.25% (Amos et al., 2013).
Quantitative methods were chosen in order to provide objective measurements for
malware detection (Babbie, 2010). The statistical, mathematical, or numerical analysis of
the data collected through the proposed malware experiments were conducted using
standard and accepted computational techniques (Babbie, 2010). Previous malware
research highlighted the need for correct and representative use of the datasets, proper
experimental methodology design such that there is sufficient transparency to enable
reproducibility, and safely conducting experiments such that no harm is caused to others
while performing the research (Rossow, 2013). This study leveraged past research for
selecting supervised and unsupervised machine learning training and experiments (Kaur,
2014).
Malware research relies mainly on observing or analyzing malicious code (H.
Yin, Song, Egele, Kruegel, & Kirda, 2007). Malware research methods must be cautious
in designing and conducting experiments that observe and analyze the execution of
malware within a real or virtual environment (Rossow, 2013). Malware experiments
must carefully and thoughtfully select datasets, detection models, and research
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methodologies in order to evaluate effectiveness (Hu, Wang, Li, Bai, & Jing, 2014).
Malware experiments must also study the longitudinal behavior and validate various
aspects of the research (Rossow, 2013). The experimental methodology utilized was
mindful of these requirements and carried out in a series of steps outlined below.
The experimental methodology had four components:
1) Secure dataset – The prototype protected the dataset (samples), data (feature
extraction from samples), experiment (cluster analysis) and experimental
resources with secure storage of malware, benign and unknown samples (over 2M
total samples) (Rossow et al., 2012).
2) Automated malware feature extraction – the prototype system processed,
analyzed, extracted and assembled multidimensional topological features from the
sample datasets through an automated means using both static and dynamic
analysis (Tamersoy et al., 2014),
3) Supervised and unsupervised machine learning – the developed prototype used
multidimensional topological features and applied advanced clustering algorithms
to demonstrate improved detection rates with training and extended datasets
(Kaur, 2014), and
4) Results Validation - the developed prototype evaluated detection effectiveness
using various accepted quantitative methods (Mohaisen & Alrawi, 2015).
This novel research developed a unique detection methodology using
multidimensional topological features in a machine learning environment. The
multidimensional topological features approach combined static and dynamic analysis in
addition to unique file properties. Extensive research of over 500 studies over the last six
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years has not produced a single study that leverages multidimensional topological
features using static and dynamic analysis with file properties. In addition, the developed
prototype produced repeatable feature extraction for various malware binaries such that
new sample datasets could be analyzed over time. The study analyzed and evaluated
results with the rigorous quantitative evaluation measures described by Mohaisen and
Alrawi (2015).

Research Design
In this study, the researcher sought to understand the role of multidimensional
topological features plays on improved malware detection. The study employed a
quantitative experimental approach using the Single-Case Experimental Design (SCED).
SCED has been chosen for this study as it enables the researcher to study small groups (in
this case unique polymorphic malware) and generalize findings to a larger population
(malware classes) (Neuman & McCormick, 1995). SCED provided a methodology for
establishing a baseline and measuring interventions or changes over time (Neuman &
McCormick, 1995). SCED was chosen because each polymorphic malware sample may
be unique and can be treated as individual subject for research purposes. Therefore, the
features extracted through static and dynamic analysis from the individual malware
become criterion for further study. Instead of using control groups, Changing Criterion
Design (CCD) was selected for this study as it allows the researcher to add or subtract
features to better understand and manipulate detection rates based on adding/subtracting
or weighting of features. SCED CCD was chosen as control groups are not be
appropriate for this malware study. In drug and disease treatment protocol studies,
control groups are commonly used to evaluate treatment over time. Detection is binary
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and will not improve or decline over time. The SCED CCD allowed the researcher to
introduce incremental changes in terms of multidimensional topological features and
measure those changes in terms of detection rates throughout the study (Neuman &
McCormick, 1995). Parallel studies in both the Educational and Clinical arenas use
SCED research design with changing criterion design to understand behaviors, drugs and
treatment for certain conditions (Neuman & McCormick, 1995). SCED CCD allows
experimental controls to be demonstrated by a consistent shift in the rate of targeted
outcome with each successive test or measurement (Neuman & McCormick, 1995). In
theory, each achieved criterion of a behavior can function as the baseline for the next
targeted criterion for successive studies (Neuman & McCormick, 1995). Given that each
malware samples may represent a unique malware sample and unique features may
improve detection the design is appropriate.

Research Procedures
The study randomly selected and assigned three test datasets of 200,000 samples.
These datasets were constructed via a pseudo-random program that composed the
datasets on a stratified sample basis (malware, benign and unknown). The test datasets
developed maintained the distribution profile on a percentage basis: malware (40%),
benign (30%) and unknown (30%). The datasets were then used to conduct baseline and
further testing with the three clustering algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP). The study
ran a series of baseline tests with unweighted multidimensional topological features to
determine baseline detection rates. Baseline detection rates were documented for each
clustering algorithm. The datasets were used as part of SCED CCD testing process for
manipulating feature weighting for each clustering algorithm. After establishing the
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baseline for each algorithm, incremental tests were conducted with weighted
multidimensional topological features to evaluate improved or decreased detection rates.
The study established an effective detection rate for polymorphic malware
detection ranges from 68.75% to 81.25% (Amos, Turner, & White, 2013). Each of the
three clustering algorithms produced detection rates well above 81.25%. Additional
experiments were conducted to tune and document the effects of feature weighting on
detection rates. Additional tests were used to better understand the how weighting of
multidimensional topological features improved or reduced the effective detection rate.
Baseline Testing. Initial baseline experimental testing was conducted for each
clustering algorithm using unweighted multidimensional topological features. These
features were derived through extracting static analysis, dynamic analysis and file
properties features. Baseline testing enabled the researcher to establish training dataset
for each clustering algorithm. Baseline testing supported further investigation of cause
and effect to enable the researcher to develop manipulation or intervention strategies
(Neuman & McCormick, 1995).
Weighted Occurrence Testing. The first set of experimental tests conducted
utilized weighted multidimensional topological features derived from static analysis.
These tests are similar to experiments presented by Bilar in 2007. Bilar (2007)
performed a series of experiments with weighted features based on frequency of
occurrence using static analysis various malware samples. Bilar (2007) used the
weighted features in a series of Support Vector Machines (SVM) experiments. The study
performed both weighted features and frequency of occurrence testing from static
analysis using the three clustering algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP).
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Dynamic-Static Occurrence Testing. The next set of experiments involved
leveraging Bilar’s weighted occurrence tests (derived from static analysis) with features
derived from dynamic analysis. Polymorphic malware can encrypt functions and have
embedded library calls which can be hidden from static analysis (Hansen, Mark, Larsen,
Stevanovic, & Pedersen, 2016). Other studies have observed that malware developers
have padded or introduced “junk” code to bypass static dynamic thus making the function
call tracing very difficult (Jasiul, Śliwa, Gleba, & Szpyrka, 2014). Therefore, linking
static and dynamic analysis may serve to enhance detection by linking dynamic
occurrence of functions to those function calls observed in static analysis. This study
extended Bilar’s weighted feature study (2007) by linking opcodes observed in an actual
execution environment (dynamic analysis) with those observed through static analysis.
The weighting of features was directly correlated to frequency of occurrence in dynamic
to static analysis. The experiments performed evaluated the detection results linking the
static to dynamic features for all three advanced clustering algorithms (MB, IBk and
DLMLP).
Extended Static-Dynamic Occurrence Testing. Polymorphic malware may call
libraries or use functions available through the operating system such as Microsoft’s
dynamic link libraries (DLLs) (Egele, Scholte, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2012). The intended
use or abuse of such functions by malware can be linked to file properties of the malware
itself (Hansen et al., 2016). Therefore, experiments conducted during this phase, added
various features from file properties to those of dynamic-static occurrence tests
performed previously. Previous research has shown that there exists a number of
“metadata” properties that can be used for malware detection (Kamongi, Kotikela, Kavi,
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Gomathisankaran, & Singhal, 2013) and (A. Singh et al., 2012). This study found similar
results. This study performed extended static to dynamic occurrence testing with all three
advanced clustering algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP).
The research process evaluated and demonstrated effective detection rates for
polymorphic malware. The detection rates for each algorithm exceeded the established
ranges for polymorphic malware of 68.75% to 81.25% (Amos, Turner, & White, 2013).
It was anticipated that each of the clustering algorithms with weighted features would
deliver detection rates above the baseline test results. Additional weighting and
experiments conducted did in fact deliver higher detection rates. The developed
prototype environment to extract and assemble test datasets is presented next.

Prototype Environment
In order to consistently, accurately and safely extract multidimensional
topological feature information, the study developed an integrated system to perform
automated feature extraction for analysis for all datasets. This integrated system delivered
the capability to extract features for file properties, static and dynamic analysis. The
integrated system then constructed one dataset for each clustering algorithm. The feature
extraction framework consisted of five modules: 1) a pre-process module that extracts
and generates topological features based on static analysis of machine code and file
characteristics, 2) a behavioral analysis module that extracts behavioral characteristics
based on file execution (dynamic analysis), 3) a post-processing module that reviewed
results from the pre-process and behavioral modules, 4) an input file construction and
submission module, and 5) a machine learning module that employs various clustering
techniques to be specified at run-time. As with most signature-based or behavior-based
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detection mechanisms, careful attention was paid to false positive and false negative rates
which can serve to reduce overall detection effectiveness.

Advanced Malware Inspection Environment
Data Acquisition

Analysis

Pre-Processing

Detection

Peer-Review

Malware
Repository

Sample
Acquisition

Malware
Static Analysis
Dynamic Analysis

Classification
&
Detection

Benign

Features &
Characteristics

Figure 1. System Overview

Data Acquisition. The first step was to acquire sufficient samples needed to
conduct study’s experiments. This study needed to acquire three types of samples: 1)
known malware, 2) known benign files and 3) unknown files. Known malware and
benign files was acquired through industry partnerships and open source repositories
available for malware researchers. However, this required more effort and time than
anticipated. This study leveraged malware repositories from across industries and
communities of interest. The malware samples were acquired through relationships with
Virus Total, VirusShare, VXHeaven and Contagio. There are a number of such malware
repositories that contain polymorphic and metamorphic samples specifically for malware
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research. Symantec had previously agreed to share samples. However, due to personnel
changes at Symantec this was no longer possible in time for the study. A majority of the
malware and benign samples were acquired through Virus Total and VirusShare. These
databases provided deep metadata and samples to track various types of malware. This
database also provides other details such as unique files, cloned files and file identifiers.
Working with Virus Total and VirusShare, the researcher was able to obtain samples
(malware, benign and unknown), metadata/labels and other key malware classification
information. Unknown files were acquired through the same means and other open
source repositories for malware research. The unknown files were acquired from
VirusShare, VXHeaven and Contagio.
Analysis and Feature Extraction. As discussed previously, static and dynamic
analysis provides a means to observe and identify malicious behaviors and characteristics.
Pre-processing of samples is needed to identify obfuscated malware variants. This step
provides the ability to gather multidimensional topological data from malware samples.
This step extracts file properties and other detailed features extraction via static and
dynamic analysis. The integrated prototype system confirmed the inventory of functions
through static analysis. The integrated prototype system evaluated execution and observed
execution of behaviors through dynamic analysis. While many families of malware
obfuscate and encrypt modules, many commercial vendors have incorporated “malwarelike” obfuscation techniques to protect intellectual property. Pre-processing was needed
to ensure the dataset contains representative samples for all three data types. As expected,
static and dynamic analysis provide sufficient details, features and characteristics for
identifying samples. These dynamic malware features consisted of observing malicious
102

behaviors, triggered behaviors and malicious characteristics.
The integrated prototype system produced an environment to conduct both static
and dynamic analysis tools in order to extract multidimensional features from known and
unknown samples. The integrated prototype used the static tool known as IDA SDK v6.95
(IDAPro) in order to extract static features and topological information. An example of
static analysis is shown in Fig. 3. However, the extraction software development kit (SDK)
provides a means to submit and extract feature information. As discussed in the literature
review (Bilar, 2007), previous research suggests that there exists a limited set of operations
that may point to malware; operations such as MOV, ADD, LEA, SUB, AND, INC, OR,
NEG, XOR, ASSIGN (XCHG), STACK (POP), and CONTROL_C (JMP) have been used
for malware detection in other studies. Bilar (2007) observed that the total universe of
Microsoft 32-bit executables was 398 opcodes. Upon deeper inspection, Bilar (2007)
observed that non-executable opcodes account for 192 of the 398 opcodes. Further, Bilar
(2007) found that malware accounted for 141 of the 398 opcodes. Analyzing the 141
malware opcodes further, Bilar (2007) found that 72 opcodes accounted for over 99% of
the malware opcodes, 14 opcodes accounted for over 92% malware opcodes, and 5 opcodes
accounted for over 65% malware opcodes found (Bilar, 2007). Thus, based on Bilar’s
research (2007) the number of opcodes needed for improved detection was somewhere
between the 14 and 72 opcodes. The opcodes captured during feature extraction was used
for the static feature component of the multidimensional topological data.
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Fig. 3. Static Analysis - IDAPro

As discussed previously, Dynamic Analysis is needed to collect additional features
during execution.

Dynamic Analysis was performed on the basis of system-wide

quantitative data flows from previous research (Wüchner et al., 2014). System-wide data
flow analysis allows the researcher to capture the actual processes executed and the context
of the system calls within a specific time frame within an operating environment (Wüchner
et al., 2014). System calls were captured and aggregated as part of the integrated prototype
environment. Dynamic Analysis features were captured for the purpose of augmenting the
dynamic feature component of the multidimensional topological data.

As previous

researchers found, features such as File Size (FSize), File Type (Ftype), Malware Type
(Malware_Type), Virtual Machine Aware (VM_Aware), Compiler Type (Comp_Type),
Internal or External Libraries (Libraries) and Encryption Function (EncrypFunction) have
been proven in the past to be good indicators of malware during execution (Ulrich Bayer
et al., 2010; Devesa et al., 2010; Wüchner et al., 2014). The dynamic analysis information
was augmented with both the file and static feature information for a complete data set for
a single sample. An example output from an open source dynamic analysis tool – Cuckoo
– is shown in Fig. 4. During the dynamic analysis step, a sample was placed into an
operational virtual machine environment and system calls were captured. The dynamic
analysis features were combined with file and static analysis data and stored into a single
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repository for the dataset being processed. Some programming/scripting enabled the
automated data collection and dataset construction.

Fig. 4. Dynamic Analysis - Cuckoo

Binary Feature Extraction. The study utilized three types of multidimensional
topological data: 1) file features, 2) static analysis features, and 3) dynamic analysis
feature for detection. The study treated input features as independent variables for the
study. The emphasis of the study was to improve detection rates for polymorphic
malware. Currently, detection rates range from polymorphic detection rates using
advanced classifiers range from 68.75% to 81.25% (Amos et al., 2013). These detection
rates used Bayes and Multilayer Perceptron techniques to establish a baseline for
effective detection of various types of polymorphic malware (Amos et al., 2013). Due to
the polymorphic nature of the malware the study (dependent variable) controlling for
time (control variable) for polymorphic malware samples that have been collected from
the malware analysis community. The independent variables file features, static analysis
features and dynamic analysis features were used as a single input of features for the
sample in question. In other words, the topological file properties/features extracted from
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the executable/sample, the static analysis features – the topological properties/features
extracted from code analysis for the executable/sample and dynamic analysis features–
the observational behavioral features extracted from the execution of the sample were all
used for detection purposes. The detection rate dependent variable was defined as the
effective detection rate for malware in terms of Accuracy (Number of correct
assessments)/Number of all assessments) and the control variable can be defined as time
(control variable) – as polymorphic samples mutate changes occur and the intervening
variable defined as external calls/libraries.
Feature Aggregation and Detection.

All information collected during file

property, static and dynamic analysis was compiled into a single database. The researcher
explored various tools and databases (e.g. Elasticsearch) to store extracted features from
the various modules based on a unique identifier. Elasticsearch enabled the construction
of linked features and enabled analysis to be conducted multiple times. Ultimately, the
database (all features linked to the MD5 hash) was converted into an Attribute-Relation
File Format (ARFF). The ARFF file was used as an input file for the Weka Open Source
Machine Learning tool. Weka was used to perform cluster analysis on the ARFF input file
for each dataset. Weka is a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks.
The algorithms were directly applied to the three datasets through a programming
application interface (API) or graphical user interface (GUI). Weka was used to perform
a number of functions and to perform advanced analysis on the experimental datasets.
Weka was used to conduct additional analysis regarding feature isolation and hidden
feature dependencies. Weka was used to advance the understanding of the relationships
between the features for each of the three datasets. Weka algorithms available were used
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to perform advanced functions such as data mining pre-processing, data classification,
regression analysis, clustering, association rules, attribute selection and data visualization.
An example of Weka is shown in Fig. 5.

Fig. 5. Weka User Interface

The extracted multidimensional topological features in the form of an ARFF file
were then submitted to Weka using the various clustering algorithms. Weka was used
to perform detection based on both supervised and unsupervised learning. A malicious
feature matrix was constructed and used to train the three clustering algorithms in
Weka. These algorithms were then used for detection to identify known malware,
benign and unknown files. These features were correlated with attributes in the Weka
machine learning environment. The study considered and evaluated the three cluster
algorithms to explore, weight and strengthen possible detection techniques. A number
of other algorithms have been researched and explored in Weka. This study focused on
MB, IBk and DLMLP. These were selected based on a number of factors including
recent studies, new approaches and new techniques.
Other machine learning algorithms considered included Belief Propagation (BP),
General Belief Propagation, Loopy Belief Propagation, Dynamic Bayesian Networks,
Hidden Markov Model (HMM), and Markov Random Field (MRF). It was believed
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that the combination of MB, IBk and DLMLP provided the study with sufficient and
broad types of algorithms for detection purposes. IBk provided advantages over LSH
by leveraging connectivity-based and proximity-based clustering. DLMLP improved
BP techniques. New research has found that artificial neural networks (ANN) can
leverage belief propagation for clustering or classification but do so inefficiently
(Gruber et al., 2017). ANN’s build networks of neurons, share information between
neurons and propagate results throughout the network using weights or beliefs (Gruber
et al., 2017). DLMLP improves the ANN approach be creating localized networks to
share “beliefs” (Gruber et al., 2017). The DLMLP approach builds localized or
shallow nets and distributes beliefs locally (Gruber et al., 2017). These shallow
networks work more efficiently as new “beliefs” do not need to be propagated
throughout an entire network (Gruber et al., 2017).
In addition to IBk and DLMLP, an ensemble technique such as Bootstrap
Aggregating (Meta Bagging) was also be evaluated. Meta Bagging may provide a model
in which the ensemble voting can be done with equal weights or weighted attributes for
various features extracted. This approach may allow the evaluation model to promote
variance based on training data to improve malware detection. Once satisfied with the
approach (through a series of techniques), the approach was tested against a larger dataset
to evaluate the efficacy for detection.

Threats to Validity
Researchers who use and quantitative measures and experimental methods to
explore hypothetical questions are categorized as quantitative research (Hoepfl, 1997).
Quantitative research emphasizes the measurement and analysis of causal relationships
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between variables (Denzin & Lincoln, 2006). Quantitative research uses numbers, charts
and graphs to explain or describe relationships that exist between variables (Bogdan &
Biklen, 1998). Quantitative research use charts and graphs to illustrate relationships
between variables, populations and results of tests (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). The
quantitative research process allows the researcher to understand the problem, develop a
methodology to study the problem and if needed generate hypotheses to be tested in
terms of numbers that can be quantified and summarized (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998).
Quantitative research utilizes a mathematical process to explore, analyze and explain
findings (Charles, 1995). Generally, quantitative research “…supported by the positivist
or scientific paradigm, leads us to regard the world as made up of observable, measurable
facts” (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992, p. 6). Quantitative research attempts to segment and
control the experimental environment such that the research can be generalizable to wider
populations and similar situations (Winter, 2000). Quantitative researchers must construct
an experiment to study the problem and use standard measures if the research is to be
useful (Crocker & Algina, 1986). In simple terms, quantitative research design must
ensure the validity of the test and measurements (Crocker & Algina, 1986). Special
attention must be made to ensure replicability or repeatability of the experimental results
(Crocker & Algina, 1986).
Internal Validity
Internal validity is concerned with the rigor of the study design (Crocker &
Algina, 1986). Internal validity can be determined by the degree of control over the
potential extraneous variables impacting the quantitative study (Crocker & Algina, 1986).
Researchers must control such issues as confounding variables in order to minimize the
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potential for alternative explanations for results (Crocker & Algina, 1986). Researchers
must also control such issues as variable treatment for testing inputs such that there is
more confidence that the effects observed are due from research manipulation (Crocker &
Algina, 1986). Campbell & Stanley (1963) have provided the research world with the
most authoritative source for understanding threats to internal validity.
Threats to internal validity compromise the study’s confidence in establishing
relationships exists between the independent and dependent variables (Morse, Barrett,
Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2008). Campbell & Stanley (1963) identified eight threats to
internal validity: history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, regression, selection,
experimental mortality, and an interaction of threats. Each are described and addressed
below.
History. History becomes a threat to validity when other factors impact the study,
subject or findings by the passage of time (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). For the purpose
of this study, the research conducted and the malware samples do not suffer from this
threat as malware remains in effect for long periods of time. History is not an internal
validity concern to be addressed for this study.
Maturation. Maturation becomes an issue when changes occur for subjects or
testing procedures and impact the outcomes or findings for the study (Campbell &
Stanley, 1963). History and maturation are both major concerns for longitudinal studies
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). For the purpose of this study, the malware samples and
procedures will remain static throughout the study. Therefore, maturation is not an
internal validity concern to be addressed for this study.
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Testing. The testing process may introduce issues with studies and test results
because of repeated testing and not the intervention or manipulation of variables by the
researcher (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Testing issues often occur as a result of
researchers administering pretests and posttests. For the purpose of this study, the
malware samples are extracted through a single repeatable process (Campbell & Stanley,
1963). The features are extracted and subjected to testing. The feature dataset remains
static but not influenced by repeated testing. Therefore, testing is not an internal validity
concern to be addressed for this study.
Instrumentation. Instrumentation issues arise when instrument calibration or
measurement protocols change and the results seemingly change due to measurement
rather than to a true treatment effect (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Measurement and
evaluation protocols must remain constant for over the course of all experiments
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). For the purpose of this study, all testing protocols and
clustering algorithms used for detection will remain the same across all tests. Only
features sets will change as part of the experimental testing. Therefore, instrumentation
is not an internal validity concern to be addressed for this study.
Regression. A regression threat occurs when subjects have been selected on the
basis of previous test scores (low and high) (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Issues with
regression occur for studies that have test scores move closer to the mean as a result of
repeated testing (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). For the purpose of this study, repeated
testing will have no effect on testing outcomes. Malware samples are subjected to a
standard single extraction process. The features are extracted and subjected to testing.
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The feature dataset remains static but not influenced by repeated testing. Therefore,
regression is not an internal validity concern to be addressed for this study.
Selection. The selection threat is of utmost concern for many experimental studies
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Studies that cannot be randomly assigned subjects to test
groups or treatment groups have issues with measurement before and after treatment
intervention (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). For the purpose of this study, each of the test
groups have both random selection and random assignment. The test groups remain
static throughout the study. The study design and testing protocol specifically addresses
the internal validity issue of selection. Therefore, selection is not an internal validity
concern to be addressed for this study.
Experimental mortality. The issue with experimental mortality occurs when
testing groups suffer from attrition, withdrawals, or dropouts (Campbell & Stanley,
1963). Experimental mortality becomes problematic with ongoing testing by losing
subjects from comparison groups subsequent to random selection (Campbell & Stanley,
1963). For the purpose of this study, each of the test groups will remain static after
random selection and random assignment. The test groups will remain static and will not
suffer from mortality throughout the study. Therefore, experimental mortality is not an
internal validity concern to be addressed for this study.
Interaction of Threats. The final issue threatening internal validity is the
interaction of the threats across the study (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Most
experimental studies are concerned with the interaction of selection and maturation
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Internal validity can be impacted when subjects are
selected and assigned to groups based on the subject maturation (Campbell & Stanley,
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1963). For the purpose of this study, random selection and random assignment to parallel
groups address the interaction of threat issues directly and effectively. Random selection
and random assignment address most internal validity issues except experimental
mortality. Differential selection is controlled for this study as random assignment creates
groups that are equivalent with respect to known and unknown variables (Campbell &
Stanley, 1963). Lastly, influences of maturation on other variables can be ruled out
because of static and consistent test groups. Other issues considered for interaction of
threats include the reactive or interaction effect of testing subject multiple times.
Reactive validity issues concern pretesting procedures and the potential increase or
decrease of a subject's sensitivity or responsiveness to the experiment (Lana, 1959;
Willson & Putnam, 1982). Again, malware samples are subjected to a standard single
extraction process. The features are extracted and the data is subjected to testing. The
feature dataset remains static but not influenced by repeated testing. Therefore, reactive
issues are not an internal validity concern needed to be addressed for this study.
External Validity
Campbell and Stanley (1963) provided the foundational groundwork for
examining issues related to external threats to validity. Smith & Glass (1987) classified
threats to external validity in a number of related issues concerning 1) population
validity, 2) ecological validity and 3) external validity of operations (Smith & Glass,
1987). Population validity and selection treatment concerning the sampling and selection
process that impact generalizability (Smith & Glass, 1987). The ecological validity issues
concern experimenter effects, multiple-treatment interference, reactive arrangements,
time and treatment interaction, history and treatment interaction (Smith & Glass, 1987).
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Lastly, issues for external validity of operations concern specificity of variables and
pretest sensitization (Smith & Glass, 1987). Each of these are discussed below.
Population validity. Population validity refers to the extent to which findings can
be generalized from the study sample to that of the larger target population and
potentially to subgroups within the larger target population (Smith & Glass, 1987).
Utilizing sufficiently large and random samples will increase the population validity of
results. For the purpose of this study, sample size far exceeds the minimum sample size
requirement. Further random selection and random assignment reduces the concern for
this external validity threat. Unfortunately, population validity is a threat in virtually all
experimental studies. The collection of malware samples from various malware
collaboration sites may under-represent new or emerging malware. Most researchers are
forced to use samples from accessible populations. In most cases these samples represent
the best group of participants available for a study. Therefore, the degree of
representativeness depends on how large the accessible population is relative to the target
population. In this study, the collection of samples exceeds one million and should be
sufficiently large to satisfy this concern.
Ecological validity. Ecological validity refers to the extent that findings from one
study can be generalized to another experimental setting (Rossow et al., 2012; Smith &
Glass, 1987). The experimental setting must accurately and in sufficient detail allow
other researcher to understand settings, conditions, variables, and contexts extent that
findings from one study can be generalized to another experimental setting (Rossow et
al., 2012; Smith & Glass, 1987). Therefore, ecological validity represents the extent to
which findings are independent from the setting or location in the study was performed
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extent that findings from one study can be generalized to another experimental setting
(Rossow et al., 2012; Smith & Glass, 1987). For the purpose of this study, ecological
validity is not a concern. The environment, settings, hardware, and software (including
versions) was disclosed as part of the study.
Temporal validity. This external validity issue refers to the ability for the
research and findings to be generalized across time (Smith & Glass, 1987). Researchers
conducting experimental research rarely mention temporal validity because most studies
are conducted within a relatively short period of time (Smith & Glass, 1987). For the
purpose of this study, the timeframe is sufficiently short such that issues with
experimental design and data collection are minimized. It should be noted that only
malware sample and benign samples created within the past eighteen months was used
for the study. Also, the single case experimental design was selected for this study as the
protocol facilitates the time to select, conduct and analyze results. Therefore, temporal
validity is not a concern for this study.
Multiple-treatment interference. This external validity issue occurs when the
same research subjects are exposed to multiple interventions (Smith & Glass, 1987)..
Multiple treatment interference also occurs when subjects are selected for multiple
studies with multiple interventions (Smith & Glass, 1987).. Thus, test results or
outcomes may not be generalizable for the target population because of the sequence of
interventions that was administered prior to or during the experiment (Smith & Glass,
1987). For the purpose of this study, the sample groups are each distinct with a
population of 200,000. However, the sampling technique to be used is random selection
without replacement across three types of samples. The total sample size is over 2 million
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and assuming the selector is not repeated the probability of being selected is remote malware (1:1 million), benign samples (1:750,000) and unknown (1:300,000). In
addition, the single case experimental design selected for this study facilitates the
manipulation of variables over time. However, the feature dataset remains static and not
influenced by repeated testing. Therefore, multiple-treatment interference is not an
external validity concern to be addressed for this study.
Researcher bias. This external validity issue arises due to processes or
procedures the researcher introduces while conducting the experiment (Smith & Glass,
1987). Researcher bias is an external validity issue as the study’s finding may be
dependent upon the researcher and thus not generalizable for the intended target
population (Smith & Glass, 1987). The more unique the researcher's process, protocol
and procedures are the more they interfere with findings (Smith & Glass, 1987). The
single case experimental design was specifically selected for this study as the testing
protocol facilitates the manipulation of variables and testing over time. SCED is an
accepted testing protocol for unique subjects such as polymorphic malware. The testing
protocol and procedures are consistent with each test. The dataset remains static and not
influenced by repeated testing. Therefore, researcher bias is minimized for this study.
Reactive Arrangements. This external threat to validity occurs when subject
response changed due to the fact that they know they are being studied (Smith & Glass,
1987). Reactive arrangements reduce external validity because findings may become less
generalizable as the results have been compromised or interventions not properly
measured (Smith & Glass, 1987). For the purpose of this study, certain malware samples
are sophisticated enough to know the they are being analyzed. For example, advanced
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malware will check environmental conditions prior to executing in a virtual environment
like dynamic analysis. In this case, the additional static analysis and file property
analysis provide missing pieces as part of the standard feature extraction process.
Therefore, reactive arrangements have been dealt with as part of the feature extraction
process. External issues dealing with reactive arrangements have been adequately
compensated for and is not an external validity concern to be addressed for this study.
Order bias. This external validity issues occurs when observed findings become
dependent upon the order in which the multiple interventions are administered (Smith &
Glass, 1987). In this case, findings resulting from the administering interventions in a
particular order may not be confidently generalized to situations in which the
interventions are applied differently (Smith & Glass, 1987). The single case
experimental design was specifically selected for this study as the testing protocol
facilitates performing various tests in a structured protocol. However, the dataset,
clustering algorithms and testing procedures are not structured such that order dictates
findings or outcomes. Therefore, order bias is not a concern for this study.
Matching bias. This external validity issues arises in cases where subjects tested
do not match those in the accessible population (Smith & Glass, 1987). Thus, matching
bias is a threat to external validity to the extent that findings cannot be generalized to
general population (Smith & Glass, 1987). This issue is a concern when the subjects
studied fall out of the sampling frame (Smith & Glass, 1987). For the purpose of this
study, the samples collected and selected become the subject studied. Therefore, study
findings will directly correlate to sample frame and reduces the concern for this external
validity threat.
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Specificity of variables. This issue is a threat to external validity to almost every
study. Researchers attempt to define and control a number of variables within the
experiment in order to generalize findings (Smith & Glass, 1987). However, the number
of variables that impact generalizability is large and include 1) a specific type of
individual, 2) at a specific time, 3) at a specific location, 4) under a specific set of
circumstances, 5) based on a specific operational definition of the independent variable,
6) using specific dependent variables, and 7) using specific instruments to measure all the
variables. Experiments with unique participants, testing time frames, developed context,
testing conditions, and other variables, the less likely the experiment will produce
findings that are generalizable. In order to counter threats of specific variables, the
researcher must operationally define variables and be able to represent the contextual
aspects of the study setting and use extreme caution when generalizing findings. The
single case experimental design was specifically selected for this study as the testing
protocol facilitates the study setting, baseline testing, manipulation of variables and
producing findings over time. SCED is an accepted testing protocol for unique subjects
such as polymorphic malware. The setting, setting variables, testing protocol and
procedures are consistent with each test. Therefore, the consistency of variables held
constant and the threat posed by specificity of variables is minimized for this study.
Treatment diffusion. This external validity threat arises as subjects are exposed
to multiple interventions and these manipulations become diffused or impact other
treatments threating the researcher’s ability to generalize findings (Smith & Glass, 1987).
In essence, the manipulation of testing variable contaminate one or more of the treatment
conditions and prevents the study from being replicated in the future (Smith & Glass,
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1987). SCED is an accepted testing protocol for manipulating treatments for
experiments. The establishing of baselines, applying treatments and measuring the
impact of treatments is consistent with each test. Therefore, the external validity of
treatment diffusion is minimized for this study.
Pretest x treatment interaction. This external validity threat arises when the
administering of pretests changes the participants’ responsiveness (sensitivity increases
or decreases) and renders the observed findings for the pretest group generalizable to
only that group and not to the untested group or larger population (Smith & Glass, 1987).
In order to utilize generalizable pretest findings, researchers must carefully choose pretest
conditions and treatments, characteristics of the research participants, the duration of the
study, and nature of the independent and dependent variables. SCED was specifically
selected for this study as the testing protocol facilitates performing various baseline
testing (pre-tests) in a structured protocol. The proposed baseline tests will not influence
further testing post intervention or manipulation. The baseline tests are quantitative in
nature and not attitudinal so future influence from pretest is non-existent. Therefore,
pretest x treatment interaction is not a concern for this study.
Selection x treatment interaction. This external validity threat arises when
treatment groups differ non-treatment groups and thus findings cannot be generalizable to
the larger population (Smith & Glass, 1987). The selection-treatment interaction threat
occurs more often when randomization is not used for selecting intervention and test
groups (Smith & Glass, 1987). However, this external threat to validity can still prevail
when randomization is used as it does not guarantee that the group selected is
representative of the target population (Smith & Glass, 1987). For the purpose of this
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study, there are a number of groups selected for testing from a sample population. The
sample set is large (over 1 million samples) and the multiple individual test groups far
exceeds the required minimum sample size. Therefore, the likelihood that the population
studied do not represent the larger population is remote is not an external validity concern
for this study.
An experiment is deemed to be valid as long as relationships can be established
and the results possess internal and external validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). The
proposed experiment has addressed internal validity concerns from an experimental
design, sampling and a replicative perspective. Internal validity is maintained when
conditions are changed or manipulated and the results are measured or observed
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Thus, internal validity provides assurances that results are
in fact due to direct treatment and not due to other circumstances (Campbell & Stanley,
1963). As such, he proposed research has also addressed internal and external validity
concerns from a number of perspectives. The proposed study has a controlled approach
and environment and experimental design addresses generalizability of findings. There
has been considerable amount of thought given to how the results and findings can be
extended to broader populations, groups, environments, and contexts outside the
experimental setting (Rossow et al., 2012; Smith & Glass, 1987). Consequently, the
proposed experimental design and approach should satisfy the issues raised for internal
and external validity. The proposed experimental design has addressed the number of
issues raised concerning internal and external validity as defined by Campbell and
Stanley (1963). A number researchers have contributed to addressing threats to internal
and external validity not only from analyzing the results but more importantly addressed
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by quantitative research and the experimental design (Smith & Glass, 1987). The
proposed study kept internal and external validity in mind by selecting an accepted
experimental design (SCED), designing the experiment with a testing protocol, adopting
a sampling strategy and insuring any possible outside influences are controlled or
mitigated such that to the greatest extent possible concerns with validity have been
addressed ensuring the validity of study.

Sample
The sample used for this study is an unrestricted probability sampling or simple
random sampling or pseudo-random sample. The study conducted a random selection
and random assignment of files for the three datasets. However, the dataset is considered
to be stratified dataset. The sample set (files) included three data types or strata on a
percentage basis: 1) known bad samples – known malware (polymorphic/metamorphic),
2) known good samples – known benign samples and 3) unknown samples – files that are
unknown to the researcher but was determined post- test. Although, malware detection is
a straightforward bi-partite problem (malware or non-malware) the study also included a
“blind” dataset for validating detection results.
Known Malware Dataset. The study had a sample set of over 1 million malware
samples of polymorphic malware targeting 32-bit and 64-bit malicious executables.
Although, there are a number of malware types, this study will group the distinct malware
types into a single class - malware. A majority of malware samples were acquired from
Virus Total, Virus Sign, and VxHeaven. The samples used represented various malware
types including: backdoors, Trojans, bots, worms, and viruses. According to Symantec
(2016), there are approximately 1 million new malware samples released and discovered
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daily. In conducting a simple sizing analysis, a sample size of at least 666 yields 99%
confidence level and 5% confidence interval for a population of one million. A total
collection of 1,009,108 malware samples were acquired for the study. Therefore, the
study dataset far exceeded the required number of malware samples needed for
developing a valid sample size and representative dataset.
Known Benign Dataset. The known benign samples were collected from Virus
Total and Virus Sign. These files were tested as “clean” from the providers and probably
were collected from clean installation disks and other known clean distribution sites.
Special attention was made to collect vendor software with valid digitally signed
installation ﬁles. In conducting a simple sizing analysis, a sample size of at least 666
yields 99% confidence level and 5% confidence interval for a population of 1 million. A
total collection of 756,322 known benign samples were acquired for the study.
Therefore, the study dataset far exceeded the required number of known benign samples
needed for developing a valid sample size and representative dataset.
Unknown Dataset. The unknown samples were collected from Virus Total,
Virus Sign and VirusVx. A majority of these samples were collected from Virus Total.
Users can submit files to sites like Virus Total as unknown and eventually these files
would be determined as malware or benign. Until the files are determined to be malware
or benign they remain in an unknown status until a determination has been made. Again,
in conducting a simple sizing analysis, a sample size of at least 666 yields 99%
confidence level and 5% confidence interval for a population of 1 million. A total
collection of 748,976 of unknown samples were acquired for the study. Therefore, the
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study dataset far exceeded the required number of known benign samples needed for
developing a valid sample size and representative dataset.
In summary, the dataset for the study was developed as a simple stratified random
sample. The study performed a pseudo-random selection via a python script for selecting
and generating datasets on a percentage basis. The random assignment from a stratified
sample of three sample subsets: 1) known malware (40%), 2) known benign (30%) and 3)
unknown (30%). The study’s sample size far exceeded the 666 samples required for a
confidence level of 99%. The three data subsets had the following sample size: 1)
malware – over 1 million samples, 2) known benign – over 750,000 samples and 3)
unknown samples – just under 750,000 samples.

Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted throughout the experiment. The focus of the
experiments was to evaluate detection rates given the various features, weighting of the
features and the advanced cluster algorithms leveraged during testing. There were a
number of data analysis tools that were used to evaluate detection performance.
Sensitivity and specificity were two statistical measures that were used to evaluate
malware detection performance (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). Sensitivity is the statistical
measure used to understand and evaluate the proportion of True Positives in an
experiment (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). The True Positive Rate (TPR) represents the
proportion of correctly identified malware samples within a given test. Specificity is
another important statistical measure and is used to represent the True Negative Rate
(TNR) (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). Specificity measures the proportion of true negatives
(non-malware) correctly identified within an experiment (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). The
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two measures – Sensitivity and Specificity provide insight into detection rates from a true
positive rate (sensitivity) and true negative rate (specificity). For any experiment, there is
usually a trade-off between the two measures in terms of usability of results. Too many
false positives or false negatives can erode the confidence of the detection approach.
Depending upon detection goal, one of the measures may be more important than the
other. In some cases, false positives (false alarms) significantly impact detection rates
and experimental outcomes. On the other hand, false negatives (non-detection) allow
researchers to evaluate characteristics and issues with missed detections. In a perfect
world, sensitivity and specificity would both be 100%. However, achieving 100% for
both is usually not achievable. Both measures can be graphed in order to analyze the
tradeoffs between sensitivity and specificity. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
depicts the curve between sensitivity and specificity. An example of ROC is provided
below.
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Figure 2. ROC Results

124

In order to evaluate other aspects of detection results, other statistical measures
can be used to evaluate detection effectiveness that go further that sensitivity and
specificity. Accuracy (ACC) and the Correlation Coefficient (CC) are additional
statistical quality measures with machine learning used to explore deeper understanding
of detection rates (Kolter & Maloof, 2006). In order to gain additional insight into
detection rate with Accuracy and Correlation Coefficient the study must produce the
results in a confusion table format. The confusion table allows the results to be fully
examined. An example of the confusion table is provided below.
Table 2 Confusion Matrix
TRUE ACCEPT

FALSE REJECT

True Positive

True Negative

FALSE (F) False Positive

False Negative

TRUE (T)

The confusion matrix presented in Table 2 is an easy concept to evaluate detection
outcomes and was generated for each test. Each entry in the table was used to evaluate
the detection algorithm effectiveness. As part of the confusion matrix or truth table as it
is also referred to, each of the rates were measured. The four entries in the confusion
matrix were used to evaluate testing outcomes: 1) True Positive Rate, 2) True Negative
Rate, 3) False Positive Rate and 4) False Negative Rate. The True Positive Rate is
defined as the number of malware that was correctly classified as malware. In other
words, the True Positive Rate (TPR) represents the proportion of positive instances of
malware correctly detected. The True Negative Rate (TNR) represents the number of
benign samples that were correctly detected as Benign. The TNR represents the
proportion of negative instances detected correctly. The False Positive Rate (FPR)
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represents the number of non-malware samples that were classified as malware. The FPR
is in essence the proportion of negative instances incorrectly detected as positive
(malware). The False Negative Rate (FNR) represents malware that was classified as
Benign. Thus, the FNR is the proportion of positive instances wrongly classified as nonmalware. The equations for each statistical measure are provided below:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

Once the confusion matrix had been fully populated, the additional statistical measures of
Accuracy and Correlation Coefficient were then applied. The equations for these two
measures are provided below:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇× 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) − (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ×𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)
(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)

The malware detection effective rate was analyzed based on the results from the
testing for the three clustering algorithms. These measurements were largely concerned
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with correctly classified sample based on the statistical measures described above. The
proposed study used these measures to evaluate detection results based on the various
datasets for detection purposes.
Additional analysis was performed using Sensitivity, Specificity, Accuracy and
Correlation Coefficient information for the various tests. Developing the confusion
matrix provided a solid understanding of the results for each test. The various types of
analysis were conducted to compare and evaluate detection rates across the three
algorithms used during testing. Also, the results were evaluated using various sample
sets, feature set and weighting of features. There were three tests conducted per
algorithm. The testing approach used a benchmark test with two other tests for weighted
feature testing per algorithm. The formatting of test results for the various experiments
are presented in the next section.

Data Formats for Results
Once the base data (TPR, TNR, FPR and FNR) had been captured, additional data
analysis was conducted using the ACC, CC, and ROC curve methodology. The detection
model had the possibility of two classes – positive (malware) or negative (benign). The
malware detection effective rate used analyzed the results from the three algorithms in
terms of correctly classified sample based on the statistical measures described above.
The study evaluated detection results based on mapping those results into a single
classification set (p, n) – positive and negative. Given a confusion matrix, there are four
possible outcomes given the set: 1) detected as a positive and correctly classiﬁed
therefore classified as a True Positive (TP), 2) detected as a negative and correctly
classified and correctly classified therefore classified as a True Negative (TN), 3)
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detected as a positive but should have been classified as a negative therefore this is a
False Positive (FP), and 4) detected as a negative but should have been classified as a
positive therefore this is a False Negative (FN). The confusion matrix illustrates the set
of instances in a two-by-two confusion matrix. The following example show the various
rates achieved by clustering algorithm (MB, IBk and DLMLP).
Table 3 Example Confusion Matrix
MB
TRUE (T)
FALSE (F)

TRUE ACCEPT FALSE REJECT
0.9630
0.0010
0.0031
0.0060

IBk
TRUE (T)
FALSE (F)

TRUE ACCEPT FALSE REJECT
0.9780
0.0012
0.0080
0.0017

DLMLP
TRUE (T)
FALSE (F)

TRUE ACCEPT FALSE REJECT
0.9970
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Further, the following example demonstrates the preliminary results for MB, IBk
and DLMLP algorithms each with 20 unweighted features:
Table 4 Example Unweighted Testing Results

IBk
DLMLP
MB

True Positive
False Positive True Negative
False Negative
ACC
CC
0.9630
0.0031
0.0010
0.0060
0.9741
0.9780
0.0012
0.0080
0.0017
0.9971
0.9970
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.9970

0.0010
0.0078
0.0000

From this data, a graph can be generated to demonstrate the effective rates achieved
comparing the results across the three clustering algorithms. The graph below
demonstrates the baseline testing and the achieved results across the three algorithms
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Figure 3. Comparative Baseline Testing Results.

Additionally, based on the result from the confusion matrix, the ROC graph can be
constructed using a two-dimensional graph. The TP rate is plotted on the Y axis and the
FP rate is plotted on the X axis. Overall the ROC graph enables the visualization of
relative trade-oﬀs between beneﬁts (true positives) and the associated costs with
detection (false positives) (Fawcett, 2006). The graph below demonstrates the ROC with
the three classifiers (MB, IBk and DLMLP).
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Figure 4. ROC Analysis.

Data analysis will provide a means to evaluate achieved results. Each experiment
will provide a series of data sets for each experiment: Sensitivity, Specificity, Accuracy,
Correlation Coefficient and ROC. These standard statistical measures provide deeper
insight into the TPR, TNR, FPR and FNR produced by each experiment. The malware
detection effective rate will analyze the result from the three clustering algorithms in
terms of correctly classified sample based on the statistical measures described above.

Resource Requirements
The study has a number of resource requirements. The most critical resource for
conducting the proposed study was the dataset. A number of unaffiliated websites
(contagio, Virus Sign, VxHeaven, Virus Total, and others) contributed samples in order
to achieve the 1 million malware sample target. Malware samples collected from the
various websites were checked via the MD5 hash to avoid duplication. It is common for
these websites share and collaborate on samples. Malware researchers from industry and
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academia frequently find interesting samples and share finding across the community. In
doing so, researchers leverage known malware samples for detection purposes and
experiments.
The second issue was that of constructing a dataset with sufficient number of nonmalware (unknown and benign) samples. Fortunately, Virus Total provided a majority of
benign samples for the research. Virus Total also was able to provide unknown samples.
Both sample types – unknown and benign were needed in order to evaluate the algorithm
detection effectiveness. However, these samples were identified by the SHA256 hash
versus MD5. Sample Identifiers (SampleIDs) were then generated for tracking purposes.
All samples were collected, uniquely identified, analyzed and screened. All samples
were analyzed to ensure that they contained contemporary characteristics and behaviors
that protect intellectual property for commercial software. Duplicate samples were
removed. These non-malware behaviors and characteristics are often mimicked by
malware developers in order to bypass detection. In order to conduct a realistic
evaluation, malware, benign and unknown samples were used for testing. Over 1 million
benign samples were collected, analyzed and screened. Benign samples historically had
been more difficult to obtain than the malware data set. For the collected 1 million
benign sample collected only roughly 75% passed the screening criteria. Over .5
million unknown samples were collected, analyzed and screened. Roughly 50% of the
unknown samples passed screening criteria. These samples were then used to create
basis for the generation of the datasets used for testing. These non-malware samples
were then used to evaluate overall detection effectiveness (False Positives and False
Negatives) during testing.
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A related data set issue was simply the storage of the malware data set. Once the
various data sets had been collected, the malware and non-malware samples were stored
in a secure and protected repository. The secure storage of malware data set needed to
ensure non-detonation of samples within the experimental storage environment. The
malware samples were kept in a .zip file with password to prevent detonation or infect the
analysis platform/environment. Another issue is the size and number of malware
samples. The objective of the research is to analyze millions of samples in order to
evaluate efficacy and validate the proposed detection approach. This study acquired over
2 million total samples. The storage will require over two terabytes of storage for
malware and non-malware samples.
Lastly, the tools required to perform the analysis had issues. IDAPro did not
ultimately provide the necessary API for bulk analysis. Open Source tools such as
Capstone provided better programmatic access and was readily available. These tools
provided static and dynamic analysis and was used to extract features from the sample
repository. The number of modules were developed to extract the various static and
dynamic features. The seven feature extraction modules included: 1) Compiler Extractor
(Embedded Compiler, Compiler Type, Compiler Used), 2) Encryption Extractor
(Encrypted Indicator, Encrypted Type), 3) Library Call Extractor (Call Indicator, Call
Counter, Library Call) , 4) Malware Extractor (Malware Indicator, Malware Type), 5)
Virtual Machine Aware Extractor (VM Aware Indicator), 6) OpCodes Extractor (MOV,
ADD, LEA, SUB, AND, INC, OR, NEG, XOR, XCHG, POP, and JMP) and 7) File
Properties Extractor (File Type and File Size). The dynamic analysis tool (Cuckoo) was
leveraged for some feature extraction and detection. The tools used for these upgrades
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did impact schedule but did not affect other tools such as IDAPro and Weka. Managing
the overall analysis environment was challenging and but was technically achievable.
The researcher had a mitigation plan or alternative plan for all issues raised. In
terms of malware samples, the researcher had collected a majority of the malware
samples. Virus Total was able to supply both benign and unknown samples. There were
a number of blogs which offer malware samples as well. However, the researcher had a
strong desire to work with mainstream malware research data sets. In corresponding with
both Symantec and Virus Total, there is a high degree of confidence that at least one of
the firms would deliver the number of benign samples needed. The researcher has also
found a number of malware research sites that provide “benign” samples as well.
Therefore, the non-malware data set may have to be constructed using samples from
Virus Total. Additional analysis was required to ensure that the samples represent the
types of samples needed for the research. The additional analysis has been factored as
part of the proposed effort. Mitigating the secure storage of malware was a process that
checks and changes file extensions to prevent file execution. In addition, shipments of
malware were done via third-party compression software such as WinZip. Each set of
Zip files transferred will also be password protected in order to prevent file execution. In
terms of meeting storage requirements for the project, a high performance 24 TB
Network-Attached Storage (NAS) device was purchased to house both malware and nonmalware data sets. The only remaining concern for storage was a backup for
experimental data set. The researcher did explore cloud-based backup solutions.
In order to construct a solid analysis environment, the researcher began with the
latest releases of a number of static analysis tools (IDAPro, Capstone and objdump),
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Open Source dynamic analysis tool (Cuckoo) and the Open Source machine learning tool
(Weka). The researcher had sufficient understanding of the computing requirements for
the various tools as well as the underlying operating system compatibility issues. This
approach allowed and enabled the researcher to begin the assembly of the analysis
environment and provided a programmatic means to investigate integration issues with
the latest releases. The assumption is that the latest releases will have a vibrant technical
support network and issues raised were supported by the community of interest. Most of
the other resources are in place or can be easily secured. A full description of the
resources needed is provided below.
Table 5 Experimental Resource Requirements
Type
Dataset

Resource
Malware Samples

Hardware

Server

Hardware
Hardware
Hardware
Software
Software
Software
Software
Software
Software
Software

Workstation
Storage
Network
IdaPro
Volatility
Yara
Weka
Cuckoo
Python
Microsoft Office

Description
Semantec Agreement
Dell Server i7 64bit
w/Linux 16GB RAM
Toshiba i3
64bitw/Windows7
4 TB Storage
Internet Connectivity
v6.6
v2.3
v3.2
v3.7.9
v1.1
v2.7
2010 or better

Possess?
No

Risk Assessment
Other Sources are available

Yes

New Server/No Warranty

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Current Laptop/No Warranty
To be Purchase
Wifi Enabled
Education Version/Limited Version
Education Version/Limited Version
Researcher owned
Open Source
Open Source
Education Version/Limited Version
Education Version/Limited Version

Most of the resources needed fall into the software category. The researcher had
developed risk mitigation for each item. The only issue that presented itself was Weka
during experimental time period. WEKA had a major upgrade and release that took time
to configure. Yara and Volatility are tools for analysis. Volatility is an advanced
memory analysis framework for deeper inspection of memory. This software can be used
to analyze memory dumps after malware has been detonated through dynamic analysis.
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Yara is a tool that assists malware researchers to identify and classify malware samples.
Contingencies for most issues were use or leverage academic or demonstration licenses
offered by the software vendor. No issue arose during integration or testing.

Summary
This research developed a unique detection methodology using multidimensional
topological features in a machine learning environment. The multidimensional
topological features approach combined static and dynamic analysis in addition to unique
file properties. The study was designed to develop a quantitative experimental prototype
using multidimensional topological data with machine learning using advanced clustering
that provided improved detection for polymorphic malware above 81.25% for
polymorphic malware. The study utilized quantitative methods to provide objective
measurements for experimental results as described by Babbie (2010). The proposed
data collection, data analysis and presentation experimental results were conducted using
standard and accepted computational techniques (Babbie, 2010). The study was designed
with correctly assembled and representative datasets, proper experimental methodology
design such that the experiment can be reproducible and safely conducting experiments
such that the malware cannot infect the research environment (Rossow, 2013). The
experimental methodology was designed to establish, capture, analyze and evaluate
results with the rigorous quantitative evaluation measures offered by Mohaisen and
Alrawi (2015).

135

Chapter 4
Results
Research Goals
The goal of this study was to develop an experimental prototype system to
provide improved detection for polymorphic malware. Today’s effective detection rate
for polymorphic malware detection ranges from 68.75% to 81.25% (Amos et al., 2013).
The prototype system developed performed various feature extraction and assembled the
datasets. This study conducted various tests within testing SCED protocol. The test
results were then quantitatively examined and evaluated detection rates for polymorphic
malware. This study leveraged previous quantitative experiments for supervised machine
learning for malware research (Boro, et al., 2012; Pradesh, 2014) to better understand
how a limited set of multidimensional topological information can be used for malware
detection.

Review of the Methodology
The single-subject experimental design provides a standard framework and has
been widely accepted protocol for research questions posed for this study. The study
followed the basic single-subject protocol throughout the study. The protocol follows the
following steps.
1. Establish baseline test data – established a testing baseline for detection given a
standard feature dataset with a standard clustering algorithm for polymorphic malware
through multiple measurements before an intervention. The number of standard features
included file properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis.
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2. Manipulate feature set – the standard feature dataset was manipulated to
evaluate whether detection rates improved or deteriorated after the intervention. The
study examined three multidimensional datasets – one dedicated for each algorithm. The
three datasets were generated by combining known malware, known benign and
unknown samples into single feature dataset of 200,000 samples.
3. Controlled procedures and environment – the developed prototype environment
and datasets were controlled to ensure the extracted feature dataset remained static over
time and the automated feature extraction process remained unaltered (Rossow et al.,
2012).
4. Standard measurement approaches – a standard measurement approach for
documenting and capturing baseline testing data and subsequent test results. Detection
measurements were conducted in the same fashion for all tests. The study established
baseline detection rates for each of the three clustering algorithms. Standard
measurements were documented to evaluate Accuracy (ACC), Correlation Coefficient
(CC), True Positive Rate (sensitivity measure), and False Positive Rate (specificity
measure). As specified by the standard protocol, these measurements were established
as a permanent observational recording (Rossow et al., 2012).
5. Weighting of features – as part of this testing protocol the inputs were
manipulated and assessed. Within a single dataset, features were removed based on an
attribute selection algorithm (e.g. greedy stepwise) and then evaluated for each algorithm.
6. Capturing testing results - All test results were captured in terms of ACC, CC,
True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
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7. Graphing results - All test results were graphed and presented in terms of ACC,
CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
8. Evaluating results – All test results were evaluated after each test. Each test
was analyzed with rigor to understand the ACC, CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR).
9. Test controls – All tests were conducted using the required test controls. Test
controls regulated the test environment, test data, and test results.
The experimental design and approach enabled the researcher to conduct
experiments in a staged and systematic manner. The standard testing protocol provided a
means to plan, prepare, execute, document and analyze the test results. The testing
protocol allowed the researcher to document the detection results for the various testing
algorithms (Rossow et al., 2012). The results were collected in stages and results were
evaluated for effectiveness at the end of each experiment (Rossow et al., 2012). The
experimental research methodology was consistent with previous quantitative malware
studies (Creswell, 2007). The study’s methodology provides a means to introduce new
measures and systematically evaluate test results prior to conducting additional testing.
The quantitative experimental approach for conducting this study leveraged other testing
techniques conducted in healthcare, drug trials and other medical studies (Rizvi & Nock,
2008).

Experimental Outcomes
The following test cases were executed as part of the SCED protocol for each
algorithm (MB, IBk and DLMLP).
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Test Case 1
As with all test cases, the SCED testing protocol was used to structure and guide
the execution of the various experiments. Test Case 1 utilized Dataset 1 with the
Metabagging (MB) cluster algorithm. Dataset 1 was generated through a pseudo-random
selection of samples representing a stratified sample. The stratified sample contained
three sample types: malware, benign and unknown. Dataset 1 was selected and generated
on a percentage basis: Malware (40%), Benign (30%) and Unknown (30%). Dataset 1
was automatically selected and generated from a 2.5 million sample population.
However, the generation of the final file required some manual intervention to generate
the final Comma Separated Values (CSV) file. Once the CSV file was generated, Weka
was used for data validation purpose and to convert the CSV file to ARFF file. Once
completed, the dataset was found to be “clean” or validated. Dataset 1 was then saved
into a controlled directory for validated ARFF files. Dataset 1 was validated prior to the
beginning of any baseline testing. The 26 features were validated and included all
attributes from file properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis.
1. Establish baseline test data – Dataset 1 was validated through processing the
features through Weka. Upon file import, it was discovered that Dataset 1 had several
features/attributes mistyped. The fields are typed as part of validated upon import of the
CSV file into Weka. A number of numeric features (typically counts) were incorrectly
typed or imported as nominal values. In order to use these features for detection these
typing errors needed to be corrected. Errors introduced through automated parsing was
fixed through searching and eliminating leading spaces and/or special characters
embedded in the field. These errors were removed from the entire dataset and all features
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were checked for leading spaces and embedded special characters. Validation was
conducted on all 200,000 rows and 26 features. Once completed, the dataset was found
to be “clean” or validated. Dataset 1 was then saved into a controlled directory for
validated ARFF files. Dataset 1 was validated prior to the beginning of any baseline
testing. The 26 features were validated and included all attributes from file properties,
static analysis and dynamic analysis.
2. Manipulate feature set – Once the Dataset 1 was validated, Dataset 1 was used
to produce three distinct datasets - Dataset 1-1, Dataset 1-2, and Dataset 1-3. These three
datasets would be used to perform testing for the metabagging algorithm in various ways.
Dataset 1-1 was used for MB Baseline experimental testing. Dataset 1-2 would be used
for MB Reduced Features and Dataset 1-3 MB Information Gain. Dataset 1 was used as
the basis for all MB training and test datasets.
Dataset 1 was then used to generate Dataset 1-1 (baseline – no manipulation).
Dataset 1-1 was used as a “full-feature” dataset and all 26 features were used with the
MB algorithm to establish a detection baseline. The baseline testing did not filter and did
not use any feature analysis to improve any test results. Upon completion of baseline
testing, the dataset was exposed to further feature analysis.
Dataset 1 was also used to generate Dataset 1-2 Reduced Features dataset.
Dataset 1-2 was generated by analyzing the features in Dataset 1 to better understand
relationships and possible feature interdependencies. The full Dataset 1 – was analyzed
and all 26 features were processed by the Greedy Stepwise algorithm to understand data
relationships and interdependencies. This algorithm analyzes various features from the
dataset based on analyzing relationships that exist between features. Previous studies
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have analyzed and discovered that features or attributes can have relationships of various
types including irrelevant, weakly relevant or strongly relevant feature relationships
(John, Kohavi, & Pfleger, 1994). The output of the Greedy Stepwise algorithm suggested
that of the 26 original features within Dataset 1, could be reduced to 6 features/attributes.
The Greedy Stepwise algorithm produced a .793 Merit of Subset value. The features
selected by this algorithm included: 1) File Size, 2) File Type, 3) Compiler Type, 4)
Library Calls, 5) Encryption, and the Op Code 6) XCHG. The next step was to reimport
the entire Dataset 1and remove extraneous features/attributes – this became Dataset 1-2.
Dataset 1-2 removed all features except for File Size, File Type, Compiler Type, Library
Calls, Encryption, and XCHG. Dataset 1-2 was then processed with the MB algorithm.
The third and final dataset (Dataset 1-3) was analyzed utilizing another feature
analysis tool to evaluate features and relationships. The Information Gain algorithm
seeks to amplify certain features within a dataset to potentially improve model outcomes
(C. Lee & Lee, 2006). In this case, the intent was to use information gain to provide a
reduced feature set that potentially increases the detection rate. The information gain
algorithm was used to analyze the entire Dataset 1 – all 26 original features. The
information gain algorithm suggested that the top seven attributes/features included: 1)
Compiler Type (1.50537), 2) Malware Type (1.35976), 3) MOV (1.15211), 4) File Size
(1.07808), 5) Encrypt Type (0.89771), 6) File Type (0.88218), and 7) Library Calls
(0.79424). Dataset 1-3 used the full dataset and reduced the features to only the top
seven features to potentially improve detection results. Therefore, Dataset 1-3 used these
seven features for detection within MB. Further, Compiler Type could be used as a
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leading detection indicator or attribute. Dataset 1-3 then used Compiler Type as a
selected attribute and was then processed with the MB algorithm.
After running various experiments with Datasets 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3, it was
determined that the results being produced delivered higher than anticipated results.
After researching the issues, it was determined that the models were potentially
experiencing training data saturation as noted by Zhu (2012). These higher than
expected results produced were attributed to using a subset of Dataset 1 for training
purposes. The initial training approach was to use a subset of the dataset for training the
classifier with widely accepted 10 fold cross validation (Kohavi, 1995). This approach is
a standard supervised learning practice and has been used many times to build the
internal estimation training models within machine learning (Kohavi, 1995). Based on
the previous research (Zhu, 2012), a new training dataset was generated and MB testing
was repeated to evaluate testing outcomes.
Previous research has shown that datasets too closely related can produce higher
than expected results (Zhu, 2012). Therefore, a new training dataset was generated
similar to Dataset 1. The training dataset that was selected and generated in the same
manner as Dataset 1. However, the training dataset was allowed to have overlapping
samples from Dataset 1. Based on a re-run of the MB Baseline test, the newly generated
training dataset seemed to correct the training set saturation issue. Based on the MB test
results, additional training datasets were generated in a pseudo-random stratified fashion
for use with the other two algorithms. Training Dataset 1 was used for MB testing.
Training Dataset 2 and Training Dataset 3 were generated and used for the other cluster
algorithm experiments.
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3. Controlled procedures and environment – the developed prototype environment
and datasets were controlled to ensure the extracted feature dataset remained static over
time and the automated feature extraction process remained unaltered (Rossow et al.,
2012). Dataset 1-1, Dataset1-2 and Dataset 1-3 remained unaltered during any and all
testing. Additional precautions were taken to ensure that the Datasets 1-2 and 1-3
remained static after removal of extraneous features. All datasets were exported in ARFF
format after validation and manipulation using naming standard conventions identifying
the dataset.
4. Standard measurement approaches – a standard measurement approach was
used to document and capture testing results. Test results for Baseline testing (Dataset 11), Reduced Feature Selection (Dataset 1-2), and Data Amplification (Dataset 1-3) were
collected and captured. Detection measurements were conducted for all tests. Per the
testing protocol, the study established a baseline detection rate for MB. Subsequent tests
results were captured and analyzed. Results were analyzed using standard measurements
including Accuracy (ACC), Correlation Coefficient (CC), True Positive Rate (sensitivity
measure), and False Positive Rate (specificity measure). As specified by the standard
protocol, these measurements were captured as a permanent observational recording
(Rossow et al., 2012).
5. Weighting of features – as part of this testing protocol the inputs were
manipulated and assessed. Using the baseline dataset (Dataset 1-1), features were
removed based on an attribute selection algorithm (e.g. greedy stepwise) and then
evaluated for MB. Likewise, using the baseline dataset (Dataset 1-1), features were
removed based on the information gain for data amplification. The three tests for MB
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included MB Baseline (Dataset 1-1), MB Reduced Feature Selection (Dataset 1-2), and
MB Data Amplification (Dataset 1-3).
6. Capturing testing results - All results were captured in terms test and
measurement. Each test (MB Baseline, MB Reduced Feature Selection, and MB Data
Amplification) was captured with the associated measurement - ACC, CC, True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). The results are provided below:
Table 6 MB Baseline Classification Results
Experimental Results
MB Baseline
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 1-1
198,866

99.433%

1,134

0.567%

Table 7 MB Baseline Experimental Results
MB Baseline
Measurement
True Positive Rate (TPR)
True Negative Rate (TNR)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
False Negative Rate (FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)
Correlation Coefficient (CC)

Result
0.99983
0.99983
0.00017
0.00017
0.99983
0.00001
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Table 8 MB Reduced Feature Classification Results
Experimental Results
MB Reduced Feature
Selection
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 1-2
199,994

99.997%

6

0.003%

Table 9 MB Reduced Feature Selection Experimental Results
MB Reduced Feature Selection
Measurement
Result
True Positive Rate (TPR)
0.99991
True Negative Rate (TNR)
0.99995
False Positive Rate (FPR)
0.00005
False Negative Rate (FNR)
0.00009
Accuracy (ACC)
0.99992
Correlation Coefficient (CC)
0.00001

Table 10 MB Data Amplification Classification Results
Experimental Results
MB Data Amplification
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 1-3
199,997

99.9985%

3

0.0015%
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Table 11 MB Data Amplification Classification Experimental Results
MB Data Amplification
Measurement
True Positive Rate (TPR)
True Negative Rate (TNR)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
False Negative Rate (FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)
Correlation Coefficient (CC)

Result
0.99999
0.99998
0.00002
0.00001
0.99998
0.00001

7. Graphing results - All test results were graphed and presented in terms test (MB
Baseline, MB Reduced Feature Selection, and MB Data Amplification) and measurement
for True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) are shown below. Accuracy
essentially followed the same trendline as TPR. CC as a constant .0001 for all three
experiments MB Benchmark, MB Reduced Features and MB Amplified Features.

ROC
1.20000

0.99992

0.99984

1.00000

0.99999

0.80000
0.60000
0.40000
0.20000
0.00000

0.00009
0.00000
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TPR

0.00003
MB Reduced
Features

0.00000
MB Amplified
Features

FPR

Figure 5. MB Graph Results
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8. Evaluating results – All test results were evaluated after each test. Each test
was analyzed with rigor to understand the ACC, CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR).
Table 12 MB Experimental Results

True Positive Rate
(TPR)
True Negative Rate
(TNR)
False Positive Rate
(FPR)
False Negative Rate
(FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)

0.99983

MB Reduced
Feature
Selection
0.99991

0.99983

0.99995

0.99998

0.00017

0.00005

0.00002

0.00017

0.00009

0.00001

0.99983

0.99992

0.99998

Correlation
Coefficient (CC)

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

Measurement

MB Baseline

MB Data
Amplification
0.99999

9. Test controls – All tests were conducted using the required test controls. Test
controls regulated the MB test environment, MB test data (Training Datasets 1-1, 1-2, 1-3
and Test Datasets 1-1, 1-2, 1-3), and test results (MB Baseline, MB Reduced Feature
Selection and MB Data Amplification).
Test Case 2
As with all test cases, the SCED testing protocol was used to structure the
experiment. Test Case 2 utilized Dataset 2 with the IBk Nearest Neighbor clustering
algorithm (IBk). The Instance Based k-Nearest Neighbor (IBk) algorithm was chosen to
replace LSH as the algorithm improves upon the “locality” aspects of the clustering
algorithm. The IBk is a k-nearest-neighbor classifier that utilizes a similar distance metric
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used in the LSH algorithm. The calculated Euclidean distance function is used by IBk as
a critical search parameter within the algorithm (Manikandan et al., 2016). Dataset 2 was
generated through a pseudo-random selection of samples representing all three types of
samples: malware, benign and unknown. Dataset 2 was automatically generated based on
the same random selection algorithm that generated Dataset 1. Dataset 2 was selected
and generated on a percentage basis: Malware (40%), Benign (30%) and Unknown
(30%). Dataset 2 was automatically selected and generated from a 2.5 million sample
population. However, the generation of the final file required some manual intervention
to generate the final Comma Separated Values (CSV) file. Once the CSV file was
generated, Weka was used for data validation purpose and to convert the CSV file to
ARFF file. Once completed, the dataset was found to be “clean” or validated. Dataset 2
was then saved into a controlled directory for validated ARFF files. Dataset 2 was
validated prior to the beginning of any baseline testing. The 26 features were validated
and included all attributes from file properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis.
1. Establish baseline test data – Like Dataset 1, Dataset 2 was validated through
processing the features through Weka. As was seen in Dataset 1, several of the numeric
features within Dataset 2 were typed incorrectly as nominal. These errors were
highlighted upon importing the Dataset 2 CSV file into Weka. Data validation was
conducted and data errors were corrected in exactly the same fashion as Dataset 1.
Again, these errors were introduced into the dataset through automated parsing during the
extraction process. These errors were fixed through searching and eliminating leading
spaces and/or special characters embedded in the field. These errors were removed from
the entire dataset and all features were validated. Once completed, the dataset was found
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to be “clean” or validated. Per the testing protocol, the dataset was validated prior to the
beginning of baseline testing. The features (26) included attributes from file properties,
static analysis and dynamic analysis. As noted above, a Training Dataset 2 was
generated, validated and used as part of the classifier training protocol.
2. Manipulate feature set – The manipulation of the feature set produced three test
datasets – Dataset 2-1, Dataset 2-2, and Dataset 2-3. Similarly, the training dataset was
developed from the Training Dataset 2 for each test. After both datasets (training and
test) were validated, Training Dataset 2-1 and Test Dataset 2-1 (baseline – no
manipulation) were processed with all 26 features using the IBk algorithm to establish a
detection baseline. The baseline testing did not filter and did not use feature any analysis
to improve test results. Upon completion of baseline testing, the dataset was exposed to
further feature analysis.
The second set of datasets – Training Dataset 2-2 and Test Dataset 2-2 were
generated by analyzing the features to better understand relationships and possible feature
interdependencies. The full Dataset 2-1 – all 26 features were analyzed with the Greedy
Stepwise algorithm. The output of the Greedy Stepwise algorithm suggested that of the
26 original features, the dataset could be reduced to 7 features/attributes. The Greedy
Stepwise algorithm produced a Merit of best subset of 0.896. The predictive attributes
for this dataset included 1) File Size, 2) File Type, 3) Compiler, 4) Compiler Type, 5)
Library Calls, 6) Encryption and the Op Code 7) XCHG. The next step was to reimport
the both the Training Dataset 2 and Dataset 2 and remove extraneous features/attributes.
The classifier training was conducted using Training Dataset 2-2. Experimental testing
was conducted using Dataset 2-2. In both cases, Training Dataset 2-2 and Test Dataset 2149

2 removed all features except for File Size, File Type, Compiler, Compiler Type, Library
Calls, Encryption, and XCHG. Dataset 2-2 was then processed with the IBk algorithm.
The third and final dataset (Dataset 2-3) was analyzed utilizing another feature
analysis tool to evaluate features and relationships for Dataset 2. The Information Gain
algorithm seeks to amplify certain features within a dataset to potentially improve model
outcomes (C. Lee & Lee, 2006). In this case, the intent was to use information gain to
provide a reduced feature set that potentially increases the detection rate. The
information gain algorithm was used to analyze the entire Dataset 2 – all 26 original
features. In this case, the intent was to use information gain to provide a reduced feature
set that potentially increases the detection rate. The information gain algorithm
suggested that the top seven attributes/features included 1) Compiler Type (1.55744), 2)
Malware Type (1.40863), 3) XCHG (1.26408), 4) File Size (1.09264), 5) Encrypt Type
(0.88897), 6) File Type (0.86818), and 7) Library Calls (0.77946). Dataset 2-3 used the
full dataset and reduced the features to only the top seven features to potentially improve
detection results. Therefore, Dataset 2-3 used these seven features for detection within
the IBk classifier. Further, Compiler Type could be used as a leading indicator attribute.
Dataset 2-3 then used Compiler Type with the IBk classifier to deliver experimental
results.
3. Controlled procedures and environment – the developed prototype environment
and datasets were controlled to ensure the extracted feature dataset remained static over
time and the automated feature extraction process remained unaltered (Rossow et al.,
2012). Training Datasets (Training Dataset 2-1, Training Dataset 2-2 and Training
Dataset 2-3) and Test Datasets (Test Dataset 2-1, Test Dataset 2-2 and Test Dataset 2-3)
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remained unaltered during any and all testing. Additional precautions were taken to
ensure that the Test and Training Datasets 2-2 and 2-3 remained static after removal of
extraneous features. All datasets were exported in ARFF format after validation and
manipulation using naming standard conventions identifying the dataset.
4. Standard measurement approaches – a standard measurement approach was
used to document and capture testing results. Test results for Baseline testing (Dataset 21), Reduced Feature Selection (Dataset 2-2), and Data Amplification (Dataset 2-3) were
collected and captured. Detection measurements were conducted for all tests. Per the
testing protocol, the study established a baseline detection rate for IBk. Subsequent tests
results were captured and analyzed. Results were analyzed using standard measurements
including Accuracy (ACC), Correlation Coefficient (CC), True Positive Rate (sensitivity
measure), and False Positive Rate (specificity measure). As specified by the standard
protocol, these measurements were captured as a permanent observational recording
(Rossow et al., 2012).
5. Weighting of features – as part of this testing protocol the inputs were
manipulated and assessed. Using the baseline dataset (Dataset 2-1), features were
removed based on an attribute selection algorithm (e.g. greedy stepwise) and then
evaluated for IBk. Likewise, using the baseline dataset (Dataset 2-1), features were
included IBk Baseline (Dataset 2-1), IBk Reduced Feature Selection (Dataset 2-2), and
IBk Data Amplification (Dataset 2-3).
6. Capturing testing results - All results were captured in terms test and
measurement. Each test (IBk Baseline, IBk Reduced Feature Selection, and IBk Data
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Amplification) was captured with the associated measurement - ACC, CC, True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
Table 13 IBk Baseline Classification Results
Experimental Results
IBk Baseline
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 2-1
199,872

99.936%

128

0.064%

Table 14 IBk Baseline Experimental Results
IBk Baseline
Measurement
True Positive Rate (TPR)
True Negative Rate (TNR)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
False Negative Rate (FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)
Correlation Coefficient (CC)

Result
0.99984
0.99991
0.00009
0.00016
0.99986
0.00001

Table 15 IBk Reduced Feature Selection Classification Results
Experimental Results
IBk Reduced Feature
Selection
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 2-2
199,923

99.962%

77

0.038%
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Table 16 IBk Reduced Feature Selection Experimental Results
IBk Reduced Feature Selection
Measurement
Result
True Positive Rate (TPR)
0.99992
True Negative Rate (TNR)
0.99997
False Positive Rate (FPR)
0.00003
False Negative Rate (FNR)
0.00008
Accuracy (ACC)
0.99993
Correlation Coefficient (CC)
0.00001

Table 17 IBk Data Amplification Classification Results
Experimental Results
IBk Data
Amplification
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 2-3
200,000

100.0000%

0

0.0000%

Table 18 IBk Data Amplification Experimental Results
IBk Data Amplification
Measurement
True Positive Rate (TPR)
True Negative Rate (TNR)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
False Negative Rate (FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)
Correlation Coefficient (CC)

Result
0.99999
1.00000
0.00000
0.00001
0.99999
0.00001

7. Graphing results - All test results were graphed and presented in terms of test
(IBK Baseline, IBK Reduced Feature Selection, and IBK Data Amplification) and
measurement for True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). The results
are shown below. Accuracy essentially followed the same trendline as TPR. CC was a
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constant of .0001 across all three experiments IBk Benchmark, IBk Reduced Features and
IBk Amplified Features.

ROC
1.20000

0.99992

0.99984

1.00000

0.99999

0.80000
0.60000
0.40000
0.20000
0.00000

0.00009
0.00000

IBk Benchmark
TPR

0.00003
IBk Reduced
Features

0.00000
IBk Amplified
Features

FPR

Figure 6. IBk Graph Results

8. Evaluating results – All test results were evaluated after each test. Each test
was analyzed with rigor to understand the ACC, CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR).
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Table 19 IBk Experimental Results

True Positive Rate
(TPR)
True Negative Rate
(TNR)
False Positive Rate
(FPR)
False Negative Rate
(FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)

0.99984

IBk Reduced
Feature
Selection
0.99992

0.99991

0.99997

1.00000

0.00009

0.00003

0.00000

0.00016

0.00008

0.00001

0.99986

0.99993

0.99999

Correlation
Coefficient (CC)

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

Measurement

IBK Baseline

IBk Data
Amplification
0.99999

9. Test controls – All tests were conducted using the required test controls. Test
controls regulated the IBk test environment, IBk test data (Training Datasets 1-1, 1-2, 1-3
and Test Datasets 1-1, 1-2, 1-3), and test results (IBk Baseline, IBk Reduced Feature
Selection and IBk Data Amplification).
Test Case 3
As with all test cases, the SCED testing protocol was used to structure the
experiment. Test Case 3 utilized Dataset 3 with the Deep Learning Multilevel Perceptron
(DLMLP) clustering algorithm. The DLMLP algorithm was chosen to replace the BP
algorithm as it improves upon the dimensions of belief for training and test datasets. The
main idea in replacing the BP algorithm with DLMLP was recently presented by Gruber
et al. (2017). ANN’s can leverage belief propagation for clustering or classification
inefficiently (Gruber et al., 2017). ANN’s build networks of neurons, share information
between neurons and propagate results throughout the entire network (Gruber et al.,
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2017). Gruber (2017) proposed using shallow neural networks with deep learning to
achieve similar or better propagation results. The deep learning approach established
shallow neural networks and combined other algorithms such as MLP to achieve similar
propagation (Gruber et al., 2017). The goal was to utilize the DLMLP algorithm for
improved detection. Given that the goal of this research was to establish new detection
using advanced algorithms. DLMLP was selected for model efficiencies and to leverage
nascent algorithms that improved upon other algorithms. Dataset 3 was generated
through a pseudo-random selection of samples representing all three types of samples:
malware, benign and unknown. Dataset 3 was automatically generated based on the
same random selection algorithm that generated other datasets. Dataset 3 was selected
and generated on a percentage basis: Malware (40%), Benign (30%) and Unknown
(30%). Dataset 3 was automatically selected and generated from a 2.5 million sample
population. However, the generation of the final file required some manual intervention
to generate the final Comma Separated Values (CSV) file. Once the CSV file was
generated, Weka was used for data validation purpose and to convert the CSV file to
ARFF file. Once completed, the dataset was found to be “clean” or validated. Dataset 3
was then saved into a controlled directory for validated ARFF files. Dataset 3 was
validated prior to the beginning of any baseline testing. The 26 features were validated
and included all attributes from file properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis.
1. Establish baseline test data – Like previous datasets, Dataset 3 was validated
through processing the features through Weka. As was seen in previous datasets, several
of the numeric features within Dataset 3 were typed incorrectly as nominal. These errors
were highlighted upon importing the Dataset 3 CSV file into Weka. Data validation was
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conducted and data errors were corrected in exactly the same fashion as previous
datasets. Again, these errors were introduced into the dataset through automated parsing
during the extraction process. These errors were fixed through searching and eliminating
leading spaces and/or special characters embedded in the field. These errors were
removed from the entire dataset and all features were validated. Once completed, the
dataset was found to be “clean” or validated. Per the testing protocol, the dataset was
validated prior to the beginning of baseline testing. The features (26) included attributes
from file properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis. As noted above, a Training
Dataset 3 was generated, validated and used as part of the classifier training protocol.
2. Manipulate feature set – The manipulation of the feature set produced three test
datasets – Dataset 3-1, Dataset 3-2, and Dataset 3-3. Similarly, the training dataset was
developed from the Training Dataset 3 for each test. After both datasets (training and
test) were validated, Training Dataset 3-1 and Test Dataset 3-1 (baseline – no
manipulation) were processed with all 26 features using the DLMLP algorithm to
establish a detection baseline. The baseline testing did not filter and did not use feature
any analysis to improve test results. Upon completion of baseline testing, the dataset was
exposed to further feature analysis.
The second set of datasets – Training Dataset 3-2 and Test Dataset 3-2 were
generated by analyzing the features to better understand relationships and possible feature
interdependencies. The full Test Dataset 3-1 – all 26 features were analyzed with the
Greedy Stepwise algorithm. The output of the Greedy Stepwise algorithm suggested that
of the 26 original features, the dataset could be reduced to 7 features/attributes. The
Greedy Stepwise algorithm produced a Merit of best subset of 0.807. The predictive
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attributes for this dataset included 1) File Size, 2) File Type, 3) Compiler, 4) Compiler
Type, 5) Library Calls, 6) Encryption and the Op Code 7) XCHG. The next step was to
reimport the both the Training Dataset 3 and Test Dataset 3 and remove extraneous
features/attributes. The classifier training was conducted using Training Dataset 3-2.
Experimental testing was conducted using Dataset 3-2. In both cases, Training Dataset 32 and Test Dataset 3-2 removed all features except for File Size, File Type, Compiler,
Compiler Type, Library Calls, Encryption, and XCHG. Dataset 2-2 was then processed
with the DLMLP algorithm.
The third and final dataset (Training and Test Dataset 3-3) was analyzed utilizing
another feature analysis tool to evaluate features and relationships for Dataset 3. The
Information Gain algorithm seeks to amplify certain features within a dataset to
potentially improve model outcomes (C. Lee & Lee, 2006). In this case, the intent was to
use information gain to provide a reduced feature set that potentially increases the
detection rate. The information gain algorithm was used to analyze the entire Dataset 3 –
all 26 original features. In this case, the intent was to use information gain to provide a
reduced feature set that potentially increases the detection rate. The information gain
algorithm suggested that the top seven attributes/features included 1) Compiler Type
(1.69143), 2) Malware Type (1.51408), 3) XCHG (1.37264), 4) File Size (1.10192), 5)
Encrypt Type (0.91679), 6) File Type (0.78658), and 7) Library Calls (0.71794). Dataset
3-3 used the full dataset and reduced the features to only the top seven features to
potentially improve detection results. Therefore, Dataset 3-3 used these seven features
for detection within the DLMLP classifier. Further, Compiler Type could be used as a
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leading indicator attribute. Dataset 3-3 then used Compiler Type with the DLMLP
classifier to deliver experimental results.
3. Controlled procedures and environment – the developed prototype environment
and datasets were controlled to ensure the extracted feature dataset remained static over
time and the automated feature extraction process remained unaltered (Rossow et al.,
2012). Training Datasets (Training Dataset 3-1, Training Dataset 3-2 and Training
Dataset 3-3) and Test Datasets (Test Dataset 3-1, Test Dataset 3-2 and Test Dataset 3-3)
remained unaltered during any and all testing. Additional precautions were taken to
ensure that the Test and Training Datasets 3-2 and 3-3 remained static after removal of
extraneous features. All datasets were exported in ARFF format after validation and
manipulation using naming standard conventions identifying the dataset.
4. Standard measurement approaches – a standard measurement approach was
used to document and capture testing results. Test results for Baseline testing (Dataset 31), Reduced Feature Selection (Dataset 3-2), and Data Amplification (Dataset 3-3) were
collected and captured. Detection measurements were conducted for all tests. Per the
testing protocol, the study established a baseline detection rate for the DLMLP classifier.
Subsequent tests results were captured and analyzed. Results were analyzed using
standard measurements including Accuracy (ACC), Correlation Coefficient (CC), True
Positive Rate (sensitivity measure), and False Positive Rate (specificity measure). As
specified by the standard protocol, these measurements were captured as a permanent
observational recording (Rossow et al., 2012).
5. Weighting of features – as part of this testing protocol the inputs were
manipulated and assessed. Using the baseline dataset (Dataset 3-1), features were
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removed based on an attribute selection algorithm (e.g. greedy stepwise) and then
evaluated for DLMLP. Likewise, using the baseline dataset (Dataset 3-1), features were
removed based on the information gain for data amplification. The three tests for
DLMLP included DLMLP Baseline (Dataset 3-1), DLMLP Reduced Feature Selection
(Dataset 3-2), and DLMLP Data Amplification (Dataset 3-3).
6. Capturing testing results - All results were captured in terms test and
measurement. Each test (DLMLP Baseline, DLMLP Reduced Feature Selection, and
DLMLP Data Amplification) was captured with the associated measurement - ACC, CC,
True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
Table 20 DLMLP Baseline Classification Results
Experimental Results
DLMLP Baseline
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 3-1
199,903

99.952%

97

0.048%

Table 21 DLMLP Baseline Experimental Results
DLMLP Baseline
Measurement
True Positive Rate (TPR)
True Negative Rate (TNR)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
False Negative Rate (FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)
Correlation Coefficient (CC)

Result
0.99994
0.99995
0.00005
0.00006
0.99994
0.00001
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Table 22 DLMLP Reduced Feature Selection Classification Results
Experimental Results
DLMLP Reduced
Feature Selection
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 3-2
199,996

99.998%

4

0.002%

Table 23 DLMLP Reduced Feature Selection Experimental Results
DLMLP Reduced Feature Selection
Measurement
Result
True Positive Rate (TPR)
0.99999
True Negative Rate (TNR)
0.99998
False Positive Rate (FPR)
0.00002
False Negative Rate (FNR)
0.00001
Accuracy (ACC)
0.99999
Correlation Coefficient (CC)
0.00001

Table 24 DLMLP Data Amplification Classification Results
Experimental Results
DLMLP Data
Amplification
Correctly Classified
Instances
Incorrectly Classified
Instances

Dataset 3-3
199,999

99.9995%

1

0.0005%
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Table 25 DLMLP Data Amplification Experimental Results
DLMLP Data Amplification
Measurement
True Positive Rate (TPR)
True Negative Rate (TNR)
False Positive Rate (FPR)
False Negative Rate (FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)
Correlation Coefficient (CC)

Result
0.99999
1.00000
0.00000
0.00001
0.99999
0.00001

7. Graphing results - All test results were graphed and presented in terms test
(DLMLP Baseline, DLMLP Reduced Feature Selection, and DLMLP Data
Amplification) and measurement for True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate
(FPR). The results are shown below. Accuracy essentially followed the same trendline
as TPR and was not graphed for that reason. CC was a constant of .0001 across all three
experiments DLMLP Benchmark, DLMLP Reduced Features and DLMLP Amplified
Features and did not provide substantial value.
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0.99999

0.99994

1.00000

0.99999

0.80000
0.60000
0.40000
0.20000
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0.00000

DLMLP Benchmark
TPR

0.00002
DLMLP Reduced
Features

0.00000
DLMLP Amplified
Features

FPR

Figure 7. DLMLP Graph Results
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8. Evaluating results – All test results were evaluated after each test. Each test
was analyzed with rigor to understand the ACC, CC, True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR).
Table 26 DLMLP Experimental Results

True Positive Rate
(TPR)
True Negative Rate
(TNR)
False Positive Rate
(FPR)
False Negative Rate
(FNR)
Accuracy (ACC)

0.99994

DLMLP
Reduced
Feature
Selection
0.99999

0.99995

0.99998

1.00000

0.00005

0.00002

0.00000

0.00006

0.00001

0.00001

0.99994

0.99999

0.99999

Correlation
Coefficient (CC)

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

Measurement

DLMLP Baseline

DLMLP
Data
Amplification
0.99999

9. Test controls – All tests were conducted using the required test controls. Test
controls regulated the DLMLP test environment, DLMLP test data (Training Datasets 31, 3-2, 3-3 and Test Datasets 3-1, 3-2, 3-3), and test results (DLMLP Baseline, DLMLP
Reduced Feature Selection and DLMLP Data Amplification).

Data Analysis
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effective malware detection rates
using multidimensional topological features with advanced cluster algorithms. Previous
research (Fraley & Figueroa, 2016) provided some insight into detection rates using
multidimensional topological features with using advanced clustering algorithms.
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However, previous research was limited to a few thousand files/samples. This study
greatly expanded both the training and test datasets. Having larger datasets provided
deeper insight into how each of the various algorithms perform given a limited set of
topological features. This study also provided insight into how algorithms perform given
a full (26) and optimized features (6 or 7). Experiments were performed with full data,
reduced features and amplified features. This process provided an understanding of how
detection performed given some algorithm tuning. This study established baselines for
all three cluster algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP). The MB classifier out performed
other algorithms (LSH and BP) in previous studies (Fraley & Figueroa, 2016). However,
given the larger dataset, both the IBk and DLMLP classifiers out performed MB in
almost every respect.
This study also provided a test case for detecting malware using multidimensional
topological data. The baseline testing included processing the full set of features that
included file properties, static analysis and dynamic analysis. The features include File
Size, File Type, Malware Type, VM Aware, Compiler, Embedded Compiler, Compiler
Type. Library Import/Export, Library Call, Encryption, Encrypt Type, and Op codes –
ADD, AND, INC, LEA, MOV, NEG, OR, SUB, XOR, POP, JMP and XCHG. The
testing from this study supports the concept that effective malware detection can be
achieved using multidimensional topological data. Further, experimental testing has
shown that a reduced feature set (6 or 7) delivered better and more effective detection
rates than the full data set for this dataset. The features that delivered optimal detection
rates include: 1) File Size, 2) File Type, 3) Compiler Type, 4) Library Calls, 5)
Encryption, 6) Malware Type and the Op Codes 6) XCHG or MOV.
164

In terms of algorithm performance, IBk and DLMLP delivered impressive true
positive test results given this dataset. The IBk classifier scored almost a perfect
detection rate with the Amplified Feature training and test dataset (Dataset 2-3). The IBk
true positive detection rate (.99999) has been validated and repeated several times to
ensure the results. This far exceeded the initial study expectations. In addition, the study
considered training dataset saturation and developed separate training datasets in order to
not artificially increase detection rates. The near perfect detection rate should also
validate the selection of this algorithm for replacing LSH for the study.
Evaluating algorithm performance in terms of false positive rates, both IBk
Amplified Data and DLMLP Amplified Feature delivered impressive results. The false
positive rates for both of these classifiers was near zero. It is difficult to improve false
positive rates of zero. Again, several tests were repeated in order to validate these rates
for both IBk and DLMLP.
It should be noted that both the IBk and DLMLP algorithms are expensive in
terms of observed processing time. The MB algorithm would typically process and
deliver test results (200,000 samples) in under 240 seconds. The IBk and DLMLP by
contrast would process and deliver results in excess of 2,800 and 10,000 seconds
respectively. The infrastructure was not tuned for processing any algorithm. Memory
allocation and processor allocations remained constant and unchanged throughout the
testing process.
Lastly, ACC and CC were not discriminators for the various algorithms. It was
originally thought that ACC and CC would provide greater insight into algorithm
performance over and above true positive and false positive rates. However, because of
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the high true positive and low false positive rates, the evaluation of algorithms based on
ACC and CC was not as useful as anticipated.

Findings
There were a number of substantial findings from this study. The study
does answer the two basic research questions posed previously.
1) Can detection rates be improved by increasing the quality and quantity of
multidimensional features for the machine learning advanced clustering
algorithms from file properties, static and dynamic analysis?
Research findings suggest that reduced multidimensional topological feature set using file
features, static and dynamic analysis delivered better overall results than the full dataset
(7 feature vs 26 features). The reduced and amplified datasets delivered better results.
While all three algorithms delivered above target results, less or selected features
provided better detection results (99.99%) across all three algorithms.
2) Which of the machine learning advanced clustering algorithms performed
better given the multidimensional features from file properties, static and
dynamic analysis?
It should be stated that the experiments conducted for this study demonstrated that
multidimensional topological data can be used to improve malware detection. The 26
selected features did help to establish and improve overall detection rates. The
experimental approach demonstrated impressive detection rates of 99.99% (MB, IBk and
DLMLP) for all experimental datasets. The lowest detection rate delivered in
experimental testing was 99.43% (MB Baseline). The experimental detection rates
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produced delivered far above the 81.25% target for polymorphic malware (Amos et al.,
2013).
It should be noted that this study was concerned with recent malware (within the
previous 18 months) and used a malware dataset specifically targeting Microsoft
operating systems. Lastly, feature selection and data amplification both reduced the
number of features processed by the algorithm. In performing the research for both the
IBk and DLMLP algorithms, the theoretical aspects of both algorithms should perform
well with an abundance of data. It was thought that the 26 multidimensional features
would provide sufficient data features to enhance classifier performance. However, both
algorithms performed incredibly well given a reduced and amplified dataset. Both
produced near perfect true positive rates (99.99%) and near zero false positive rates.

Summary of Findings
The goal of this study was to develop an experimental approach for improved
detection for polymorphic malware. The experimental detection rates delivered for this
study were as high as 99.99% and the low was 99.43%. These experimental testing
results far exceeded the current detection rate of 81.25% for polymorphic malware
(Amos et al., 2013). The hypothesis for the study was that detection could be achieved by
combining file properties, static and dynamic analysis features. Experimental testing
with this dataset delivered effective detection using file properties, static and dynamic
analysis features. This study leveraged the SCED protocol for performing various
experimental tests. The test results were then quantitatively examined and evaluated.
This study leveraged previous quantitative experiments for supervised machine learning
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for malware research (Boro, et al., 2012; Pradesh, 2014) to better understand how
multidimensional topological information can be utilized for malware detection.
The study’s target was to develop an approach that would deliver an effective
detection rate of higher than 81.25% using multidimensional topological data for
malware detection. The prototype system performed various feature extraction and
assembled the datasets for training and testing. The study sought to establish baselines
for three advanced cluster algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP) and then manipulate
feature weighting to exceed the target effective rate. In all cases (MB, IBk and DLMLP)
the feature weighting delivered better detection performance.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
There were a number conclusions reached in for this study. The study
demonstrated that multidimensional topological data can be effectively used for
detection. Secondly, the study demonstrated that the various algorithms used delivered
solid detection results using multidimensional topological data. The study also
demonstrated that high malware detection rates can be achieved using reduced or
amplified multidimensional topological features. A brief explanation for each conclusion
is provided below.
This study produced experimental evidence that multidimensional topological
data can be used for improved malware detection. The initial premise for the study was
that by combining multidimensional features from file type, static and dynamic analysis
with machine learning effective malware detection rates could be improved.
Experimental testing with three algorithms successfully demonstrated detection rates
greater than 99.99% with the experimental datasets. In addition, the algorithms did not
suffer from an increase in false positive rates which is usually the case with algorithms
that produce high detection rates. Given the high true positive rates and low false
positive rates it can be safely stated that multidimensional topological data can be used to
improve detection rates.
The study also produced highly effective malware detection rates by leveraging
the advanced algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP). All three algorithms produced and
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delivered effective detection results given the experimental datasets: MB (99.985%), IBk
(100%) and DLMLP (99.9995%). All three algorithms produced and delivered low false
positive rates given the experimental datasets: MB (0.00002%), IBk (0.0%) and DLMLP
(0.0%). It can be safely concluded that these algorithms produced effective detection for
the experimental datasets.
The study also produced evidence that very high malware detection rates can be
achieved with reduced or amplified features. IBk and DLMLP both produced 99.999%
effective detection rates with using a minimum number of features (6 or 7). Both the IBk
and DLMLP algorithms are designed to process volumes of data. It was assumed that
these algorithms would produce better results with more data. The opposite was found to
be true for this study. Both algorithms produced better effective detection rates with the
reduced features or amplified dataset. In addition, neither algorithm suffered from
increased in false positive rate which normally is associated with algorithms that deliver
higher detection rates. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that given the high true
positive rate and the low false positive rate for both IBk and DLMLP it can be safely
concluded that high malware detection rates can be achieved with reduced or amplified
features leveraging multidimensional topological data with advanced algorithms.
As seen above, there are three valuable conclusions reached for this study. The
conclusions reached for this study include leveraging multidimensional topological for
detection, utilizing advanced algorithms to improve detection, and using reduced or
amplified features produced higher than anticipated detection rates. These three
conclusions are supported by both the experimental protocol and test results from various
experiments presented earlier.
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Implications
There are two major implications that can be gleaned from this research. First,
malware detection can be accurately detected using multidimensional topological data.
This means that a combination of file properties, static and dynamic analysis did provide
impressive detection rates for this study. The implication is that detection for
polymorphic malware targeting Microsoft platforms can be readily achieved through
extracting multidimensional features and subjecting those features to a clustering
algorithm. This implication may extend or augment current endpoint detection
techniques and/or approaches.
The second implication is that endpoint protection could be greatly improved
using reduced or amplified multidimensional topological features. The experimental
results with these datasets demonstrate that by using a few features (reduced or amplified
features) with advanced algorithms did produce impressive malware detection rates –
approaching 100%. Further, the implication of using only a few features (6 or 7) for
detection purposes for executable files may change or enhance how endpoint protection is
currently performed. Endpoint detection for malware could embed a feature extraction
and machine learning modules to process minimal features.
These two major implications for malware detection may change endpoint
strategies. Machine learning is being incorporated into many commercial products. The
study demonstrates that endpoint protection could and should use multidimensional data
for advanced protection. Secondly, endpoint protection could use a few or minimal
number of features (6 or 7) for detection purposes. The study also illustrates the case that
reduced features or amplified features could dramatically improve malware detection at
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the endpoint. These two implications could easily improve or enhance the way endpoint
detection is conducted today across the enterprise.

Recommendations
There are three areas in which additional research is recommended. Two areas
deal with an understanding the various functions or opcodes inherent in the executable.
This study extracted and counted the associated opcode for each sample through a
dynamic analysis process. For each sample, all opcodes were extracted and counted on
an execution basis. This study focused on Bilar’s (2007) top twelve Op Codes. The total
universe of opcodes is approximately 398 depending on the code set. Just as Bilar (2007)
observed, there were samples that executed a high number of opcodes. However, in
some cases the number of instances a particular opcode was executed was incredibly high
in comparison to other samples. As an example, one sample executed ADD nearly
10,000 times. Likewise, other opcodes such as LEA was executed over 7,000 times. The
average for most opcodes was under 1,000. While not the focus of this study, further
research could evaluate why the execution of some or all opcodes were performed so
many times. As it turns out, the particular sample in question was indeed malware.
Additional research needs to conducted to further understand whether this is typical for
poorly written malware thus making it noisy or is it something else more menacing like
performing reconnaissance activities for detection at the endpoint. It is interesting from a
research point of view as to why these opcodes are executed so many times.
Similarly, additional research needs to be conducted for two specific Op Codes:
MOV and XCHG. This study focused Bilar’s top 12 Op Codes. Bilar’s research
demonstrated that these 12 Op Codes represent 95% of the malicious Op Codes. Bilar’s
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(2007) research profiled ADD, AND, INC, LEA, MOV, NEG, OR, SUB, XOR, POP,
JMP and XCHG. In performing attribute analysis, reduced feature selection and data
amplification, MOV and XCHG were the only two Op Codes that were selected from an
attribute perspective. Feature analysis routinely highlighted MOV and XCHG as
interesting attributes. This study used the MOV and XCHG attributes in both reduced
feature selection and amplified features to perform advanced detection. These two
attributes produced highly effective detection rates for several experiments. These two
attributes provided improved detection across all algorithms in this study. Additional
research should be conducted to understand the nature of both Op Codes for malware and
benign samples.
The last research area is single-layer packed and multi-layer packed executables.
A substantial number of samples for this study used packing algorithms to avoid or evade
further analysis. Packing algorithms commonly used for packing malware and hiding
execution routines (Jeong, Choo, Lee, Bat-Erdene, & Lee, 2010). As previously
discussed packing is also utilized to protect intellectual property for legitimate purposes.
Packed executables essentially encode the data sections so that dynamic analysis cannot
view results (Jeong et al., 2010). As these executables are loaded into memory, packed
executables dynamically change the size and content of the data (Jeong et al., 2010).
There were a number of samples in this study that exhibited single-layer packing, repacking and multi-layer packing. This made feature extraction more difficult or in some
cases impossible. This study did not find a single benign sample that used multi-layer
packing. Therefore, additional research should be conducted to understand the nature of
single-layer packed and multi-layer packed executables for malware detection. It is
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believed that classification of packing algorithms could lead to better detection for
advanced malware.

Summary
Malware represents some of the most serious security concerns for today’s
Internet. Security breaches and cyber-attacks can be directly attributed to malware or
multi-stage cyber-attacks. Malware can compromise networks and computers in the form
of botnets, viruses, worms, ransomware and advanced persistent threats (APTs). These
cyber-attacks are launched using targeted and advanced malware techniques to steal
personal, proprietary of financial information. The high number of attacks and the
associated negative notoriety make malware one of the most popular areas for advanced
research. Much of today’s advanced research has been concentrated on developing
techniques to collect, study, and mitigate malware. This research focused on detecting
“real” malware and samples found “live” on the internet. As improved detection
becomes a reality – mitigation or elimination of malware for end-points can be greatly
enhanced. Unfortunately, current host-based detection approaches that leverage
signature-based detection is largely ineffective for new polymorphic malware.
Polymorphic malware avoids or evades signature detection by using advanced
obfuscation or encryption techniques. The goal of this research was to address these
malware detection shortcomings. New research was conducted to develop new dynamic
detection approaches. New approaches demonstrated that using machine learning with
advanced algorithms can correctly and efficiently identify potential malware threats.
This study demonstrated a novel malware detection approach that provides
improved detection for polymorphic malware. The research should enhance and augment
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traditional end-point detection approaches. This experimental study extracted key
features from file properties, static and dynamic analysis. Machine learning using
advanced algorithms correctly determined the likelihood of files (samples) to be benign
(good) or malicious (bad). The prototype environment analyzed malware executables
(program) in a controlled environment in order to better understand behaviors, function
calls and the inclusion of dynamic libraries. Features were extracted and assembled for
further analysis by three different cluster algorithms. Experiments were conducted to
better understand the malware threat landscape in terms of file properties, static and
dynamic analysis. Foundational and experimental reviews of previous research literature
was conducted and summarized.
Detecting polymorphic and metamorphic malware continues to be a challenge for
the security community. A majority of the today’s security research is focused on
developing enhanced detection using techniques that collect, study, and mitigate
malicious code (Kolbitsch et al., 2009). However, new polymorphic malware and the
detection evading techniques render many of the current signature protections useless and
therefore leave end-points unprotected (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). The speed at
which polymorphic malware is advancing threatens enterprise computing and internet
operations (Symantec Corporation, 2016). Being able to detect polymorphic,
metamorphic and zero-day malware requires advanced detection techniques that provide
rapid adaptation, scalability and produce low false positive rates (Borojerdi & Abadi,
2013). This results from this study offers an attractive alternative for detecting
polymorphic malware specifically targeting Windows operating systems. This study
performed analysis on over a sample population of 2.5M files. This study assembled a
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single data set containing known malware, known benign and unknown samples,
performing feature extraction and developed a prototype environment for detection that
far exceeded today’s accepted baseline (Amos et al., 2013). This study successfully
demonstrated a feature extraction methodology, a prototype detection environment and
conducted a number of experiments within an accepted testing protocol.
This study developed a unique detection methodology using multidimensional
topological features in a machine learning environment. The ability to extract unique
multidimensional topological features utilizing file properties, static and dynamic
analysis is a new approach for feature extraction. The study uses this information to
develop a quantitative experimental prototype using multidimensional topological data
with machine learning utilizing advanced algorithms. This approach and every
experiment conducted for this study provided ample evidence based on the experimental
dataset delivered improved detection for polymorphic malware far above 81.25%. All
experiments used quantitative methods to provide objective measurements for
experimental results as described by Babbie (2010). Experimental data collection, data
analysis and presentation of results was conducted using standard and accepted
computational techniques (Babbie, 2010). The study was carefully designed and executed
using the SCED testing protocol. The study paid particular attention to assembly of
representative datasets and the execution of the various experiments within the testing
protocol. The testing methodology followed an approach that can easily be reproduced.
All experiments were conducted in a safe environment such that the malware could not
escape and infect the research environment (Rossow, 2013). The experimental prototype
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was designed to assemble, capture, analyze and evaluate results with the rigorous
quantitative evaluation measures discussed by Mohaisen and Alrawi (2015).
The goal of this study was to develop and demonstrate an experimental approach
for improved detection for polymorphic malware that exceeded the effective detection
rate of 81.25% for polymorphic malware (Amos et al., 2013). The experimental
detection rate delivered across all three algorithms exceeded 99.99%. A number of the
experiments (IBK & DLMLP) delivered effective detection results as high as 99.999%.
The lowest effective rate observed through testing 99.43% for MB. The hypothesis for
the study was that detection could be achieved by combining file properties, static and
dynamic analysis features. The study successfully demonstrated through multiple
experiments that multidimensional topological can deliver effective malware detection.
Experimental testing with this dataset delivered effective detection using file properties,
static and dynamic analysis features. This study leveraged the SCED protocol for
performing and documenting various experimental tests. The test results were then
quantitatively examined, evaluated, analyzed and presented testing outcomes. This study
leveraged previous quantitative experiments for supervised machine learning for malware
research (Boro, et al., 2012; Pradesh, 2014) to better understand how multidimensional
topological information can be utilized for malware detection.
The study’s target was to develop an approach that would deliver an effective
detection rate of higher than 81.25% using multidimensional topological data for
malware detection. The developed prototype system performed various feature
extraction and assembled the datasets for training and testing. The study sought to
establish baselines for three advanced cluster algorithms (MB, IBk and DLMLP) and
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then manipulate feature weighting to exceed the target effective rate. In all cases, each
algorithm at baseline testing delivered higher than target detection rates. Additionally,
feature weighting through reduced feature selection and amplified features delivered
substantially better detection performance over baseline results.
Although this study was successful in addressing the research goal there were a
number of important conclusions, implications and recommendations that stemmed from
this research. In terms of conclusions, this study produced three important conclusions: 1)
multidimensional topological features did effectively demonstrate effective malware
detection with machine learning algorithms, 2) advanced algorithms using
multidimensional topological features delivered impressive detection results (MB
(99.985%), IBk (100%) and DLMLP (99.9995%)) and 3) advanced algorithms (IBk and
DLMLP) with reduced or amplified features delivered near perfect (99.9999%) malware
detection results. These three conclusions provide greater insight into how
multidimensional topological can be used to enhance endpoint detection.
There were two major implications from this study. The first implication is that
polymorphic malware targeting Microsoft platforms can be readily detected through
machine learning with multidimensional topological data. This is the first study to
evaluate and successfully demonstrate malware detection using multidimensional
topological data with machine learning. The second implication is that endpoint
protection could potentially be augmented with minimal features (6 or 7) and machine
learning for malware detection. This implication could change or expand how detection
is conducted at the endpoint. Both implications could potentially expand enterprise
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malware detection by commercial security endpoint products as well as network
boundary devices scanning and evaluating executable transport at the network layer.
There are three areas in which additional research was recommended. Two of the
three areas deal with executable functions or Opcodes. This study extracted and studied
over 2M samples through a dynamic analysis process. Leveraging prior research (Bilar,
2007), only the top twelve Op Codes were collected, analyzed and counted. In some
samples, these Op Codes were executed in abnormally high numbers (e.g. ADD nearly
10,000 times). Abnormally high counts may be another indication of maliciousness for
detecting malware. The second area requiring additional research is for two specific Op
Codes: MOV and XCHG. In over 2M samples, using reduced feature selection and data
amplification these two Op Codes were found to provide additional indications of
maliciousness for this dataset. However, additional research would have to be conducted
to understand the nature of both Op Codes for malware and benign samples. The third
research area involves packed executables. This study observed over 25% of the sample
analyzed used either single-layer packed or multi-layer packed executables. Packing
algorithms are commonly used for packing malware and hiding execution routines (Jeong
et al., 2010). Packed executables encode aspects of execution to hide routines so that
dynamic analysis cannot view results. This study did not find a single benign sample that
used multi-layer packing. Therefore, additional research should be conducted to
understand the frequency of single-layer packed and multi-layer packed executables for
malware detection. (Kim & Hong, 2014). (Zhu et al., 2012)
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Appendix A – Advanced Detection Studies
Lead
Author

Year

Study
Type

Dataset

Malware
%

Labeled
Samples

Static
Analysis

Dynamic
Analysis

Park, Y.
(2010)
Shamili, A. S.
(2010,
August).
Sun, X.
(2010)
Wang, Z. H.
(2010, May)
Ye, Y.
(2010).
Caballero, J.
(2011)
Jacob, G.
(2011)
Jang, J.
(2011)
Kolbitsch, C.
(2011)
Rossow, C.
(2011)
Zhang, J.
(2011)
Chen, Y.
(2012)
Eskandari, M.
(2012).
Ghiasi, M.
(2012)

2010

Experiment

200

55%

Yes

Yes

Yes

2010

Quantitative
Experiments

897,922

33%

No

None

None

2010

Experiment

90

67%

Yes

None

Yes

2010

5,223

68%

Yes

Yes

None

2010

Iterative
Experiment
Experiment

50,000

70%

Yes

None

None

2011

Experiment

313,791

Yes

Yes

None

2011

Experiment

37,572

Yes

None

Yes

2011

Experiment

20,000

Not
Specified
Not
Specified
100%

Yes

Yes

Yes

2011

Experiment

Yes

Yes

Experiment

Not
Specified
85%

Yes

2011

Not
Specified
100,000

Yes

Yes

None

2011

Experiment

None

None

Experiment

Not
Specified
60%

Yes

2012

Not
Specified
10,000

Yes

Yes

None

2012

Experiment

956

52%

Yes

Yes

Yes

2012

Experiment

1,211

68%

Yes

None

Yes

Zhuang, W.
(2012)
Borojerdi, H.
R. (2013)
Jha, S. (2013)
Naval, S.
(2013)
Ponomarev,
S. (2013)
Tsuruta, H.
(2013)

2012

Experiment

75,000

78%

Yes

None

None

2013

Experiment

360

67%

Yes

None

Yes

2013
2013

Experiment
Experiment

961
1,296

95%
37%

Yes
Yes

None
Yes

Yes
None

2013

Experiment

1,544

54%

Yes

Yes

None

2013

Experiment

23,234,538

27%

Yes

Yes

None
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Lead
Author

Year

Study
Type

Dataset

Malware
%

Labeled
Samples

Static
Analysis

Dynamic
Analysis

Wang, H. T.,
Wei, T. E., &
Lee, H. M.
(2013)

2013

Experiment

3,000

96%

Yes

Yes

Yes

Xiao, X.
(2013)
Zolotukhin,
M. (2013)
Adebayo,
O.S. (2014)
Dornhackl, H.
(2014)
El Attar, A.
(2014)
Elaziz, P. E.
A. (2014)
Li, J. (2014)

2013

Experiment

3,401

53%

Yes

None

Yes

2013

Experiment

1,089

55%

Yes

Yes

None

2014

1,500

67%

Yes

Yes

None

2014

Empirical
Study
Observation

None

None

Experiment

No

None

None

2014

Experiment

No

None

None

2014

Experiment

No

None

None

Pramono,Y.
W.T. (2014,
August)

2014

Experiment

Not
Specified
Not
Specified
Not
Specified
Not
Specified
Not
Specified

No

2014

Not
Specified
Not
Specified
80,077

No

None

None

Pramono,Y.
W.T. (2014,
September)

2014

Experiment

Not
Specified

Not
Specified

No

None

None

Li, Y.H.
(2015)
Hansen, S.S.
(2016)

2015

Experiment

None

Yes

Experiment

Not
Specified
100%

No

2016

Not
Specified
270,837

Yes

None

Yes

Not
Specified
1,059,419
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Appendix B – Cuckoo Installation and Configuration
Eugene Kolo’s blog - Provided useful information for installing and configuring Cuckoo
(Kolo, 2016).
https://eugenekolo.com/blog/installing-and-setting-up-cuckoo-sandbox/
Installation dependencies for Cuckoo
sudo apt-get install python
sudo apt-get install mongodb
sudo apt-get install g++
sudo apt-get install python-dev python-dpkt python-jinja2 python-magic pythonpymongo
python-gridfs python-libvirt python-bottle python-pefile python-chardet python-pip
sudo apt-get install libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev
sudo pip2 install sqlalchemy yara
sudo pip2 install cybox==2.0.1.4
sudo pip2 install maec==4.0.1.0
sudo pip2 install python-dateutil
sudo apt-get install python-dev libfuzzy-dev
sudo pip2 install pydeep
sudo apt-get install tcpdump # If not installed
# Allow tcpdump to read raw TCP data without root:
sudo setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin=eip /usr/sbin/tcpdump
wget http://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/releases/2.4/volatility-2.4.zip && unzip
volatility-2.4.zip && cd volatility-2.4
sudo python setup.py install
# Install the libraries that volatility wants:
sudo pip2 install distorm3
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Install Cuckoo and Virtual Box
git clone git://github.com/cuckoosandbox/cuckoo.git
wget http://download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/5.0.14/virtualbox-5.0_5.0.14105127~Ubuntu~trusty_i386.deb
sudo dpkg -i virtualbox-5.0_5.0.14-105127~Ubuntu~trusty_i386.deb
sudo apt-get install -f
Networking
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -o eth0 -i vboxnet0 -s 192.168.56.0/24 -m conntrack -ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT;
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j
ACCEPT;
sudo iptables -A POSTROUTING -t nat -j MASQUERADE;
sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1;
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